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Abstract 
 
Sharia has occupied the center of attention to Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike. The term, 
Sharia, in itself, is controversial, sometimes is exaggerated and often misinterpreted. When it 
comes to the different ways in which Sharia is to be applied, we find many suggestions and 
methods emanating from within the Islamic parlance. But such approaches focus, for the most part, 
on the renewal of the Islamic sciences. There is paucity of literature that examines the integration 
of Sharia into the social and, more importantly, legal fabrics of the nation-state. In this thesis, I 
examine the different ways in which Sharia has been applied or proposed to be applied. I examine 
the integrative approach advocated by Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah in institutionalizing collective ijtihād 
and the new classification of maqāṣid, and its role in the new juristic system. 
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1. Introduction 
Application of Sharia has consistently been a highly controversial topic. According to a poll 
reported by Pew research center, a vast population of Muslims in many Muslim majority countries 
firmly believe that Sharia should be applied. However, the surveyed participants expressed their 
concern about aspects regarding Sharia application, e.g. the penal code that includes flogging and 
amputation.1 These concerns resonate with the Western depiction of Sharia in media outlets as 
violent and raise similar concerns with religious minorities and the secular bloc in Muslim majority 
countries. The predilection to apply the Sharia is coupled with various concerns, most notably two: 
content and structure. With regard to content, the question of which doctrinal school should be 
applied and the rigorous approaches to exegesis are among the primary concerns. With regard to 
structure, it has been a laborious task to determine how Sharia would be integrated in the 
institutional structure of the secular nation-state. These concerns, to name a few, have been the 
focus of many debates particularly in the post-colonial period and after the Middle Eastern 
countries have inherited the structure of the nation-state.  
 One instance that reflects the confusion and fear of Sharia application is the ascension of 
Muslim Brotherhood to presidency in Egypt in 2012. I have personally witnessed many 
individuals, family and friends along with public figures, express their deep concern about 
‘Islamization of Egypt.’ Personally, I was baffled by the claims and reactions towards the 
application of Sharia. Through perusal of academic books, one realizes that the contention about 
Sharia application has been around for a while. I became invested in the topic and wondered 
whether it is an ‘impossibility,’ as some Western scholars assume, to apply Sharia in the modern 
                                                           
1 Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and 
Society, 2013, p. 226 <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-2013-2/#>. 
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nation-state and if there is no route to synthesize Sharia and modern life. But before venturing to 
integrate the two concepts, one first needs to understand and unpack such loaded terms. 
Sharia has been the law of the land, in one form or another, until Western modernity 
emerged as a world view. Modernity found its way into Muslim majority countries during the 19th 
century which brought radical changes to everyday life and Sharia. Under the five pillars of 
modernity: “sovereign nation states, science-based technology, bureaucratic rationalization, the 
quest for profit maximization, and secularization,”5/20/2019 1:59:00 PM the jurisdiction of the 
Sharia retracted, and its role was confined to certain aspects in Muslim societies. Such portentous 
impact on the Sharia urged Muslim rulers and scholars to exert their efforts to preserve the Sharia 
vis-à-vis modernity, which resulted in various movements and ideologies seeking to either prove 
the superiority of Sharia and assert its viability in every era, or to bridge the gap between Sharia 
and the nation-state through modernization of Sharia. 
The several movements of revival (iḥyāʿ) and renewal (tajdīd)2 have attempted to introduce 
changes to both the structure and content of Sharia to be more compatible with the secular society. 
These included trends emanating from within the Islamic heritage such as Rashid Rida’s (1865-
1935) call to renovate the practice of legal reasoning (ijtihād), through expanding on the concept 
of public interest (maṣlaḥa), following the footsteps of his teacher Muhammad Abduh (1849-
1905). Other proposals include reinvigoration of Divine Governance (ḥākimiyya) advocated by 
                                                           
2 The terms; iḥyāʿ and tajdīd, are generally used with different nuances in the modern and pre-modern 
periods. For the pre-modern period, they are associated with the Hadith that states, “The Prophet (ﷺ) 
said: Allah will raise for this community at the end of every hundred years the one who will renovate its 
religion for it” (Sunan Abi Dawud 429 Book 39, Hadith 1). In this regard, the mujaddid can be a scholar or 
a political leader. In the modern period; however, the term has become more associated with scholars, 
jurists and intellectuals of religious sciences. The term, in its modern sense, can be traced to multiple 
movements and personas such as Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762), Muhammad Abdel-Wahab (d. 1787), 
Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), and Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938). See: 
'Revival and Renewal.’ 
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Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) and inspired by the writings of the Pakistani intellectual Abul A'la Maududi 
(1903–77). This trend focused on the discourse of renovation of Sharia from within by 
reformulating the content based on the intellectual heritage of Islamic scholars. Another trend in 
the study of Islamic thought is concerned with bridging the gap between positive law and Sharia 
through codification. A prominent scholar heading this trend is Abd el-Razzak al-Sanhuri (b. 1895 
- d. 1971) in his seminal works, which include al-Wasīṭ fī sharḥ al-qānūn al-madanī al-jadīd 
(Medium Commentary on the New Civil Code) and Masādir al-haqq fi al-fiqh al-Islamī (Sources 
of Legal Right in Islamic Jurisprudence), among other publications. Al-Sanhuri tried to reconcile 
the differences between fiqh (jurisprudence) and positive law relying on his long legal experience 
in Western law.3  
This raises the question of why al-Sanhuri is not an integral part of the discussion. I concur 
that al-Sanhuri attempted to traverse the limitations of Sharia codification in many of his 
publications, but he falls short in some venues that are critical to the discussion. First, al-Sanhuri 
is certainly knowledgeable about Islamic law and its legal methodology which is evident from his 
discussion in Masādir al-haqq fi al-fiqh al-Islamī but to what extent is this knowledge shown in 
the legal codes. The answer is: only to a limited extent. In a discussion on codes developed or 
supervised by al-Sanhuri we find al-Bishri, a renowned legal scholar and former judge in the 
Egyptian system arguing that “the rules taken from Sharia were of limited scope . . . and many of 
these had been in the old code.”4 Moreover, the approach followed by al-Sanhuri was not focused 
                                                           
3 Enid Hill, ‘Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work 
of ’Abd Al-Razzaq Ahmad Al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971 [Part II]’, Arab Law 
Quarterly, 3.2 (1988), 182 (p. 202) <https://doi.org/10.2307/3381872>. 
4 Enid Hill, ‘Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work 
of ’Abd Al-Razzaq Ahmad Al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971’, Arab Law Quarterly, 3.1 
(1988), 33–64 (p. 186) <https://doi.org/10.2307/3381741>. 
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on “connecting Islamic jurisprudence with religion.”5 Hence, al-Sanhuri and his works are more 
relevant to a discussion on comparing Sharia to modern legal systems and the production of legal 
systems based on the ‘ethos and essence’ of Sharia rather than a discussion on transforming ijtihād 
into a legal apparatus and maqāṣid into public policies in the machinery of the nation-state. 
On a similar note, this thesis does not examine the entirety of calls for renewal (tajdīd) of 
fiqh but focuses on renewal attempts with proposals related to the legal structure of the nation-
state. Hence, prominent figures in Islamic jurisprudence, such as Qaradawi (b. 1926), are not 
thoroughly investigated. For instance, we find Qaradawi has written over one hundred publications 
in many fields ranging from Islamic jurisprudence, activism, reform of contemporary society, and 
minorities.6 Qaradawi’s scholarly knowledge is primarily focused on social activism and renewal 
of fiqh from the inside, which is similar to ʻAṭīya. But Qaradawi does not venture to examine 
methods of integrating the fiqh tradition with the modern legal system of the nation-state.  
The discussion on Sharia and modernity was not limited to Islamic scholars and 
intellectuals but included Western intellectuals and academics. In their study of the relationship 
between Sharia and modernity academics have researched the topic from different perspectives. 
For instance, Wael Hallaq contends that applying the Sharia “is both an impossibility and a 
contradiction.”7 Whereas other scholars argue in favor of a possible fusion between Sharia and 
modern legislation as long as it is in “service of the public good.”8 Similar to this approach is An-
                                                           
5 Hill, ‘Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of 
’Abd Al-Razzaq Ahmad Al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971’, p. 209. 
6 John L. Esposito and Emad Eldin Shahin, The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics (New York, NY : 
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 225. 
7 Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012), p.7. 
<http://ezproxy.library.arizona.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=nlebk&AN=619713&site=ehost-live>. 
8 Asifa Qurashi-Landes, ‘The Sharia Problem with Sharia Legislation.(Carhart Memorial Symposium)’, 
Ohio Northern University Law Review, 41.3 (2015), 545–66 (p. 559). 
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Naʿim’s argument in which he contends that “the state, and not society, [ought] to be secular” 
which “is intended to enhance and promote genuine religious observance, to affirm, nurture, and 
regulate the role of Islam in the public life of the community.”9 An-Naʿim complicates the 
relationship between the secular and religious by arguing that coexistence is achievable. An-Naʿim 
advocates for “an alternative vision to perceptions of secularism and the secular state that many 
Muslims find objectionable.”10 Others contend that the relationship is further complicated after the 
nation-state has appropriated the authority of legislation from jurists which resulted in the Sharia 
being applied through legislation rather than classical fiqh books. Thus, the Sharia has “become 
part of a great number of national legal systems…[and] codification was not only a means to 
ascertain state control over the law and to facilitate the finding of the law for judges, but also as 
an instrument of reform.”11  
One recent, and under-researched, scholar to address the relationship between Sharia and 
the modern nation-state is Jamal al-Din ʻAṭīya (1928-2017). ʻAṭīya is an Egyptian scholar with a 
degree in Islamic law, and also taught it, and a Ph.D. in modern law and practiced it for some time, 
a biographical background will be provided in chapter 3. Then the question arises of what are the 
contributions of ʻAṭīya to the discussion on Sharia and modernity? ʻAṭīya contributes to the 
discussion through two complementary proposals: a new classification for the ultimate objectives 
of the Sharia (maqāṣid) and a new proposal to amalgamate ijtihād and consensus (ijmāʿ) into a 
state-operated institution. The new classification for maqāṣid expands on the implementation of 
maqāṣid from their traditional division of five essentials, “which consists of preserving five vital 
                                                           
9 ʻAbd Allāh Aḥmad Naʻīm, Islam and the Secular State Negotiating the Future of Shariʻa (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 1. 
10 Naʻīm, p. 267. 
11 Rudolph Peters, ‘From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a Is Codified’, 
Mediterranean Politics, 7.3 (2002), 82–95 (p. 92). 
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goods, called the five necessities (al-ḍarūrāt al-khamsah): religion (dīn), life (nafs), intellect 
(ʿaql), offspring/lineage (nasl), and property (māl).”12 According to ʻAṭīya’s new classification, 
maqāṣid are divided into four realms: the individual, the family, the Umma (Muslim society) and 
all of humanity. Under each realm ʻAṭīya attempts to formulate a set of maqāṣid that can take the 
form of public policies and that are “informed by religious considerations.”13 These public policies, 
I presume, will be the guiding principles for the Ijtihād Institution to operate efficiently within the 
boundaries of Sharia. Moreover, ʻAṭīya proposes that collective ijtihād, which was present at the 
early period of Islam, takes an institutional form. By institutionalizing collective ijtihād ʻAṭīya 
relies on the legitimacy of both consensus (ijmāʿ) and ijtihād, as Islamic methods for formulating 
a legal opinion, and the institutional nature of nation-state entities. By the institutional legitimacy 
ʻAṭīya means that ulū al-amr (lit. those vested with authority), the ruler in a modern context, can 
regulate and impose the opinions generated by the Ijtihād Institution.14 In that sense, the ijtihād of 
the Institution is legally, socially and religiously binding. In chapter three, we will investigate this 
process in more detail. Despite the significance of ʻAṭīya’s research, there is a dearth in scholarly 
discussion on the ways in which his proposal can bridge the gap between Sharia and the nation-
state or a comprehensive evaluation of his project. Therefore, this thesis attempts to fill in this gap. 
Since my main concern in this thesis is to examine the viability of proposals to apply 
Sharia, I investigate the different approaches that have been produced to integrate Sharia into 
society. However, we need to highlight the criteria employed to select the different approaches. 
First, Sharia and its related sciences, fiqh, uṣūl and ijtihād, are key components to this process as 
                                                           
12 Felicitas Opwis, ‘Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿah’, In The [Oxford] Encyclopedia of Islam and Law. Oxford Islamic 
Studies Online <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t349/e0113>. 
13 Opwis, ‘Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿah’. 
14 Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah, Al-Naẓariyah Al-ʿammah Lil-Shariʿah Al-Islamiyah, 1st edn (Matbaʿet Al-Madina 
Al-Munawarah, 1988), p. 195. 
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they constitute the religious aspect of the equation. Second, the attempts have to engage the nation-
state and its legal system, either through codification as in chapter 1 or through employing juristic 
tools such as analogy (qiyās) as in chapter 2 and 3. Therefore, we have excluded the attempts of 
prominent individuals such as al-Sanhuri and al-Qaradawi, for the reasons highlighted earlier. 
This thesis is composed of three chapters, each chapter highlighting a specific approach. 
The first chapter explores Sharia codification. It analyzes the major challenges in Sharia 
codification through examining three major attempts. Such attempts include: the Anglo-
Muhammadan law, the Mecelle, and Mashrūʻ taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah (Sharia 
Codification Project). Each of these projects offer a fresh perspective and a unique context. First, 
the Anglo-Muhammadan Law is a product of a colonial system that relies heavily on textual 
interpretation of custom and religion. Second, the Mecelle is a product of the tanẓīmāt period under 
the Ottoman Empire, an Islamic regime, at least in theory. The most recent attempt to codify Sharia 
is Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah conducted by Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah 
(Islamic Research Academy), al-Azhar affiliated institute, in 1970s. This project is a proposal to 
replace the civil law with Sharia in the context of a modern nation-state. In the first chapter, I argue 
that these attempts could not establish a balance between Sharia and modernity. The attempts 
proposed to codify the Sharia following a specific approach, however, they fall short in various 
aspects. Drawbacks include a structural one; rigidity in application, and a theoretical one 
represented in lack of a section on ‘General Principles’ which is significant in the body of positive 
law. The theoretical apparatus of these attempts was rather limited, or completely absent, which 
affects their viability as laws. This will be contrasted with ʻAṭīya’s proposal for suggesting a new 
methodology for objectives (maqāṣid). Furthermore, ʻAṭīya’ advocates for a compromise between 
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common law and the concept of precedent and civil law and its regulating articles, through 
proposing the establishment of the Ijtihād Institution, which will be discussed in chapter three. 
The second chapter examines an additional method for applying Sharia through re-adapting 
some of the legal tools employed by scholars to conduct ijtihād. Therefore, I investigate ijtihād as 
a basis for legal reform. Understanding the role of ijtihād and the ways in which different scholars 
have approached this topic will enable us to better comprehend ʻAṭīya’s project for renewing 
ijtihād and to evaluate the viability of his approach. Thus, I divide the chapter into three main 
sections. The first section is significant because it denotes the main components and conditions of 
ijtihād, which will give us an insight to the extent of change the modern scholars are proposing. 
The chapter proceeds to examine the general trends for ijtihād in the modern period. It aims to 
provide an overview of the different models for interpreting ijtihād. This classification will help 
us, later on, understand where ʻ Aṭīya’s model fits within the larger spectrum of renewal and reform 
in the modern period. The third section narrows down our research to the different trends of 
integrating ijtihād into the legal structure of the modern nation-state. The research is limited to 
three concepts: analogy (qiyās), consensus (ijmāʿ) and public interest (maṣlaḥa), as they are the 
most relevant to ʻAṭīya’s work and renewal model. 
The third chapter investigates ʻAṭīya’s project for consolidating ijtihād and consensus 
(ijmāʿ) into a state institution that is responsible for legislation, and renewal of objectives of Sharia 
(maqāṣid). It examines ʻAṭīya’s approach in transforming the five essential elements: “religion 
(dīn), life (nafs), intellect (ʿaql), offspring/lineage (nasl), and property (māl),”15  into four realms: 
the individual, the family, the Umma and humanity. In this chapter we explore ʻAṭīya’s model for 
attempting to incorporate ijtihād and maqāṣid into the structure of the nation-state. I argue that 
                                                           
15 Opwis, ‘Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿah’. 
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ʻAṭīya may not have provided a solution or a method through which we can plausibly argue in 
favor of Sharia application, but he proposes a theoretical approach that is cognizant of the internal 
institutional structure of the nation-state. ʻAṭīya’s approach, whether the ijtihād or maqāṣid, keeps 
in mind the nation-state as a fact that Sharia has to merge with rather than overrule. ʻAṭīya offers 
a possible synthesis between ijtihād and the modern legal structure that takes the form of the Ijtihād 
Institution, then proceeds to highlight the relationship between this Institution and judiciary and 
executive bodies. Furthermore, ʻAṭīya is mindful of the complexity of codification; therefore, he 
suggests a method through which the Ijtihād Institution will play a role in legislating general 
guidelines for judiciary to facilitate its adjudication. 
1.1. Points of Reference 
Before we begin the discussion, I realize that we need to highlight few points. First, we need to 
draw a distinction between some terms that are essential to the discussion to avoid any confusion. 
The terms include Sharia, fiqh, uṣūl and ijtihād. Moreover, in this section we will denote what this 
thesis is not about to guard the reader against building up unfulfilled expectations. 
 Scholars have provided multiple definitions of Sharia to highlight its nature and 
characteristics. The term ‘Sharia’ means, lexically, “way” or “path” and refers to “God’s Law” 
which denotes the ideal way for Muslims to behave and interact in this world. Proponents and 
critics of Sharia application seem to presume that Sharia is “a set of religious rules that a Muslim 
government must legislate and enforce” which can convey the idea that an Islamic government 
should necessarily be theocratic.16 In classical texts, Sharia is defined as “[t]he rules given by God 
to His servants as set forth by one of the prophets (may God bless them and grant them 
                                                           
16 Qurashi-Landes, ‘The Sharia Problem with Sharia Legislation. (Carhart Memorial Symposium)’, p. 547. 
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salvation).”17 Peters argues that Sharia has two main features that make its religious character 
distinct: the basis of Sharia’s validity is God’s will and it “contains rules of a purely religious 
character.”18 Other scholars define Sharia in the legal context as “God’s eternal and immutable 
law—the way of truth, virtue, and justice. In essence, Shari‘ah is the ideal law in an objective and 
noncontingent sense, as it ought to be in the divine’s realm.”19 
Sharia is the overarching principle with general rules that are directly stated in the Scripture 
(Qur’an and Sunnah) but if the Scripture is finite and contains a limited number of rules and 
principles, then one may ask where do all the regulations come from? To answer this question, we 
move on to the next term; that is ‘fiqh.’ Fiqh is the rigorous interpretation by Muslim scholars of 
Qur’an and Hadith to “extrapolate detailed legal rules covering many aspects of Muslim life, from 
how to pray and avoid sin to making contracts and writing a will.”20 A misuse of the term ‘fiqh’ 
occurs when it is used to add Divine legitimacy to the legal opinions, however, “[f]iqh scholars 
have always been acutely aware that, although the object of their work is God's Law, they do not-
and cannot-speak for God.”21 The question arises of what is the methodology for inferring the rules 
from the Divine Scripture? This question drives us to uṣūl al-fiqh (roots of law). Uṣūl can be 
defined as a “legal theory that laid down the principles of linguistic–legal interpretation, theory of 
abrogation (naskh), consensus and juristic reasoning, among others.”22 Uṣūl is the realm of 
principles and methodologies for developing rules from the Divine Scripture. Uṣūl examines “the 
                                                           
17 Peters, ‘From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a Is Codified’, p. 82. 
18 Rudolph Peters, ‘From Jurists’ Law to Statue Law or What Happens When the Shari’a Is Codified.’, 
Mediterranean Politics, 7.3 (2002), 82–96 (p. 83). 
19 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Reasoning with God: Reclaiming Shari’ah in the Modern Age (Lanham, Maryland : 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), p. xxxii. 
20 Asifa Qurashi-Landes, ‘The Sharia Problem with Sharia Legislation. (Carhart Memorial Symposium)’, 
Ohio Northern University Law Review, 41.3 (2015), 545–66 (p. 548). 
21 Asifa Qurashi-Landes, ‘The Sharia Problem with Sharia Legislation. (Carhart Memorial Symposium)’, 
Ohio Northern University Law Review, 41.3 (2015), 545–66 (p. 548). 
22 Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 2005, p. 210. 
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four sources of the law—the Quran, Hadith, consensus (ijmāʿ), and analogical reasoning (qiyās)—
to provide structures for interpreting revelation.” 23 This brings us to the last term; ijtihād which 
can be defined as “a process of legal reasoning and hermeneutics through which the jurist-mujtahid 
derives or rationalizes law on the basis of the Quran and the Sunna; during the early period, the 
exercise of one’s discretionary opinion (raʾy) on the basis of ʿilm (q.v.).”24 Ijtihād is the process of 
synthesizing fiqh and uṣūl to produce legal rules, which is defined by Abu Zahra (1898 – 1974) in 
his book, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, as “exerting the utmost effort to infer, and/or apply, al-aḥkām Sharʿiyya 
[Sharia ordinances].”25 This brief overview should aid the reader in following up with the 
discussion in coming chapters. 
It should be noted that while this thesis is concerned with application of Sharia in modern 
society, it falls entirely within the Sunni tradition for a few reasons. The Shi’i tradition, and within 
that general term a few factions can be discerned such as Zaydī and Twelvers among others, are 
markedly different from Sunni tradition in areas such as ijtihād, closing of the doors of ijtihād, 
primary sources of inference and legal methodology. These marked differences demand a separate 
research project and an independent treatment; hence, the legislative system in countries where 
Shi’ism is the dominant narrative will be excluded. 
1.2. Sharia and Modernity  
A conceptual investigation of the divergence between Sharia and modernity,26 and its by-products, 
e.g. the secular nation-state, is foundational to the discussion. Thus, this section highlights the 
                                                           
23 John L. Esposito, ‘Islamic Law’, 2004. 
24 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 208. 
25 Muhammad Abū Zahra, Uṣūl Al-Fiqh (dar el-fikr el-arabi, 1958), p. 379. 
26 It is difficult to identify exactly when the advent of modernity started but it can be traced back to the 
publications of Descartes, e.g. Discourse on Methods, and other works of 17th century authors. Tracing the 
discourse of modernity, when it started, and its evolving principles are not within the scope of this study. 
Nonetheless, for further reading on the rise of modernity, refer to ‘Islamic Law and Modernity’ by Rawaa 
El Ayoubi Gebara where the author provides a brief depiction of the birth and development of modernity 
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major and critical differences between Sharia and modernity then narrows down the discussion to 
the main discrepancies with regard to the legal system of the nation-state compared to Sharia.27  
The issue of Sharia compatibility with the modern nation-state is a contentious one that has 
been explored by many scholars. One prominent scholar with multiple publications on Islamic 
law, Sharia and modernity is Hallaq. In his seminal book titled The Impossible State: Islam, 
Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament, Hallaq presents his argument about the 
impossibility of Sharia application within the structure of the nation-state, as one of the main by-
products of modernity. In the introductory section we find Hallaq clearly stating his claim: “The 
‘Islamic state,’ judged by any standard definition of what the modern state represents, is both an 
impossibility and a contradiction in terms.”28 Hallaq’s claim rests on two main pillars: morality 
and the structure of the nation-state, particularly with respect to the legal system. Hallaq bolsters 
his account through an investigation of the historical rise of the modern state and compares it to 
Sharia-based ruling, which he calls “paradigmatic Islamic governance.” Hallaq enumerates five 
principal attributes of the modern state: “(1) its constitution as a historical experience that is fairly 
specific and local; (2) its sovereignty and the metaphysics to which it has given rise; (3) its 
legislative monopoly and the related feature of monopoly over so-called legitimate violence; (4) 
its bureaucratic machinery; and (5) its cultural hegemonic engagement in the social order, 
                                                           
and Hallaq’s Sharia: Theory, Practice, Transformation – The Sweep of Modernity in which the author tackles 
the conceptual framework of modernity, its core principals and how it came to influence the Sharia. 
27 For an examination of the cultural and social impact of modernity, refer to Part III of Hallaq’s Sharia: 
Theory, Practice, Transformation, where he examines the transformation in the episteme and structure of 
Islamic law in different social contexts and their impact on the culture and society. Other works include 
Abdullahi An-Na’im’s book entitled Islam and the Secular State, Negotiating the Future of Sharia’ where he 
discusses the public role of Sharia and how it can be accommodated in a secular context. Further works 
include Khaled Abou El Fadl’s Reasoning with God: Reclaiming Shari’ah in the Modern Age, where he 
examines the role of colonial powers in disconnecting the Muslims from their heritage and rise of 
puritanical approaches to exegesis. 
28 Wael B. Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament, Paperback 
edition (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 1. 
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including its production of the national subject.”29 These five attributes boost the formulation of 
“state subject” which creates “a personality that cannot rest on or be shaped by spirituality…[and 
the] distinction here is between rationality and practical ethics.”30  
Hallaq contrasts the portrait of the historical analysis of the modern state and its 
constituents with the paradigmatic Sharia. Sharia is an organic blend that Hallaq restates as 
category of governance that “ was not only about law, morality, and their organic confluence; it 
was also and equally about a mystical perception of the world, a perception deeply anchored in a 
society—represented by a class of mystics-cum-jurists — that did not distinguish, in the practice 
of living, between the meanings of the legal, the moral, and the mystical.”31 However, Hallaq’s 
argument falls short in some aspects. 
Hallaq ventures to compare a pre-modern version of Sharia that is juristic-based with the 
modern nation-state and its institutional machinery. Hence, we find limited literature on modern 
intellectuals who discuss methods to synthesize Sharia and modernity, e.g. Iqbal and Turabi, or to 
renovate the pillars of Sharia to better suit the contemporary needs, e.g. Qaradawi. The significance 
of the proposals advanced by these scholars and intellectuals is that they situate Sharia in the 
modern context while attempting to preserve the ‘moral’ and ‘spiritual’ dimensions. Moreover, 
Hallaq contends that “the sultan possessed no real sovereignty,”32 except for mainly controlling 
the tools for violence. This is contrasted by the view of many jurists who acknowledged the right 
of the ruler to assign a specific legal opinion to be the dominant norm. This view occurs in the 
context of Sharia-based policy (Siyasa Shar’iyya), as argued by many scholars including al-
                                                           
29 Hallaq, p. 26. 
30 Hallaq, p. 79. 
31 Hallaq, p. 98. 
32 Hallaq, p. 53. 
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Qarāfī.33 This view has been adopted by modern scholars, e.g. ʻAṭīyah, in their endeavor to 
understand some of the ways in which Sharia could operate within the modern state, rather than 
replacing it. 
A critical difference is the source of legitimacy. Sharia relies on the Qur’an as God’s 
revelation to the Prophet (PBUH) and after his death Muslims collected reports of his sayings, 
actions and exemplary behavior which constitute the “foundation of its validity.”34 Whereas 
modernity manifested in different ways but mainly rested on five pillars: “sovereign nation states, 
science-based technology, bureaucratic rationalization, the quest for profit maximization, and 
secularization.”35 Sovereignty of the nation-state and secularization demanded a unified code of 
legislation which resulted eventually in “‘legal centralism’ or ‘legal monism,’ according to which 
all law is and should be state-sponsored law, which is uniform and equally applied to all citizens 
across the board.”36 The source of such a unified code is no longer divinity or the church but 
mankind. When the project of modernity was introduced, this conflict of human code vis-à-vis 
divine code posed a significant conundrum. 
 Moreover, the Sharia is concerned with regulating two relationships; the relationship 
between individuals and God, and the relationship among members of the society (by means of 
fiqh) through “the creation and extinction of rights and obligations…[t]his is done by classifying 
them [actions] into five categories (obligatory, commendable, indifferent, reprehensible and 
forbidden) indicating their effects as far as rewards and punishment are concerned.”37 This 
                                                           
33 Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah, Al-Naẓariyah Al-ʿammah Lil-Shariʿah Al-Islamiyah, 1st edn (Matbaʿet Al-Madina 
Al-Munawarah, 1988), p. 195. 
34 Peters, From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a Is Codified, p. 83. 
35 Karčić, p. 212. 
36 Sherman A. Jackson, Islamic Reform between Islamic Law and the Nation-State (Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p. 44 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195395891.013.004>. 
37 Peters, ‘From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a Is Codified’, p. 83. 
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characterization marks the behavior of a ‘good Muslim’ who shall be rewarded in this life and the 
Hereafter. Whereas, secularization of the nation-state does not rely on the concept of ‘The 
Hereafter’ and focuses primarily on the model of an ideal citizen abiding by state-issued 
legislations. In other words, “the modern state emerged to marginalize religious prejudice (and 
loyalty) and secure societal peace and order by monopolizing the means of violence. In effect, this 
constituted a transfer of ultimate authority and loyalty (and according to some a sense of the holy) 
from the Church to the state.”38 These points mark the practice and jurisdiction of Sharia and the 
secular nation-state, notably a unified legislative system through codification. 
 Additionally, a critical distinction between fiqh and modern codification is uniformity. The 
exegesis of Sharia by jurists does not provide a uniform system of laws. Fiqh developed into a 
number of doctrinal schools each following a legal reasoning process that differ from one school 
to another. This variation of opinions started as “differences in opinion that resulted in the 
emergence of different schools of jurisprudence (madhhab, plu. madhāhib), that ascribed their 
doctrines to and derived their names from famous jurists from the eighth and ninth centuries. 
Controversies did not only exist between these schools but also among the jurists of one single 
school, even on essential legal issue.”39 This legal plurality is a marked attribute of fiqh. On the 
other hand, the modern nation-state is distinguished by ‘legal monism’ which imposes a state-
sponsored law on all citizens. 
 In brief, the major differences between Sharia and modernity, and the nation-state as its 
main by-product, can be summarized as: the question of morality, legitimacy and its source, and 
the legal structure and practice (legal centrality vis-à-vis multiplicity of opinion in ijtihād). These 
key differences have reduced the influence of Sharia in the context of the nation-state, which has 
                                                           
38 Jackson, pp. 44–45. 
39 Peters, ‘From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a Is Codified’, p. 84. 
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taken a number of ways: collapse of the financial support foundations (waqf) that boosted the 
juristic practices, gradual displacement of jurists with modern lawyers and judges, replacement of 
Sharia courts with modern courts, replacement of or supplementing fiqh-based laws with modern 
laws.40 This has urged the Muslims scholars and intellectuals to propose some of the ways to 
consolidate these major differences in hope to implement Sharia in a modern context. The question 
which arises here is ‘what are the ways in which ʻAṭīya’s proposal offer a response in relation to 
these challenges?’ I contend that ʻAṭīya’s proposal clarifies some of the aspects about the 
opposition between the Sharia and nation-state. One major area is the concern about morality and 
how the nation-state takes a position contradictory to Sharia. According to ʻAṭīya, the division of 
maqāṣid into four realms; the individual, the family, the Umma and humanity, attempts to show 
us how maqāṣid can be formulated to respond to individual as well as collective issues of morality 
in society. Another major area is legal centrality of the positive law compared to the pluralism of 
ijtihād to which ʻAṭīya responds by suggesting the Ijtihād Institution and its operating mechanism. 
These proposals may not necessarily ‘provide a solution’ to the apparent opposition articulated by 
Hallaq and other scholars, but it provides a new framework for ijtihād and maqāṣid and some of 
the ways in which they can be integrated, which shows us some aspects that were ambivalent. 
  
                                                           
40 Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʻa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, UK, 2009), p. 
500. 
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Chapter I: Limitations of Sharia Codification 
The previous section discussed the ways in which Sharia and modern legal systems differ, notably 
in the legal structure of the nation-state. This chapter further investigates this relationship through 
examination of attempts to codify Sharia. The nation-state has become entrenched in many aspects 
of life in Muslim majority countries, therefore Muslim political thinkers and intellectuals have 
become more focused on “how the nation-state can or should be made Islamic” than to establish 
an Islamic caliphate.41 From such tendency to integrate Sharia arises a number of challenges and 
limitations. Thus, this chapter begins with a discussion on the attributes of modern legal systems 
to evaluate the viability of Sharia codification attempts based on these attributes.42 Then, the 
chapter proceeds to analyze three prominent attempts for Sharia codification: the Anglo-
Muhammadan Law, the Mecelle and Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah ʻalá al-Madhahib 
al-Arbaʻa (Sharia Codification Project based on the Methodology of the Four Doctrinal Sunni 
Schools). I examine how each codification project followed a certain approach to traverse the 
divergences between Sharia and positive law and the challenges and limitations of each attempt. 
First, the Anglo-Muhammadan Law which represents an early attempt by the British colonial 
powers to codify the Sharia in accordance with the Ḥanafī law. Second is the Mecelle in the context 
of the Ottoman Empire which presents an Islamic context under the influence of Western colonial 
powers. Third is Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah ʻalá al-Madhahib al-Arbaʻa (Sharia 
Codification Project based on the Methodology of the Four Doctrinal Sunni Schools) conducted 
                                                           
41 Jackson, p. 43. 
42 It is important to note that this is not to argue that Sharia or Islamic law are lower in status or viability. 
But the Muslim countries have inherited the structure of the nation-state from the colonial European 
powers and it has become integrated in all venues of life. It has become exceedingly difficult to abandon 
this structure; therefore, one possible response is to attempt to codify Sharia on the mold of positive law 
to fit in the modern structure. Prominent scholars, e.g. Asifa Quraishi-Landes, contend that these calls for 
integration have been devastating to the main core features of Sharia: 1) fiqh pluralism and 2) non-
theocratic siyasa rule. See Asifa Quraishi-Landes, ‘The Sharia Problem with Sharia Legislation.’ 
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by Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah (Islamic Research Academy). I argue that while each of these 
attempts provide an original and a unique approach towards Sharia codification, they entail content 
and structural drawbacks. There are a number of issues with these codes that range from 
employment of incorrect translations and resemblance to fiqh books in a manner that impedes their 
application by non-jurist judges, emphasis on textuality and lack of an efficacious section on 
general principles, which is a significant element in modern civil law, as will be discussed later. 
These are some of the limitations identified in the discussed codes, which provide a precursor to 
the challenges that face and will face any future attempts towards Sharia codification. This 
prompted modern Muslims scholars and intellectuals, such as ʻAṭīya, to formulate basis for 
theories and legislative models with the objective of surmounting these challenges. 
Certainly, there are other limitations that can be discerned in the aforementioned codes, but for 
the sake of this thesis an emphasis will be directed to content and organizational factors to which 
ʻAṭīya discusses. ʻAṭīya responded to the question of lack of general principles through his 
proposal to renew objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid) as public policies. In his proposal, ʻAṭīya 
contended that there is a dire need to reconstruct maqāṣid structurally and thematically to cope 
with the needs of modern legal systems. Additionally, he responds to the lack of competent 
judiciary by advocating for an amalgamation of ijtihād and ijmāʿ (consensus) in the form of a 
legislature which will be responsible for both issuing laws and supervising regulations. 
1. Functionality of Positive Laws 
In order to evaluate the extent to which these codes managed, or failed, to operate as positive laws, 
one has to be familiar with what the term ‘positive law’ entails. Thus, this section highlights the 
structure, organization and content of positive laws in hope to provide the criteria according to 
which one could evaluate the three attempts. 
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 Mainly, positive legal systems fall into one of two categories; civil law and common law.43 
This thesis will focus on the features of civil law.44 The basis of a civil law is legislation where 
large areas of the law take the form of a code and follows a systematic manner. Moreover, a key 
feature is “importance attached to the preparatory works and the draftsmen's comments, as well as 
the parliamentary discussions in connection [to] its initial formulation.”45 Civil law can be 
summarized as follows: 
A civil code is a book which contains the laws that regulate relationships between individuals. 
Generally, it contains the following topics: persons and the family, things and ownership, 
successions donations, matrimonial property regimes, obligations and contracts, civil 
responsibility, sale, lease, and special contracts, as well as liberative prescription (statute of 
limitations) and acquisitive prescription (adverse possession). A code is not a list of special 
rules for particular situations; it is, rather, a body of general principles carefully ranged and 
closely integrated. A code achieves the highest level of genralization based upon a scientific 
structure of classification. A code purports to be comprehensive and to encompass the entire 
                                                           
43 Generally, legal systems aim to regulate the relationship between individuals in a community. A legal 
system can be referred to as a “living organism” which grows and develops as part of the society. There 
are two main legal systems in modern societies: civil law and common law. Succinctly, the main 
differences between the two systems are: basis and source; role of judiciary and lawyers; and 
methodology for adjudication. For further discussion on the difference between civil law and common 
law, see: Joseph Dainow, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison’, The American 
Journal of Comparative Law, 15.3 (1966), 419 <https://doi.org/10.2307/838275>. 
44 I opt for civil law over common law for two main reasons. First, the focus of this study is to examine the 
viability of Sharia-based legal systems within Muslim majority countries (as they will be more inclined 
towards Sharia application). Since the legal system within a majority of these countries follows the civil 
law system, it would be more apt to analyze the civil law. Secondly, the three attempts to codify the Sharia 
follow the example of the civil law in terms of organization and content. For example, the Anglo-
Muhammadan Law was based on al-hedāya (fiqh book) and fatāwā Alamgiri as a body of legal rules since 
the British officials did not have the required knowledge to issue or follow the example of judicial 
decisions of Muslims scholars. Therefore, the outcome was a body of legal rules rather than abstract 
decisions. Moreover, both the Mecelle and Mashrūʻ taqnīn were following the example of French codes 
prevalent at that time. Also, the structure of the two codes were based on a body of legal rules than 
precedents. 
45 Dainow, p. 421. 
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subject matter, not in the details but in the principles, and to provide answers questions which 
may arise. 
In other words, the civil law is a well-structured body of regulations drafted by legal experts (a 
legislature) and reviewed by another body for approval, e.g. a parliament in a modern context. The 
court system plays a crucial role in the interpretation46 of the rules of law and the judges are not 
bound to follow previous judicial decisions (precedents). As can be seen, the body of a civil law 
is thematically organized with a dedicated section on general principles that can generate further 
regulations. 
A code is not detailed but comprehensive in its principles that purport to respond to 
individual cases. The hierarchy of using the resources commonly starts with the body of laws or 
other pertinent legislation, then it considers the commentators and the treatises, and only in third 
place the judge will refer to cases for consideration and evaluation.47 This signifies the crucial role 
of the judge and court system in the adjudication process. It is important to note that the language 
of the civil law is authoritative, concise and provide unequivocal provisions. For example, the 
Egyptian Civil Law of 1948 comes in 1149 articles with clear and concise language that can be, 
for the most part, understood by the layman. An example of this is article 4 that states, “A person 
who uses his right in a lawful manner shall not be responsible for any harm arising therefrom.” In 
this example, the language is clear and does not entail ambivalence or contradictory opinions that 
were markedly observed in fiqh books.48   
                                                           
46 In the legal tradition there are two main approaches to the interpretation of a legal text; textualism and 
intentionalism. For further analysis between the two approaches, see: Siegel, 'The Inexorable 
Radicalization of Textualism’; Nelson, ‘What is Textualism?’; and Fisher III, ‘Texts and Contexts: The 
Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History.’ 
47 Dainow, p. 430. 
48 Peters, ‘From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the Shari’a Is Codified’, p. 89. 
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In civil law, the judge is not bound to follow previous adjudications or judicial decisions, 
thus they are entitled to interpret the legal text in response to the case. Therefore, competence in 
interpreting the civil law starts with legal education. In civil law systems, an emphasis is placed 
upon legislation, codification and doctrine. The legislation formulates the starting point to a viable 
interpretation of the law. Thus, the educational process, for students of civil law, starts with a study 
of codes and textbooks. The learner is taught about the Justinian codifications and their impact on 
modern legal systems. Moreover, they are trained to employ general principles and how to think 
in abstractions.49 In case of legislative vacuum in civil law, the judge is entitled to fill in gaps 
through means of interpretation, analogy and/or recourse to general principles. Primarily, the judge 
interacts with the body of written law through the pertinent general principles or the bases of a 
reasoning by analogy. For instance, in Germany the tradition dictates that the judge fills the gap 
through use of customary law or resorting to general principles.50 Thus, it can be discerned that the 
general principles play a significant role in the construction of the civil law.  
General principles can be identified as “legal principles derived from consolidated branches 
of law, such as private law, and from law in general. In this manner, the legal principles fill the 
gap left by the absence of specific legal rules applicable to the issue at stake.” It plays cardinal 
roles to enhance and interpret legal rules and bolster the legal reasoning process underlying legal 
decisions.51 The general principles serve as the foundation of any legal construction. At times, a 
legal issue cannot be adjudicated due to the absence of specific legal rules. Hence, the general 
                                                           
49 Dainow, p. 429. 
50 Dainow, pp. 430–35. 
51 F.O. Raimondo, ‘General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and 
Tribunals’, ed. by P.A. Nollkaemper, de Wet E., and [unknown], 2007, p. 7. 
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principles have full applicability, “being valid for the entire system of law, while others are 
applicable only to private law or public law or to a certain branch of the law.”52 
 It is significant to note that the difference in generality between the rule of law and the 
general principles is that “a rule of law is general because it is applicable to an indefinite number 
of acts and facts, however, in relation to some of them, it can have a special characteristic. On the 
contrary, a principle is general, in what concerns an indefinite series of applications.”53 In other 
words, the general principles are more general but pertinent to the application of the law, e.g. penal, 
civil or commercial, and mainly facilitate the function of the judge to revert back to in case of legal 
vacuum or further emphasis regarding a legal issue. For example, the Egyptian Civil Law no. 131 
of 1948, the first chapter is entitled ‘Preliminary Chapter – General Provisions’ which includes 
three sub-sections of 88 articles. These articles provide general rulings for the following sections 
and chapters and regulate the ways in which they can be applicable; jurisdiction, persons 
(individual and legal) and timeframes. 
Summarily put, the civil law comprises certain features that distinguish and maintain its 
functionality. These include a codified legislation drafted in concise, lucid and authoritative 
language. Also, a competent and well-educated judiciary that plays a crucial role in the success of 
this legal system through interpretation of the legal text in case of legislative vacuum. In order to 
be capable of discharging their duties, judges receive legislation and codification-focused 
education. The judges employ different methods in case of vacuum, notably, reliance on general 
principles as guidelines to facilitate the adjudication. The lack of any of these quintessential 
factors: competent judges, intelligible language and a facilitating section (general principles), 
would impede the functionality of the law. 
                                                           
52 Elena Anghel, ‘General Principles of Law’, Lex et Scientia, xxiii.2 (2016), 120–30 (p. 121). 
53 Anghel, p. 122. 
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2. Anglo-Muhammadan Law 
This section examines the approach followed towards the production of the Anglo-Muhammadan 
Law (AML).54 I argue that the AML represents a combination of positive law and fiqh. 
Notwithstanding its prominence, it contains structural and content limitations. Notably, it lacks an 
efficient judiciary and a robust section on general principles that would facilitate the process for 
non-specialist judges, who replaced the jurists, to navigate the Islamic law. Additionally, the 
British officials followed a textualist55 approach for statutory interpretation of the Islamic legal 
texts, which impaired its viability as a legal system governing the status of Muslims and efficiently 
responding to legal issues.56 
                                                           
54 There is an abundance of literature on the making and legal process of the Anglo-Muhammadan Law. 
See, ‘Islamic Law and Social Change: An Insight into the Making of Anglo-Muhammadan Law,’ by Zubair 
Abbasi in which he investigates the topic of waqf under the British role while arguing that the AML was 
responding to legal and social changes; ‘Indigenous Customs and Colonial Law,’ by Manaf Kottak 
kunnummal. The author examines the intersection of gender, family and religion in colonial India and 
their impact on legislature in ‘Formal Writing, Questionnaires and Petitions Colonial Governance and Law 
in Early British Malabar, 1792–1810’ by Santhosh Abraham. The author examines the departure from pre-
colonial legal reasoning and custom to the new and complex legal system and the way in which formal 
legal writing was a form of resistance to British colonialism (see, ‘Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter 
in British India’ by Michael Anderson). 
55 Textualism refers to the process of prioritizing the text. It follows the ‘plain meaning method’ which 
“bases legal interpretation on the most readily understood, plain and literal meaning” and strips the text 
from the context. For further reading please refer to ‘Textualism, structuralism and originalism: the art of 
the NPC Standing Committee's interpretations of the Basic Law’ by Shigong Jiang; ‘What Is Textualism?’ 
by Caleb Nelson; and ‘The Rise and Fall of Textualism’ by Jonathan T. Molot.  
56 The question arises of how a mujtahid would interact differently with the text from the ways in which 
the British Officials processed it. As will be shown later on, the officials relied on two main sources; hedāya 
book and fatāwā Alamgiri to infer the preponderant opinion in the Ḥanafī doctrinal school. These sources, 
particularly fatāwā Alamgiri were responding to particular legal cases wherein the jurist exercised their 
ijtihād. Certainly, this constitutes a precedent that is a core principal in Common Law. While the Islamic 
law shares a similar structure in the way that Islamic law is judge-made law rather than statutory laws, it 
differs in the authority the precedent establishes. The legal reasoning process entails that a mujtahid will 
exert the effort to reach an opinion for each case on the condition that a direct order has not been stated 
in the Qur’an or Hadith. In other words, “every new case he [a mujtahid] encountered [constitutes] a legal 
norm.” Wael B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 
19, Cambridge Core <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511801044>. Hence, reliance on these sources 
reduced the fluidity and flexibility of Sharia to precedents. For further reading, see Hallaq’s book entitled 
‘An Introduction to Islamic Law’; Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s al-ijtihād fi al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmīyyah (Ijtihād in Islamic 
Sharia); Uṣūl al-Fiqh by Muhammad Abū Zahra. 
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The Anglo-Muhammadan Law57 (AML) can be defined as a hybrid legal system that contains 
concepts from the English law and principles of equity along with fiqh.58 Sharia application can 
be divided into three main periods: under the Muslim domination, under the British colonial rule, 
and after the announcement of the Republic. It started with the Mughal emperors initially by 
Mahmoud of Ghazni, a Persian-speaking Turk and was also a “nominal vassal of the Caliph of 
Baghdad” who belonged and promoted the Ḥanafī -Sunni branch of law.59 This led to the adoption 
of the Ḥanafī school which continued till the colonial rule of the British.60  
Under the British colonial rule, Sharia application took the form of the AML which was drafted 
to serve certain intents. It was required to function as “strategy of rule” to limit the need for military 
intervention.61 But the principal objective was “to have security in social conditions so as to 
facilitate trade.”62 Thus, the British officials had to establish a legal system to solidify their role. 
The AML was part of the British legal system to govern Bengal that started with the appointment 
of Warren Hastings (1732-1818) as Governor of Bengal in 1772. Hastings initiated a multi-tiered 
legal system that placed British administrators at the top, followed by a tier of British judges who 
would consult with local jurists with regard to issues governed by Islamic law.63 The main 
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challenge, from a British perspective, would have been in interpreting and legally managing the 
local society in an economically efficient manner and without much military intervention.64  
2.1. Drafting of the Anglo-Mohammadan Law 
At the outset, Muslim rulers aspired to apply Sharia but encountered plurality in customs and 
religious practices. This required the Moghuls rulers to adopt more flexible regulations to cope 
with the diverse and unique environment of the sub-continent. The rulers ensured religious rights 
to non-Muslims and to be legally ruled by their respective laws.65 While the rulers adhered to the 
principles of Sharia as interpreted in the Ḥanafī tradition, this did not prevent them from declaring 
“several kinds of rules having the force of law [that] came to be recognized and enforced. The 
well- known distinction between shari'at (sacred law) and qanuin (secular law) came to be 
recognized; and laws, during the later Moghuls”66 were divided into categories:  
- Canon Law; which deals with religious issues such as apostasy and conversion,  
- Criminal Law; which deals crimes and torts, 
- Royal Decrees; which organize matters of the empire such as land allotment and 
administrative issues, 
- Customary Law; which mainly addresses the question of non-Muslim citizens who enjoy 
the right to be governed by their respective laws and customs. While this was issued to 
allow non-Muslim the freedom and equality, some Muslim converts employed this when 
in their advantage, e.g. “a large piece of land cannot be broken up for the benefit of a son-
in-law,” 
- Fatāwā (s. fatwā and translates into a legal opinion) and Precedents; 
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- Justice and Right; this includes the conduct of judges and some directions and guidelines 
to navigate cases.67  
This form of Sharia was adopted under the British rule, at the beginning. The earliest legislative 
outcomes of such policy can be found in the charter of George II in 1753 and each religious group 
continued to adhere to their respective legal systems. For example, it was dictated in section 27 of 
the 1780 regulations that cases regarding inheritance and marriage the Muslims and Hindus will 
be subject to their respective laws.68  
Changes have been introduced to the AML during the reign of Warren Hastings, first 
Governor-General of the Bengal Presidency during 1773-1785. The AML comprised legal 
assumptions69 as well as, translations, fiqh textbooks, and new legal technologies.70 The British 
officials set up a judicial system of a Supreme Court at Fort William, in addition to maritime, 
military, arbitral, and equity courts. A key change was the transmutation of fiqh texts law to legal 
codes, deeply informed by utilitarian philosophy, such as the Indian Penal Code (1862), the Code 
of Criminal Procedure including the Evidence Act (1872), and the Contracts Act (1872).71 Another 
key change was the change of judiciary. The British officials suspected the integrity of local Sharia 
court system. The officials did not deem the judges (qāḍīs) and mufitīs72 (scholars who give fatwā) 
to be trustworthy due to their disregard of precedent. The reason for this position is the process 
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through which the jurists interpreted the Islamic law. The jurists employed their ijtihād in response 
to legal cases resulting in different legal opinions for seemingly similar cases.73 This tradition led 
the British to question the viability and integrity of the traditional court system. Therefore, a new 
legal system with minimum reliance on the jurists seemed inevitable. The British officials relied 
on a number of sources to produce a new law (AML): al-hedāya, fatāwā Alamgiri and a portion 
of an Ithna ‘Ashariya (Shi’a) text, which was “translated by Neil Baillie and published in 1865 
under the title of A Digest of Mohammadan Law.”74  
Hastings attempted to graft the indigenous legal norms, for Muslims and Hindus, into a 
British-based legal system. The process entailed that the British judges would present the Muslim 
scholars (maulavi) with a hypothetical question, void of relevant details. Then request the scholars 
to give their opinion, hence, outcome cannot be considered as a legal rule or a principle of law. 
The officials, however, would formulate it as a ‘precedent,’ which reduced Sharia to a rigid set of 
legal rules.75 Eventually, the indigenous scholars were replaced by British officials. The British 
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officials of the East India Companies started exercising their judicial powers through the Charter 
of 1661.  
2.2. Limitations and Challenges  
The Anglo-Muhammadan Law has two main limitations that fall within the scope of the current 
study; structural and methodological. With respect to the structural organization, the AML is 
comprised of two main sections: the “Historical and Descriptive Introduction” and the “Digest.” 
The Historical and Descriptive Introduction is concerned with Islam in India, the divisions of 
doctrinal schools and factions. Hence, it can be considered as an overview of the Islamic culture 
and history. The second section, the Digest, is comprised of five parts divided into fifteen chapters 
with each chapter including its related definitions at the beginning. The first part, “Preliminary,” 
contains a number of articles and would be expected to function as general principles. But it does 
not include sufficient general legal maxims (qawāʿid fiqhiyya) to perform this function.  
Part I (The Preliminary) includes three sub-sections; Topics, Persons and Sources, and 
comes in sixteen articles. The statement at the introductory section declares: “[t]his chapter treats 
chiefly of the rules for determining in what cases, to what persons, and in which of its different 
shapes, Anglo-Muhammadan Law is applicable, and the relative authority of the sources from 
which, when applicable, it is to be ascertained.”76 However, the scope and content of the body of 
articles do not reflect this claimed role. For instance, articles 1-3 and 5-8 tackle the question of 
territorial jurisdiction of the AML with minor details on other topics such as divorce and law of 
gifts. This does not negate the fact that the Preliminary section includes articles that have the 
attributes of general principles. For example, articles 11-14 discuss on whom the law will be 
enforced, and which doctrinal school regulates the litigation, and the relationship between Muslims 
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and non-Muslims.77 However, the Preliminary chapter falls short in serving as general principles, 
due to its limited scope.  
Additionally, the Muslims judges were replaced by British colonial judges who appear to 
have applied the law mechanically to the cases before them, practically on third-hand information 
of the law from the local jurists whose sense of justice born and bred in the native social 
environment was not available to the officials.78 Therefore, the British officials were not competent 
to interpret the fiqh and fatāwā. Taking into account the lack of a facilitating section and 
unfamiliarity of the legal methodology, the officials did not obtain the sufficient knowledge or 
scholarly experience to enforce the Islamic law as their local counterparts. 
With respect to content and methodology, textbooks and translations constituted significant 
sources towards the production of the AML. The officials followed a textualist approach in drafting 
the AML. This approach entailed that “the text of a statute is the law… and it is the text that must 
be observed,” and it conspicuously isolates the text from its context.79 In an Islamic legal context, 
this approach is evidently inoperable. At the core of fiqh lies the concept of ijtihād which implies 
a customization of opinion based on individual cases. Each case can have a different opinion 
depending on the context; therefore, familiarity with the status quo is quintessential for a sound 
ijtihād.80 However, if there are clear regulations present in the Qur’an or Hadiths, with a robust 
chain of transmitters, an abidance by the Scripture is mandatory. Nonetheless, this is more common 
in liturgical rituals and practices (ʿibādāt) than daily transactions and dealings (muʿāmalāt). 
Hence, it can be argued that Islamic legal tradition synthesizes the two approaches: intentionalism 
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and textualism, with the former more prominent in muʿāmalāt. This contravenes the general 
tendency of textualists to assume that “statutory text is the law.” Since, the application of the AML 
“proceeded on the basis of textual understanding which allowed the officials to ascertain general 
legal rules quickly, it may have meshed with understandings of Islam.81 Thus, trying to impose 
textualism implied “absurdity, perpetuating errors, and enforcing interpretations that fail 
unnecessarily to fulfill statutory intent.”82 
The compilation of material was thematic, but the material lacked objectivity or deep 
insight. For instance, the compilation of fatāwā by MacNaghten was conducted in accordance 
“with his own wide-ranging generalisations under the title Principles and Precedents of 
Mohammadan Law.”83 But MacNaghten glossed over “areas of problematic interpretation and 
present a unified rule in place of genuine differences of doctrine.”84 This reduced the Islamic 
intellectual heritage of doctrinal differences to “a fixed body of immutable rules beyond the realm 
of interpretation and judicial discretion.”85 The British officials deemed the flexible fatāwā to be 
inconsistent and “their dependence on local advisors as a form of disempowerment, they soon 
decided to seek a direct relationship with the source texts.”86 Therefore, the translation movement 
started in the second half of the eighteenth century and was focused on al-hedāya, with various 
translation errors, “fatwa Alamgiri and a portion of an Itna ‘Ashariya (Shi’a) text”, which 
constituted the textual basis of the AML.87 There have been a number of inaccuracies 
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accompanying the translation of the texts because “translators [tended] to interpose their own 
views with the translation, loosely paraphrase, or omit some parts original.”88  
In sum, the material used to produce the AML involved inaccuracies and the process was 
limited in scope and content. Moreover, the judges did not have the sufficient scholarly knowledge 
to interpret the Islamic rules or respond to legal issues. With these intrinsic deficiencies, the final 
outcome was a distorted version of fiqh books and a poor imitation of positive law which rendered 
the project “unpopular amongst many Muslims.”89 
3. The Mecelle  
This section explores the production of the Mecelle as an effort towards encountering Western 
intervention. Despite the considerable effort by the jurists and officials, the Mecelle can be 
described as lacking in some areas, especially structure and organization.90 It is argued that the 
Mecelle did not fully discard the fiqh jargon, did not include an authoritative and regulatory general 
principles section and also the sole reliance on the Ḥanafī doctrinal proved deficient in some areas, 
e.g. contracts. 
The Ottoman Empire encountered several challenges that resulted in the gradual adoption 
of modernization. The Gülhane charter mark the starting point of a dual legal system in the Empire. 
Before 1839 the legal system operated in accordance with Sharia, primarily, and the Sultan enjoyed 
the prerogative of issuing decrees in accordance with this framework. After the declaration of the 
Gülhane charter in 1839 a new legal system was introduced along the lines of Western legal codes, 
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particularly the French Code.91 The Empire aspired to establish new judicial institutions and 
procedural system to respond to the active relations with European persons and states resulting in 
the initium of tanẓīmāt era. In the year 1850 the French Commercial code was adopted to cover 
areas where the Sharia was silent notably “foreign exchange, corporations, and commercial 
transactions” to mediate the controversies between foreigners and Ottoman subjects. Other venues 
of reform included “admiralty, criminal law and the enforcement of court decisions.”92  
The binary extended to institutions in 1868 when two bodies were established: Council of 
State, which was concerned with preparation of laws and supervision of their enforcement, and the 
Judicial Committee, which determines the of the new Westernized system. The application of the 
new court system, along with the new laws resulted in some confusion. For instance, the 
Commercial Code was Western, while the Ottoman civil law continued to be based on Sharia. 
Therefore, there was a dichotomy between the traditional law of the Ottoman system and the new 
statutes formulated on the basis of foreign laws. This urged a more systematic approach towards 
legislation; hence, two proposals were advanced. First, an application and adoption of the French 
civil code, sponsored by Ali Pasha (1813-71). Second, the establishment of an Islamic code based 
on the principles of Sharia, advocated by the conservative trends and headed by Ahmed Cevdet 
(1822-95). The latter view prevailed and resulted in the formation of the committee responsible 
for preparing the Mecelle in 1869.93 The committee convened towards the production of the 
Mecelle which can be described as a product of the tanẓīmāt period. It constitutes the first Ottoman 
attempt to codify the Ḥanafī jurisprudence and was produced during the period of 1869/70 and 
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1877 and comprised of 1,851 articles in sixteen books in Ottoman Turkish covering different legal 
matters varying from contracts, torts, legal liabilities, and some articles on civil procedure.94  
The Mecelle was responding to two significant issues; how Islamic jurisprudence 
encountered modernity and it formulated the new ideals in values in a modern context.95 The main 
objective from the production of the Mecelle is explicit in Cevcdet Pasha’s statement in the 
committee’s report, which is as follows: 
“The work of compiling religious principles to make a code containing provisions to satisfy the 
needs of our society was vested in us by a decree of the Sultan. We met in the office of the High 
Court and collected the opinions and ideas of the most eminent Ḥanafī jurists on the subject of 
muʿāmalāt to suit the present conditions. The result of our work is classified according to various 
subjects of law and the code is called Majallat-i Ahkami Adliye.”96  
The Mecelle was an attempt to counter the Western intervention and legal hegemony over 
commercial litigation within the Ottoman Empire.97 On a more practical level, the Mecelle aimed 
to “influence judicial reasoning and to expedite court proceedings” through the creation of legal 
genres dedicated to these functions. The Mecelle depended heavily on the legal maxims and the 
fatāwā of late Ḥanafī scholars to formulate its basis.98  
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3.1. Organization and Content  
The introductory section of the Mecelle includes a collection of principles that aim to serve 
as guidelines for the judiciary in “applying its provision to specific cases.”99 This section comes in 
100 Articles under the title ‘legal maxims,’ and the rest of the articles are modeled on these 
maxims. The first section was drafted from the legal rules of the Ḥanafī school without reference 
to other doctrinal schools, which is plausible since the Ḥanafī school was the official doctrine of 
the Ottoman Empire but also confines the vast Islamic intellectual history to one legal reasoning 
approach. This introductory section and its articles on general legal maxims (al-qawāʿid al-
fiqhiyya) were expected to organize and facilitate the adjudicating process in the court system. 
Hence it can be argued that the ‘Introductory’ section could function as general principles. But 
such hypothesis can be refuted by reverting back to the nature and function of the general 
principles. The general principles constitute a reference to the judges in cases of legislative vacuum 
or emphasis on legal reasoning. However, these ‘100 principles’ of the Mecelle were extracted 
from the fiqh books of late Ḥanafī scholars, such as the Ibn Nujaym.100 These legal maxims require 
a high degree of jurisprudential capacity to interpret them. Sewilam argues that  
“there are two ijtihād paths before the Mejelle's legislators: the absolute ijtihād or the school-
affiliated ijtihād. Had the legislators practiced the first type, they would have produced a new 
legislative methodology for decision-making in Sharia. Had they practiced the second, they would 
have produced new legislation in line with the methodology of the official Hanafi School of law. 
In reality, however, the Mejelle's legislators could not practice any level of ijtihād neither the 
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absolute ijtihād nor the takhrij [lit. extraction]. The reason for this incapacity goes back to the fact 
that the Mejelle's legislators did not enjoy the necessary freedom for ijtihād practice.”101 
Thus, the legislators and judges could not practice either ijtihād or extraction (takhrīj) due to state 
restrictions that confined their practices to imitation (taqlīd).  
The reasons for such incapacity can be attributed to the Ottoman state’s intervention in the 
codification and legislation of the Mecelle that took a number of forms. The adoption of the Ḥanafī 
doctrinal school limited the freedom of judges “to adopt methodologies or decisions against the 
recognized theses and practices of the Hanafi School.”102 In addition, the legal methodology of the 
Ḥanafī school may not have been the most compatible with codification. For instance, Sewilam 
contends that drafters of the Mecelle complained that the Ḥanafī “did not cut down the number of 
legal cases present in their furuʿ study” which made the codification process more complicated.103 
Sewilam proceeds to state that there was a Ḥanafī “tendency to decide on the cases of the furuʿ 
through the application of legal principles. The Shaf'i tendency is therefore closer to the 
codification style of deriving decisions on cases from legal rules. The drafters reasoned such 
difference had a reduction in the size of the Hanafi furuʿ occurred in the history of this school, 
their task of extracting Hanafi ‘key cases for problem solving’ would have been easier.”104 
The Mecelle exhibited other limitations in its content. The principles of the Mecelle, as 
derived from the Ḥanafī jurisprudence, were founded on morality “rather than on economic 
necessities” which is evident in certain chapters, e.g. sale.105 This manifested in “[t]he theory of 
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objective responsibility wherein a situation creates a benefit for a person, that person should also 
be responsible for the risk involved, [whereas in the European civil law, responsibility is] based 
largely on the principle of negligence…[and] objective responsibility is applicable only in certain 
cases.”106 Moreover, the Mecelle did not acknowledge the Western principle of ‘freedom of 
contract,’ but instead provided limited choices in order to protect the individuals.107Additionally, 
the Mecelle adopted the theory of voidable (fāsid) contract. The Mecelle concentrated solely on 
the Ḥanafī doctrinal school and did not take benefit from the wide spectrum of opinions in other 
jurisprudential school, which could offer more freedom and liberalized regulations on contracts.108 
This limited the scope of contracts and caused the Mecelle to lag behind. Further, the Mecelle did 
not discuss personal issues such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, or waqf.109 Al-Sanhuri offered 
a similar critique as he argued that the Mecelle is closer to a civil contract than it is to a 
comprehensive civil law and lacks a general theory of obligation. Al-Sanhuri continues to argue 
that the Mecelle relies completely on preponderant opinion (al-ra’y al-rajiḥ) of the Ḥanafī school, 
without reference to opinions in other doctrinal schools which made the Mecelle less flexible in 
responding to legal issues within the vast Ottoman Empire. He contended that the fashioning of 
the Mecelle includes parts that take the form of fiqh texts, which is not compatible with the modern 
legislative style that relies on commands in the form of regulations.110 
In brief, the Mecelle constitutes a genuine effort towards the production of an Islamic code to 
replace Western positive laws. However, the Mecelle fell short on different levels. It focused on 
the transition from fiqh to civil law but forfeited important sections in the civil law, notably, general 
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principles. The vital role of the judge was not fulfilled due to state-imposed restrictions. Moreover, 
reliance on the Ḥanafī school proved a limitation than an advantage particularly with regard to 
inferring from particulars (furuʿ) in comparison to other doctrinal schools and restrictions on 
contracts. Ironically, the Mecelle tended to “deal with details in its body rather than broad 
principles which “often restricted the power of the judge and the freedom of action of the 
parties.”111 These limitations could not be transcended and the Mecelle leaned towards fiqh books 
than positive laws. This is not to undermine the fiqh tradition but to argue that the Mecelle included 
inherent drawbacks. 
4. Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah ʻalá al-Madhahib al-Arbaʻa 
This section investigates a recent attempt to codify the Sharia, Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-
Islāmīyah ʻalá al-Madhahib al-Arbaʻa (Sharia Codification Project based on the Methodology of 
the Four Doctrinal Sunni Schools), conducted by Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah (Islamic 
Research Academy). The two previous attempts (the Anglo-Muhammadan Law and the Mecelle) 
are prominent codification attempts with available literature and analysis. The Sharia Codification 
Project, however, does not enjoy the same level of attention. Thus, the Sharia Codification Project 
methodology, structure and content will be examined in this section. It should be noted that this 
project has been proposed but has not been implemented in the Egyptian courts, thus it will be 
difficult to evaluate its functionality. However, it is argued that it shares drawbacks similar to those 
in previous attempts which would hinder its viability as a legal system. These limitations vary 
from fiqh-based content and structural setbacks, e.g. lack of a viable general provisions section, 
which would impede its application as a positive law. 
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In 1967, IRA held its 27th session in which the board agreed to draft a comprehensive set of 
laws (civil and criminal, and others). Application of such codes was contingent on the approval of 
the Egyptian parliament. A year later, in 1968, the IRA approved the recommendation for 
establishing a committee comprised of jurisprudence scholars and legal experts (modern 
practitioners) to draft laws and bills that would facilitate the adoption of Sharia as the law of the 
land. Hence, in 1970, the board approved a phased plan including the establishment of committee 
for Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah.112 The drafters stated the main objective in the 
introductory section of the Mālikī book. They argued that the codification was conducted as a "step 
towards depicting the Sharia in its original image...applicable in this [modern] age. This is a step 
through which officials, responsible for legislation and judiciary in different Islamic countries, 
could abandon positive laws and [secular] legislations."113 The introduction proceeds to contend 
that some individuals may believe that Sharia is not equipped to regulate affairs in a modern secular 
context, however, Sharia has managed to prevail for hundreds of years and through various 
regimes due to its advocacy of public interest. The introductory section can be considered as a 
response to the claims raised by ‘individulas’ who doubt the viability of Sharia in a modern 
context.  
4.1. Content and Methodology 
The Committee divided the Project into two phases: a. codification of the four major doctrinal 
Sunni schools, separately; b. synthesis of the codified doctrinal schools into one applicable law.114 
                                                           
112 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá 
Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, al-Ṭabʻah al-tamhīdīyah. (al-Qāhirah: al-Qāhirah, al-Sharikah al-Miṣrīyah lil-
Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr, 1972), pp. 6–8. 
113 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, p. 5. 
114 It should be noted that the Committee completed a codification of a chapter on ‘Sales’ in each doctrinal 
school. However, the Committee never added other chapters or synthesized the chapter on ‘Sales’ into 
 45
The Committee indicated that it will choose preponderant opinion (al-ra'y al-rajiḥ) from each 
school with an annex report. The report includes the pool of opinions from which the Committee 
has chosen and indicate the ranking of opinions in each doctrinal school. The Committee 
contended that the two phases allow the option of applying the codification of one doctrinal school 
or the synthesized version of all schools.115 
Similar to the contention surrounding the production of the Mecelle, the Committee 
received a suggestion to review the Egyptian positive law and amend the articles that may 
contravene with the Sharia. This suggestion aimed to complete the codification in a timely manner 
as many of the enacted laws were based on Sharia and differed in certain aspects. However, the 
Committee disregarded this proposal for a few reasons. First, the terminology of the positive law 
differed from the terminology employed in fiqh books. Second, the positive law is a product of a 
specific environment; Western customs and philosophy, that is different from the principles upon 
which Sharia is based. For instance, many articles in the positive criminal law would practically 
fall under the category of discretionary punishment (taʿzīr), however these articles do not convey 
Islamic traditions and morality. In addition, discretionary punishment should be closely tied to 
Islam's concept of punishment and reward.116 While reviewing the positive law might be an option, 
it does not reflect the core of Sharia’s principles and morals. 
 The introduction exhibited other aspects of the internal debate. It was suggested that the 
Committee synthesize the doctrinal schools directly and bypass the codification of each school. 
                                                           
one codified book. The author did not find any information regarding any further steps that has been taken 
in this regard. 
115 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, p. 8. 
116 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, p. 10. 
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This proposal contended that fiqh books are, nearly, codified in the form of matn117 and require 
recapitulation and minor additions. However, the Committee responded by stating that codification 
of doctrinal schools would have to precede the enactment of a unified Sharia law. This is due to 
multiple legal opinions in each doctrinal school and the difficulty to consider matn as a ‘nearly 
codified.’ The Committee argued that matn takes succinct and ambivalent forms with multiple 
shurūḥ (sing. sharḥ and refers to annotations and commentaries).118 Moreover, it comprises rulings 
on acts of worship and citations of evidence to support each opinion, hence matn should be 
transmuted into a more pragmatic form to be an applicable code. The drafters relied pimarily on 
specific fiqh books:  
• In the Mālikī doctrinal school: al-Sharḥ al-Ṣaghīr wa al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr by al-Dardiri (d. 
1787 AD) 
• In the Ḥanbali doctrinal school: Kashshāf al-Qināʿ ʿan Matn al-Iqnāʿ by Al-Bahūtī (d. 
1641 AD) and al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr ʿ ala al-Muqniʿ by Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī (d. 1223 AD). 
• In the Ḥanafī doctrinal school: Radd al-Muhtār ʿala al-Durr al-Mukhtār by Ibn Abidin (d. 
1836 AD) and Fatḥ al-Qadīr by Ibn al-Hammam (d. 1457 AD). 
• In the Shāfiʿī doctrinal school: Mughni al-Muḥtāj ila Maʿrifat Maʿānī Alfāẓ al-Minhāg by 
Shams al-Din al-Shirbini (d. 1570 AD) 
4.2. Case Study 
 This section explores the similarities and differences between the codification of the four doctrinal 
schools with regard to the section on ‘Fruit Sale.’ The previous codifications investigated the 
                                                           
117 The term matn is commonly used in the context of Hadith to refer to reports of the Prophet. It 
constitutes one of the main pillars of Hadith studies. The other is isnād (chain of transmitters). In this 
context, the author uses the term ‘matn’ to refer to the body of authoritative fiqh books that are comprised 
of the main cases and legal maxims that have been commentated and analyzed for their significance. 
118 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, pp. 11–15. 
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limitations and challenges in codifying a single doctrinal school. This project is an attempt to 
codify the four doctrinal schools and then synthesize them into one code. This poses similar and 
different set of challenges such as transcending the legal reasoning methodologies in each school 
to reach a synthesis. Therefore, it will be required to exhibit some of these differences through 
examining the present case study. It is argued that each prospectus differs in scope, structure and 
the legal reasoning from other prospecti which makes the synthesis process rather complicated. 
Additionally, this section examines the extent to which the drafters managed to transcend fiqh 
attributes, such as jargon, classification of fiqh books and discussion on evidence, in order to draft 
a viable code. 
4.2.1. Mālikī 
In article 44 of Imam Mālik's prospectus, the drafters explicate the conditions for fruit sale by 
stating: "It is permitted for fruit to be sold without being ripe if sold with its origins [origins here 
indicate the plant that are multi-harvested annually, and could include the land]. However, the fruit 
may not be sold separately unless it appears to be, or some of it, ripe. Fruit is deemed ripe if it is 
about to be ripe or ready to be consumed. If the origins produce more than once a year, the yield 
can be sold altogether if the first yield seemed in a good condition and there is no separation period. 
However, if there is a separation period, then the second yield cannot be sold unless proven 
ripe.”119 
 Article 45 regulates the relationship between buyer and seller in case of unforeseen 
catastrophe: “If the fruit, after being sold, was affected by an avoidable catastrophe, then the buyer 
is entitled to decrease the price by an amount equivalent to the damage. In case if the damage 
occurrs before the fruit is fully ripe or yielded, then value of the damaged fruit is equivalent to 
                                                           
119 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, p. 93. 
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one-third, or more, of the overall value of the fruits. Unless the catastrophe is caused by draught, 
in which case the buyer is entitled to request the seller to incur the value of the damage, even if 
the value is less than the one-third.”120 It is noticed that only two articles primarily cover the issue 
of fruit sale. Nonetheless, there are other articles that entail details about the fruits but under 
different sections, therefore, do not fall under the scope of this study. 
4.2.2. Ḥanbali 
 In the Ḥanbali prospectus, the fruit sale comes in three articles. Article 139 discusses the 
conditions under which the seller is entitled to sell the fruits before being ripe: “It is not permitted 
for fruit to be sold before being ripe or the plant before it is close to yielding, except in the 
following instances: a. if the buyer is the owner of the land and origin [plant]. b. If the fruit or 
seeds are sold along with the origin. c. If the fruit is sold under the condition that it is collected 
forthwith, the yield has benefit, and the fruit is not under joint ownership.”121 Article 140 proceeds 
in the same vein: “a. It is permissible to sell the fruit that can be collected and picked only from 
plants that produce continuous harvest, under the condition that the harvest is collected or picked 
promptly. b. It is permissible to sell the origins, that produce continuous harvest, and the fruits fall 
under the same sale.”122 Article 141 further discusses the instances in which the sale might be 
invalid or situations that could result in disputes. It states: “a. if the buyer purchases the fruit before 
being ripe, or before the seeds grow in size with the condition of prompt collection, then the buyer 
does not collect the fruit till it ripens or the seeds grow, in which case the sale is invalid. b. if there 
                                                           
120 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, p. 94. 
121 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal., Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-
Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, al-Tabʻah al-tamhīdīyah. (al-Qāhirah: al-Qāhirah, 
al-Sharikah al-Miṣrīyah lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr, 1972), p. 214. 
122 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal., p. 215. 
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is a new crop mixed with a crop whose origin was transferred to another owner, or with another 
crop bought after appearing to be ripe, then the new crop could not be distinguished, in which case 
if the portion is known then the ownership is joint with the former buyer, otherwise they ought to 
reach an agreement, and the sale is valid.”123 
4.2.3. Ḥanafī 
  In the Ḥanafī school, there is only one article that is under the section ascribed to fruit sale. 
Article 29 states: “fruit sale is valid if the fruit appears and is not ripe. The buyer is bound to collect 
the fruit promptly. If the buyer sets the condition to keep the fruit, then the sale is invalid unless it 
becomes ripe.”124 
4.2.4. Shāfiʿī  
  The Shafi'i code is by far the most developed in terms of volume and details. With respect 
to the fruit sale, it is divided into different sections on agricultural lands, types of seeds, plants, 
and agriculture-related activities. However, with respect to fruit sale there are 15 articles; 119-121; 
123-134.125 For instance, article 123 discusses the fruit sale after appearing to be ripe as it states, 
“a. It is permitted to sell the fruit after appearing to be ripe, generally. b. It is not permitted to sell 
the fruit apart from the tree before it appears to be ripe unless collected promptly, with the 
possibility of benefiting from it.”126 Moreover, article 128 discusses the case in which the fruit is 
                                                           
123 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal., p. 216. 
124 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Abu Ḥanīfa., Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá 
Madhhab Al-Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, al-Tabʻah al-tamhīdīyah. (al-Qāhirah: al-Qāhirah, al-Sharikah al-
Miṣrīyah lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr, 1972), p. 80. 
125 For the purpose of this paper that is focused on the effort in incorporating the various opinions in each 
school, the concentration will be paid to articles with content discussed in books of the other schools to 
elucidate the differences and similarities. 
126 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Al-Shafiʿī., Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá 
Madhhab Al-Imām Mālik, al-Ṭabʻah al-tamhīdīyah. (al-Qāhirah: al-Qāhirah, al-Sharikah al-Miṣrīyah lil-
Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr, 1972), p. 302. 
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damaged: “If the fruit and the plant are damaged due to poor irrigation from the seller, then the 
buyer has the option [to continue the deal or rescind it].”127 
4.3. Challenges and Limitations 
The prospecti present a genuine effort to codify the Sharia along the lines of positive laws, but not 
without limitations. Similar to the previous codification projects, the challenges and limitations 
fall mainly into two categories; structure and content. 
There are some differences between the four schools in articles related to rescinding the 
sale agreement or in case of damage. For instance, the Shāfiʿī school grants the buyer the option 
to rescind the sale agreement if there is damage resulting from negligence on part of the seller, 
whereas the Mālikī school does not rescind the contract, but obliges the seller to incur the damage 
costs. The codification attempts do not indicate how these differences will be consolidated. 
Generally, there are specific approaches applicable in this context, e.g. talfīq128 (piecing together), 
however, the Committee did not clarify which approach is to be followed in amending the 
divergencies among the doctrinal schools. The need for a method to synthesize the differences 
between the doctrinal schools is dire. For instance, the Shāfiʿī prospectus, has a much larger scope 
than the Ḥanafī prospectus. These discrepancies are the product of different methodological legal 
reasoning practices in each doctrinal school. Eventually, the synthesis of the prospecti came to a 
hault without any verfiable data. 
                                                           
127 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Al-Shafiʿī., p. 309. 
128 Piecing together. Legal term describing the derivation of rules from material of various schools of 
Islamic law. In modern times talfīq was advocated by Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and his student 
Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935) as a means to reform Islamic law. Ikhtilāf (differences of opinion) were 
a source of intellectual wealth, they reasoned, that ought to be utilized for the benefit of the whole 
community. 
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With respect to strucutre, it is noticed that the prospecti could not overcome certain drawbacks. 
The project iniates with a discussion on the sources of Sharia; introduction to the characteristics 
of the Qu’ran and Hadith and the construction of their authority. The four prospecti are not 
organized in the same manner. For instance, the Mālikī and Ḥanafī prospecti include a section 
which discusses the general regulations of the rules on sales. Whereas the Ḥanbali and Shāfiʿī 
prospecti do not include such section. While there are sections containing articles concerning the 
general principles, they are limited in scope with only seventeen articles in the Mālikī and twenty 
in the Ḥanafī. Moreover, the general principles section includes regulations that have been derived 
directly from fiqh books and convey a religious nature. For instance, article 8 of the Ḥanafī 
prospectus states, “If Ḥalal is blended with Ḥaram, then the Ḥaram prevails.”129 Other articles are 
not, directly or indirectly, related to Sales and Contracts, which is the focus of the prospecti. For 
instance, article 10 of the Ḥanafī prospectus discusses the authority of ruler, “Actions of the Imam 
with regard to the citizens are contingent on public interest.”130  
In conclusion the prospecti constitute a genuine effort exerted by the scholars to codify the 
Sharia. They attempted to codify each school separately and synthesize them into one code, 
nonetheless, the project came to a halt. The scholars did not highlight the process through which 
they would synthesize the four doctrinal schools. Moreover, the prospecti were not consistent with 
the organization and structure. Moreover, the prospecti suffer from a lack of an efficacious section 
dedicated the general principles to facilitate the production and development of legal reasoning 
and adjudication in a modern context.  
                                                           
129 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Abu Ḥanīfa., p. 27. 
130 Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ 
Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Abu Ḥanīfa., p. 28. 
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5. Conclusion  
This chapter ventured to explore the challenges and limitations in different codification projects. 
Each of the projects discussed here is a representative of a unique culture in which the legislature 
was addressing a unique social context. It is argued that each of these projects was responding to 
the question of where and how Sharia would fit in the structure of the nation-state and its legal 
system. The chapter contended that each of these codification projects fell short in various aspects 
such as using fiqh jargon, lack of a facilitating section (general principles) and restricting the 
jurisdiction of judiciary. These are essential features to the functionality of modern laws. For 
instance, the general principles section performs as guidelines for the judges to facilitate the 
process of legal reasoning. Legislators comprehend that the law is not complete; thus, the presence 
of such principals rectify the situations where the law falls short. The absence of an efficacious 
body of general principles is detrimental to the application of law as it will certainly encounter 
legal issues that are not covered by the law. Since the law reacts to social needs, it does not 
proactively produce legal rules, therefore, general principals are significant due to their flexibility 
to respond to nascent legal issues. 
The chapter examined three main features: general principles section, judiciary and presence 
of fiqh jargon in each of the codification projects. For instance, the Anglo-Muhammadan Law 
included a Preliminary Chapter; however, the scope and content fell short in establishing a 
comprehensive theory of reference. Similarly, the Mecelle included 100 principles that are based 
on legal maxims (al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya) within the Ḥanafī doctrinal school. The incapacity of the 
‘100 principles’ to perform as a general principles stem from the legal methodology of the Ḥanafī 
school, level of complexity of the maxims and state-imposed restrictions. In the same vein, 
Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah includes similar setbacks. The Mālikī and Ḥanafī 
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prospecti contain a section where some articles can, arguably, be referred to as general principles, 
while such a section is completely absent in the Ḥanbali and Shāfiʿī codifications.The sections in 
the Mālikī and Ḥanafī projects have legal provisions that entail religious rules. This would not 
provide an aide to the judge, who would have been required to be specialized in the legal reasoning 
of the doctrinal schools and traditions of fiqh.  
In order to respond to these limitations, two factors are necessary: an efficacious legislature 
and a viable body of laws, with practical general principles. While ʻAṭīya does not offer a detailed 
legal code, he proposes a methodology to extrapolate legal maxims from different doctrinal 
schools to avoid some of the limitations present in some doctrinal schools, as in the Ḥanafī school, 
which may jeopardize the codification. Furthermore, ʻAṭīya advocates for an amalgamation of 
ijtihād and ijmaʿ (consensus) into an institution which he calls ‘the Ijtihād Institution’ which will 
be responsible for generating broad legal principles (kulliyyāt) rather than particular legal maxims 
(juz’iyāt) to allow judiciary the freedom to practice ijtihād. 
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Chapter II: 
Formation, Trends and Renewal of Ijtihād 
Ijtihād is the exertion of effort to interpret the Divine Scripture and provide legal opinions and 
regulations for the community. Ijtihād is guarded by a number of prerequisites established by 
Muslims scholars over the course of history to ensure a high probability of reaching the right legal 
opinion. Many scholars in the modern period have investigated ijtihād and the different ways in 
which it evolved. Scholars, including ʻAṭīya, build up on the efforts of previous scholars while 
preserving the nature of ijtihād as an ever-evolving practice. In this sense, this chapter provides a 
gateway to understanding ʻ Aṭīya’s project of renewal (tajdīd) and ijtihād by providing an overview 
of the concept and the ways in which it has been understood and implemented.  
This thesis investigates the different ways Muslim scholars and intellectuals have proposed to 
apply Sharia. One method of applying Sharia is through codification of fiqh, which was the primary 
focus of the first chapter. In the first chapter, I have examined three prominent attempts to codify 
Sharia: the Anglo-Muhammadan law, the Mecelle and Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah 
(Sharia Codification Project). Despite the ingenious approach followed in each of the attempts to 
transform Sharia into a modern code, they have not been fully successful due to some inherited 
limitations. Another method for applying Sharia, as envisaged by scholars, is through re-adapting 
some of the legal tools of uṣūl al-fiqh. Therefore, in this chapter I examine some of the attempts 
that employ legal tools a basis for legal reform in the modern nation-state. Understanding the role 
of ijtihād and the ways in which different scholars have approached this topic will enable us to 
better comprehend ʻAṭīya’s project for renewing ijtihād and to investigate the viability of his 
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approach. Therefore, I have divided this chapter into three main sections. The first section 
examines the concept of ijtihād, and the prerequisites required to practice it. It focuses on the 
formative period and the different conditions set by prominent scholars. It highlights the key 
principles of ijtihād: Qur’an, Hadith, analogy (qiyās) and consensus (ijmāʿ) and the extent to which 
mujtahids should be familiar with each principle. The first section is significant because it denotes 
the main components and conditions of ijtihād in the classical sense, which will give us an insight 
into the extent of change the modern scholars are proposing. The second section investigates the 
general trends for ijtihād in the modern period. It aims to provide an overview of the different 
models of interpreting ijtihād from within the fiqh tradition or through reliance on modern 
sciences. This classification will help us, later on, understand where ʻAṭīya’s model fits within the 
larger spectrum for renewal and reform in the modern period. The third section narrows down the 
research to investigate the different trends for ijtihād with the aim of integrating ijtihād into the 
legal structure of the modern nation-state. The research is limited to three concepts: analogy 
(qiyās), consensus (ijmāʿ) and public interest (maṣlaḥa), as they are the most relevant to ʻAṭīya’s 
model. Therefore, the third section will examine the different ways prominent scholars, e.g. Rida, 
Turabi and Iqbal, have expanded or re-interpreted legal tools, e.g. public interest (maṣlaḥa), 
analogy (qiyās) and consensus (ijmāʿ) respectively, to achieve their aims in a modern context. 
1. Ijtihād in the Formative Period 
This section examines the concept of ijtihād, its legal and social functions in the formative 
period.131 Then, the section proceeds to highlight the main prerequisites laid down by scholars to 
                                                           
131 Modern scholarship has examined the concept of ijtihād from different perspectives. For instance, 
Hallaq explicates the process of ijtihād through its theoretical basis: uṣūl al-fiqh and argues that Qur’an 
and Sunna do not specify the law but refer to its through aḥkām (rulings) and dalālāt (indications) to 
which the jurist, directly or indirectly, builds upon to adjudicate new cases. Hallaq contends against the 
notion of closing the gates of ijtihād by referring to practices that can be deemed as ijtihād over the course 
of Islamic history. See: Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihād Closed? Weiss highlights the process of deriving the 
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regulate the practice of ijtihād. The section is meant to aid the reader in two ways: first, the 
discussion on the prerequisites will enable us to evaluate later attempts, particularly in the modern 
period; second, it will briefly indicate the role and function of ijtihād to verify if the modern 
attempts towards renewal (tajdīd) show resemblance to or difference from the classical nature of 
ijtihād.  
Ijtihād can be defined as “a process of legal reasoning and hermeneutics through which the 
mujtahid derives or rationalizes law on the basis of the Quran and the Sunna; during the early 
period, the exercise of one’s discretionary opinion (ra’y) on the basis of ʿilm.”132 The Qur’an and 
Sunnah do not represent “specialized law manuals” but rather a set of rulings and indications that 
can aid scholars to infer further ordinances. Therefore, “[o]n the basis of these indications and 
causes the mujtahid may attempt, by employing the procedure of analogy (qiyās), to discover the 
judgement (ḥukm) of an unprecedented case (farʿ pl. furūʿ). But before embarking on this original 
task, he must first search for the judgement in the works of renowned jurists.”133 Some scholars 
contend that “ijtihād presupposes that the process of producing rules is a process of elucidating 
that which is present but yet is not self-evident.”134 
                                                           
rules by arguing that the Holy Law is “the totality of rules” but few ordinances are clearly stated and man 
has a duty to derive from the sources. The process of deriving (or extracting) the legal rules from by man 
is termed ijtihād. Weiss discusses the similarities and differences between the Roman law and Islamic law 
in the way they are drafted by ‘lay specialists,’ but differ in the monopoly of legislation as the state in Islam 
“upholds the Law and enforces it but has no right to make the law.” See: Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic 
Law: The Theory of Ijtihād. Another position is held by the eminent Joseph Schacht in his seminal work 
titled An Introduction to Islamic Law. Schacht explores pre-Islamic background of the legal and social 
customs, then proceeds with development of Islamic jurisprudence and contends that the gates of 
independent reasoning (ijtihād) have been closed. Schacht, then, highlights the development of ijtihād and 
legal reform in the modern context and the ways in which the ‘purists’ reacted to the compromise between 
legal theory and practice.  
132 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 208. 
133 Hallaq, Was the Gate of Ijtihād Closed? 4. 
134 Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of ‘Ijtihād, 200. 
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 Ijtihād required a legal theory to regulate its practice which came in the form of uṣūl al-
fiqh,135 with legal tools and principles as its main components. The primary objective of this legal 
theory “was to lay down a coherent system of principles through which a qualified jurist could 
extract rulings for novel cases. From the third/ninth century onwards this was universally 
recognized by jurists to be the sacred purpose of uṣūl al-fiqh.”136 While the legal methodology did 
not take an elaborate form at the end of the first century, it was practiced in accordance with rules 
of inference from the Scripture _Qur’an and Hadith_ and non-binding legal opinions (fatāwā) of 
the companion-scholars. The legal methodology further developed in the following years at the 
hands of school eponyms who laid down legal theories for their respective doctrinal schools.137 
The main function of the legal theory was to establish a coherent system of principles that would 
enable proficient mujtahids to “extract rulings for novel cases” and “[t]hroughout the third, fourth, 
and fifth Islamic centuries, ijtihād, the only channel of legal development, was rejected by various 
elements. Among these were extreme legal and theopolitical groups (or sects) that called for taqlīd 
or condemned the principle of qiyās - a principle that constituted the backbone of ijtihād.”138  
The social function of ijtihād took different forms.139 In the early period, the Prophet 
practiced ijtihād as a legislative tool on the sociopolitical and individual levels in addition to 
                                                           
135 Uṣūl can be defined as “legal theory that laid down the principles of linguistic– legal interpretation, 
theory of abrogation (naskh), consensus and juristic reasoning, among others. See: Hallaq, The Origins and 
Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 210. 
136 Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’, p. 5. 
137 Abū Zahra, pp. 11–12. 
138 Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’, pp. 5–7. 
139 The question arises of whether ijtihād was the only method for legislation. In brief, there is not a clear-
cut answer and the reason is that the other method for legislation is entangled with the practice of ijtihād. 
The other component for legislation in Sharia is al-Siyasa al-Sharʿiyya (Sharia-based policy). Al-Siyasa al-
Sharʿiyya can be defined as “a broad doctrine of Islamic law which authorizes the ruler to determine the 
manner in which Shari’ah should be administered… provided that no substantive principle of the Shari’ah 
is violated thereby. The ambivalence in answering the question lies in the fact that Siyasa is suggested to 
facilitate the task of the ruler to respond to matters absent from Sharia’s main sources: Qur’an and Hadith. 
In that sense, Siyasa fulfills the public interest within the boundaries of Sharia, which falls under the 
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delegating the right of adjudication to the companions who were deployed as judges (qāḍīs). The 
deployed companions performed multiple administrative roles including acting as governors, such 
as Mu’adh b. Jabal and Abu Musa al-Ash’ari.140 The role of the judge (qāḍī) continued to exist 
during the caliphate of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali, and 
developed further in following Muslim dynasties. For instance, during the Umayyad dynasty the 
office of qāḍī became more structured and separate from the role of governor.141 However, the 
assignment of  qāḍīs did not stop scholars from engaging in practicing ijtihād in legal cases but 
the opinion, in this case, falls under the category of non-binding legal opinion (fatwā).142 The fatwā 
entails that the individual requiring the opinion could comply with the fatwā or seek the opinion 
of another scholar. It is noticed that there is a distinction between the roles of qāḍīs and jurists,143 
however, both qāḍīs and jurists are required to meet a number of prerequisites to practice ijtihād. 
Scholars have set different conditions for individuals to be capable of conducting ijtihād. 
Nonetheless, there are a few basic, and essential, conditions agreed upon by many scholars of the 
early as well as contemporary periods. A fundamental prerequisite is knowledge of the Qur’an and 
Hadith. Scholars, however, debated the extent to which one should be knowledgeable in Qur’an 
                                                           
domain of maṣlaḥa. Thus, the ruler should display a level of ijtihād, which is suggested by many scholars 
notably Rashid Rida in his seminal book al-Khilāfa (The Caliphate).  
140 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 34. 
141 Mathias Rohe, Islamic Law in Past and Present (Leiden, The Netherlands : Koninklijke Brill, 2015), pp. 
43–44. 
142 Rohe, p. 34. 
143 Scholars have noted a distinction between ijtihād, as a general practice, iftāʾ and qaḍāʾ. For instance, 
Abu Zahra notes that ijtihād is inferring regulations and the process can be a response to a legal case or a 
hypothetical scenario. Whereas iftāʾ is more specific and case-based and is issued in response to a legal 
question and requires that the mufti meets the general requirements for ijtihād, which will be discussed 
later, in addition to having familiarity with society and nature of cases. See Abū Zahra, pp. 401–2. Another 
distinction is made between qāḍī and muftī. On the one hand, a muftī exerts an effort to infer a legally non-
binding opinion while the qāḍī offers a legally binding adjudication which prompts the qāḍī to take more 
time in adjudication and more effort in inferring an opinion due to the social implications resulting from 
the adjudication. Hence, the qāḍī’s decision enjoys a higher status in the realm of legal traditions. See: 
http://uṣūl.dar-alifta.org/ar/ViewFatawaConcept.aspx?ID=%2080.  
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and Hadith. For instance, al-Ghazālī (b. 1058 - d. 1111) does not require the complete 
memorization of the Qur’an and sets few conditions: “First, it is not required to memorize the 
entire Qur’an, but to memorize the verses related to Sharia Ordinances (aḥkām), around five 
hundred verses. Second, it is not mandatory to memorize such verses but to be familiar with their 
location in the Qur’an in order to be able to revisit them when needed.”144 However, earlier scholars 
adopted a more conservative position which requires the mujtahid to be well-informed (in 
memorization) of the legal verses and obtain an overall knowledge of the whole Qur’an. This 
position contends that the Qur’an is an integrated unit and its ordinances are connected, 
predominantly.145  
With regard to Hadith, the mujtahid is required to be familiar with “all legal Hadith and 
must acquire proficiency in Hadith criticism, so as to be able to scrutinize credible and sound 
Hadith from those that are not.”146 The mujtahid, however, does not have to memorize the Hadiths 
but can rely on canonical books, e.g. Sunan Abi Dawud or other acknowledged books specialized 
in legal Hadiths.147 It is noticed that there is a high level of complexity in the way some of the 
scholars, particularly in the early period, have set the conditions for practicing ijtihād to ensure 
that it does not become a common practice or become accessible by laymen.  
Conditions for practicing ijtihād also include a well-established command of the Arabic 
language and its sciences to discern figures of speech and complexity of sentence structures. But 
the mujtahid is not required to show mastery of the language at the level of specialized 
                                                           
144 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī, Al-Mustaṣfá min ʻilm al-uṣūl, ed. by Aḥmad Zaki Ḥammad (Riyad: Dar Al-
Maiman), I, p. 6.  
145 Abū Zahra, p. 381. 
146 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 146. 
147 al-Ghazzālī, I, p. 7,8. 
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grammarians but to exhibit “sufficient knowledge to examine the Qur’an and Sunnah and fully 
comprehend the context.”148 Further conditions include familiarity with the consensus (ijmāʿ) 
cases, but such cases are highly controversial. Ijmāʿ occupies the third rank of legitimacy and 
authority after the Qur’an and Sunnah. Ijmāʿ can be defined as “consensus of the scholars of a 
particular region as embodying their Sunnaic practice, by definition exemplary; in later theory, 
consensus of the mujtahids (q.v.) – as representatives of the community of Muslims – on a legal 
matter.”149 The great majority of Muslim scholars do not differ on its authority but the disagreement 
lies on which group of mujtahids whose consensus is legal and binding to the Muslim society.  
 Some scholars argue that consensus (ijmāʿ) occurred exclusively at the time of the Saḥaba 
(first generation of Muslims) and that fiqh books on khilāf150 attest to such.151 Whereas, other 
scholars state that the concept of ijmāʿ developed through three main phases: a. the time of the 
Saḥaba in which they gathered and reached a consensus; b. at the time of school founders, when 
school founders honored the traditions followed in their regions (e.g. Abu Ḥanīfa in Kufa and 
Malik in Medina); c. later generations of scholars who investigated thoroughly for ijmāʿ cases that 
occurred at the time of Saḥaba to avoid issuing opinions that contradict them.152 Hence, ijmāʿ is 
extant and treated as a viable legal source. But the conundrum remains of how ijmāʿ could be 
reached. In his book entitled Jimāʿ al-ʿIlm, al-Shāfiʿī argued that it is difficult to find mujtahids 
who are agreed upon and accepted by the entirety of the Muslim society without any objections. 
Moreover, the dispersion of mujtahids after the first generation adds to the difficulty of reaching 
                                                           
148 al-Ghazzālī, I, p. 12. 
149 Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, UK, 2005), p. 
208. 
150 Khilaf: Fiqh books highlighting juristic disagreement. 
151 Abū Zahra, p. 212. 
152 Abū Zahra, pp. 197–200. 
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an ijmāʿ and disparity between the newly-established Muslim communities with their different 
customs adds to the complexity of a general ijmāʿ. In addition to queries of who is identifiable as 
‘mujtahids’ and whether other scholars in fields such as Kalām (scholastic theology) could be 
considered mujtahids.153 In essence, Shāfiʿī investigated the complexity surrounding the concept 
of ijmāʿ but approves its viability in matters related to obligatory liturgical actions that are proven 
by decisive ordinances (from the Qur’an and Sunnah).154 It is noteworthy that ijmāʿ, at the time of 
the Saḥaba, was based mainly on the Scripture, except in rare cases. e.g. a man cannot marry a 
woman and her aunt (maternal or paternal) due to kinship ties.155 In such cases, the ijmāʿ was 
directly or indirectly dependent on Scripture.  
 Analogy (qiyās) can be defined as “the deduction of legal prescriptions from the Quran or 
Sunnah by analogic reasoning. Qiyas provided classical Muslim jurists with a method of deducing 
laws on matters not explicitly covered by the Quran or Sunnah without relying on unsystematic 
opinion (ra’y or hawā).”156 A key element to borrow the ordinance is presence of ratio legis (al-
ʿilla157 ) between two cases. The ratio legis, however, requires basis from the Scripture for the 
analogy to be viable.158 The role of ratio legis and analogy will be discussed in more detail in the 
third chapter as ʻAṭīya advocates for a different basis of qiyās, but within the general framework 
of traditional scholars. 
                                                           
153 Muḥammad ibn Idrīs Shāfiʻī, Jimāʿ Al-ʿilm (Talbiya - El Haram: maktabah ibn taymiyyah’), pp. 46–59. 
154 Abū Zahra, p. 201. 
155 Abū Zahra, p. 201. 
156 John L. Esposito, ‘Qiyas’, 2004. 
157 AL-ʿilla is defined by Hallaq as ratio legis: ‘‘cause’’ or ‘‘factor’’ occasioning – in analogical qiyās (q.v.) – 
a rule in the original case; the presence of the same ratio in the new case requires the transfer of the rule 
from the original case to the new. See: Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 209. 
158 Abū Zahra, pp. 218–24. 
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 Summarily put, the concept of ijtihād features profound significance since it is the human 
interaction with Divine Scripture to guide society. Thus, scholars wanted to ensure that the walls 
of ijtihād are elevated to prevent involvement of unqualified individuals. This tendency added a 
level of complexity to ijtihād which increased over time to render ijtihād into an arduous process. 
Ijtihād was performed as an individual practice regulated by a collective tradition. In the later 
periods, late pre-modern and modern periods, Muslim scholars have shouldered the daunting task 
of reinvigorate traditional concepts of ijtihād to be more compatible with the modern nation-state.  
2. Modern Trends towards the Practice of Ijtihād  
In this section we investigate the question of ijtihād in the early and late modern periods. We 
will seek to respond to questions such as: what are the different trends of ijtihād in the modern 
period? What methodologies were followed to enforce Sharia through ijtihād? Do we simply 
comply with the modernist vis-à-vis traditionalist postulates envisaged by many scholars? This 
section will aid us in better understanding these questions, identifying the ways in which ʻAṭīya’s 
model is comparable to such models, and pinpointing where ʻAṭīya fits into the spectrum of 
scholars who aspired to implement Sharia. In addition, this section provides an overview of the 
different ijtihād trends which prepares us for the next section where we will discuss the ways in 
which modern scholars have tried to integrate ijtihād into the legal and political structures of the 
nation-state. I argue that scholars in the modern period scholars were threatened by loss of their 
authority to the state. Therefore, different trends towards interpreting the role of ijtihād have been 
proposed to balance the power dynamics and restore the lost grandeur of scholars and integrate the 
traditional methodology into the nation-state. Thus, ijtihād has taken, at least, four forms: abiding 
by the classification of doctrinal schools; abandoning the school classification and deriving 
regulations directly from Divine Scripture with an emphasis on the literalist interpretation of the 
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Scripture; devising a new theoretical model that is based on modern sciences; and redefining the 
legal tools employed by the doctrinal schools but without subscribing to any school.159 Each of 
these trends provide valuable insights to bridging the gap between Sharia, as an ethical and a legal 
system, and the nation-state, as a product of modernity.  
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many Muslim countries (or countries where 
Muslims constituted a substantial percentage) were plagued by colonial systems that threatened 
the Islamic culture and identity. In response to colonialism and the modernization project, Muslim 
scholars and intellectuals responded in varying degrees. One is tempted to divide the scholarly 
response into modernist/progressive vis-à-vis traditionalist. Such division, however, detracts from 
the significance and ingenuity of responses offered by Muslim scholars. One could argue, 
nonetheless, that the majority of these projects held one major objective: Sharia application. The 
downside to such multiplicity is that there is no consensus on what or how the Sharia should be 
applied. Whenever “an Islamic government or authority claims to be applying divine law (such as 
Iran, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia), some group or party challenges this claim and asserts a rival 
model of what constitutes the Sharī’ā.”160Another principal factor is ‘who’ will shoulder the 
responsibility of Sharia application. For instance, the scholars formulate the legal structure in their 
respective schools and judges, affiliated with such schools, adjudicate accordingly. But the ruling 
                                                           
159 Reform from within and from outside the Islamic legal tradition has been adapted from Kazemi-
Moussavi’s article titled Modern Intellectual Approaches to Islamic Law where he examines the Islamic 
reform of four scholars who represent the two categories. However, I have found that other scholars, e.g. 
ʻAṭīya, advocate for the same division. ʻAṭīya contends that reform can stem from within or outside the 
Islamic traditions and advocates for the significance of reform from within, in his book titled Tajdīd al-
Fiqh al-Islami. 
160 Sami Zubaida, Contemporary Trends in Muslim Legal Thought and Ideology, ed. by Robert W Hefner 
(Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 270 
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521844437.012>. 
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regimes (caliphate or dynasties) were responsible for social affairs which falls under the umbrella 
of Sharia-based governance (al-siyasa al-shar’iyya). 
Muslim scholars have followed, at least, four trends in applying Sharia through ijtihād. The 
first trend portrays the compliance to the traditional classification of doctrinal schools. This trend 
is more prevalent in the Indian subcontinent and crystalized through the works of many earlier 
scholars who were proponents of this position, notably Shah Wali Allah (b. 1703 - d. 1762). The 
adherence to the legal doctrine of the school can be discerned during Rida’s visit in 1912 to the 
Deobandi school, who were proponents of the Ḥanafī school and most of the scholars were firm 
adherents to the practice of imitation (taqlīd). Muhammad Anwar Shah Kashmiri noted that the 
Deobandi scholars adhered to the ideas of Wali Allah who sought to “re-introduce the Muslims of 
India to the foundational texts of Islam. To this end, he [Wali Allah] had translated the Qur'ân into 
Persian and written a commentary on the Muwatta' of Mãlik b. Anas (d. 179/795), one of the 
earliest extant works of law.”161 Shah Wali Allah’s legal methodology exhibits adherence to the 
basic principles of ijtihād within the division of Ḥanafī doctrinal school, while not rejecting views 
from other doctrinal schools. 
The second trend in conceptualizing ijtihād can be identified in the abandonment of school 
classification and deriving regulations directly from Qur’an and Hadith. Some would contend that 
this approach towards ijtihād can be attributed to Salafism. I would argue that a labeling such as 
‘Salafism’ is an exaggeration. The term ‘Salaf’ is a loaded term that does not necessarily typify a 
specific approach towards interpreting religion, despite acquiring certain features in a modern 
context. For instance, Salafism can imply two conceptualizations: a purist and a modernist model 
                                                           
161 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, ‘Evolving Conceptions of Ijtihad in Modern South Asia.(Report)’, Islamic 
Studies, 49.1 (2010), p. 9. 
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that both emerged and evolved with distinct viewpoints on ijtihād.162 Key Islamic thinkers 
representative of this approach are Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida who ascribe themselves 
to the ‘Salaf’ but their approach towards employing ijtihād is different from other scholars 
belonging to the conservative model. The conservative trend is characterized by an aversion from 
‘opinion’ (al-ra’y) and leans towards inferring ordinances directly from Scripture. A key figure of 
the ijtihād relying on direct inferences from the Scripture is al-Shawkani163 (b. 1759- d. 1834). Al-
Shawkani believes in “the absolute necessity of applying ijtihād as a means of combating the 
sectarian and antagonistic tendencies amongst different schools of law.”164Al-Shawkani contends 
that soliciting evidence from the Scripture is what separates “ittibāʿ [verifiable-following] qua 
ijtihād from taqlīd [precedent following]: the former is always based on textual evidence, albeit, 
in the form of a legal pronouncement (fatwā) of a mufti, while the latter refers to an opinion or 
even a fatwa that is not corroborated in the same way.”165 To al-Shawkani “reason, or more 
accurately, rational discourse not related to the establishment of the primacy of textual evidence 
in any given matter, is an inappropriate mechanism in the Law.”166 Al-Shawkani preferred a direct 
interaction with the Divine Scripture to practice ijtihād, “or at least an access to, or knowledge of, 
those sources.”167 He advocated for “a return to the principal sources—the Qur’an and the 
                                                           
162 Henri Lauzière and Henri Lauzière, The Making of Salafism : Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century 
(New York : Columbia University Press, 2016), p. 235. 
163 Yemeni scholar, jurisprudent, and reformer. He rejected the Shi’i Zaydi school of law into which he was 
born. Influenced by Salafi thought, he called for a return to the textual sources of the Quran and hadith. He 
viewed himself as a mujtahid muṭlaq, i.e. an authority to whom others had to defer in religious law and 
developed a series of syllabi for attaining various ranks of scholarship. He used a strict system of legal 
analysis based on Sunni thought. Despite his Shi’i background, he is regarded as a great revivalist of Sunni 
Islam in his time by various Salafi and Wahhabi movements. See: Esposito, 'Shawkani.’ 
164 Bernard Weiss, Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, 2001, p. 340. 
165 Muneer Goolam Fareed, Legal Reform in the Muslim World : The Anatomy of a Scholarly Dispute in the 
19th and the Early 20th Centuries on the Usage of Ijtihād as a Legal Tool (San Francisco: San Francisco : 
Austin & Winfield, 1996), pp. 111–15. 
166 Fareed, pp. 115–17. 
167 Iik Mansurnoor, ‘Shawkani and the Closed Door of “Ijtihad”’, Hamdard Islamicus: Quarterly Journal of 
the Hamdard National Foundation, Pakistan, 11.2 (1988), 57–65 (p. 62). 
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Sunnah— which must be literally understood; any interpretation that draws one away from the 
texts is forbidden.”168 The basic premise, of al-Shawkani, that a “mujtahid can find in these 
evidence or proof to substantiate his legal decisions without recourse to any other source, be it 
consensus (ijmāʿ), most forms of analogical reasoning (qiyās), or independent reasoning (ra'y).”169  
The third trend can be identified through the works of intellectuals who proposed to interpret 
ijtihād through modern sciences. The contemporary Egyptian intellectual Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd 
can be considered a proponent of this trend. Abu Zayd attempted to apply hermeneutics as a 
method of analyzing the legal texts. Abu Zayd ventured to evaluate Islamic methods of semantics 
and their further implications for text interpretation through a variety of hermeneutics frameworks 
based on the works of Friedrich Schleiermacher (d. 1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey (d. 1911). Abu 
Zayd applies semantics to the Qur’an through understanding the text in its cultural context which 
will eventually aid the reader in eliciting legal injunctions. Abu Zayd proceeds to contend that the 
Scripture has two levels: statement (manṭūq), which is fixed and conception (mafhūm) which is 
changeable and open to variable approaches. Therefore, Abu Zayd urges for a new form of ijtihād 
based on the social and cultural context which constitutes a change from the normative viewpoint 
of ijtihād.170 
The fourth trend is redefining the function of legal reasoning tools, e.g. analogy (qiyās) or 
public interest (maṣlaḥa ),171 to fit into the modern society. This trend includes a considerable 
                                                           
168 Weiss, Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, p. 341. 
169 Weiss, Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, p. 342. 
170 Ahmad Kazemi-Moussavi, ‘Modern Intellectual Approaches to Islamic Law’, Islam and Civilisational 
Renewal, 1.3 (2010), 474 (pp. 488–91). 
171 The term maṣlaḥa (public interest) was employed by Imam Malik as al-maṣālih al-mursala 
(unrestricted interest) to a public good that has not been directly stated in the Scripture; however, it can 
be traced to a certain basis (aṣl). See: khadduri, 'The ‘Maṣlaḥa’ (Public Interest) And‘ 'Illa’ (Cause) in 
Islamic Law,' 214. Maṣlaḥa went through a transformative breakthrough in the 5th century at the hands of 
al-Ghazali who defined maṣlaḥa in a “tangible manner” as he argued that “maṣlaḥa was God's objective 
(maqṣad, pl. maqāṣid) in revealing the divine law, and, more concretely, that this intention was to preserve 
for humankind the five essentials of their well-being, namely their religion, life, intellect, and property. 
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number of scholars, notably Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida who advocated for a new form 
of ijtihād based on the concept of maṣlaḥa.172 Abduh and Rida restructured the concept to cope 
with the social challenges imposed by modernity. For instance, Rida attempted to “adapt the 
Sharī’ā to the exigencies of the age, and that is where maṣlaḥa played an important part. This 
concept of maṣlaḥa was developed in the new context of public advocacy through the new print 
media, in particular his own influential magazine, al-Manār.”173 Rida departed from the historical 
employment of maṣlaḥa as a subordinate principle to presenting it as a leading principle in making 
decisions and issuing fatāwā (non-binding legal opinions). Rida’s view on maṣlaḥa will be 
discussed in depth in the following section as it addresses how scholars have employed ijtihād in 
a legal sense. 
In sum, the four trends towards ijtihād indicate the different ways in which Muslim scholars 
have tried to accommodate Sharia into modern society. Scholars have tried to purify, integrate and 
renovate Sharia but a key component is lacking; that is participation of the state and highlighting 
the role the state will play in the enforcement of Sharia. The following section addresses the ways 
in which ijtihād can be integrated into the legal structure of the nation-state.  
3. Ijtihād and the Modern Legal Structure 
Islam is a religion that is viable for every era and time,’ is a statement promulgated among many 
scholars and jurists. The basis for such statement of continuity is the flexibility of regulations in 
Islam. Permanence lies in objectives and objectives of the Sharia to preserve the religious 
principles and morality. Permanence can take different forms such as the five main pillars of Islam, 
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Qarafi. See: Opwis, Maṣlaḥa in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory.  
172 Rachel Anne Codd, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Role of Ijtihad in Legal Reforms in the Muslim World’, 
Arab Law Quarterly, 14.2 (1999), 112–31 (pp. 121–22) 
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according to Sunni scholars, and prohibitions that have been stated in clear commands in the 
Qur’an and Hadith. Whereas, change is evident in means and methodologies and is related to 
particular injunctions of cases (juz’iyāt al-aḥkām), particularly in Sharia-based policy (al-Siyasa 
al-Sharʿiyya).174 In their search to prove the continuity statement, Muslim scholars have followed 
different modi operandi. A key approach is to employ ijtihād and its legal tools from uṣūl al-fiqh 
to revitalize religious discourse and implement Sharia.175 In this section I pay closer attention to 
three principles in the process of ijtihād: consensus (ijmāʿ), analogy (qiyās) and public interest 
(maṣlaḥa), and the ways in which these principles have been proposed to integrate ijtihād into the 
legislative arena. I examine three prominent scholars and intellectuals: Rashid Rida and his 
understanding of maṣlaḥa, Mohammad Iqbal and his interpretation of ijmāʿ, and Hassan al-Turabi 
and his expansion on the concept of qiyās.  
Rida, Iqbal and Turabi have proposed different methods to synthesize ijtihād and modern 
society and bridge the gap between modernity and tradition. For instance, we find Rida expand on 
the scope of maṣlaḥa to establish an Islamic caliphate (as a political and a legal system) derived 
from the Divine Scripture while preserving the traditions of the early generation through 
consideration of what best suits the contemporary society. Similar to Rida’s approach in focusing 
on the structure of the state is al-Turabi who preaches for renewal (tajdīd) and reinterpretation of 
Islam while persevering Islam’s main principles. Al-Turabi holds that the state has a central role 
in this model as the state incurs “responsibility for that interpretation through the introduction and 
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enforcement of the Shari‘ah.”176 In his endeavor, al-Turabi argues in favor of an expansion on the 
concept of qiyās to allow the needed reinterpretation. Another significant figure in the context of 
legal reform is Muhammad Iqbal who interpreted ijtihād as the concept of movement and deemed 
it key to the modern legal system. Ijtihād, to Iqbal, is a process that contains four essential sources, 
but he places greater emphasis on ijmāʿ and provides a new interpretation of the term to adapt to 
the modern state. Iqbal contends that ijmāʿ should be in the form of a parliament. The following 
pages will provide a detailed discussion on the project of each scholar. 
 A controversial, yet highly flexible, concept that has surfaced in the discussion on Islamic 
reform during the 19th century is maṣlaḥa (public interest). A key figure to reinvigorate this 
concept is Rashid Rida (b. 1865 - d. 1935) whose legacy and ideology has been profound in 
establishing many of the Islamic reform movements of the 21st century. The significance of 
maṣlaḥa lies in the fact that it can be considered as a channel for objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid),177 
in addition to serving as a “vehicle for legal change.”178 Maṣlaḥa does not rely on ratio legis (al-
ʿilla), like analogy (qiyās), which allows the jurist to expand on the ordinances of the Divine 
Scripture (finite texts) to the ever-changing life events (infinite), thus facilitating the derivation of 
rulings which could provide maṣlaḥa with a context in which it can be the basis of a legal system, 
argues Rida.179 Furthermore, Rida implies that qiyās adds a level of complexity that is not 
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necessary in inferring ordinances and scholars could have arrived “at the same conclusions that 
could be reached by the equally valid (but much simpler) process of istiṣlāḥ.”180  
Moreover, Rida’s view on consensus is unorthodox. Some scholars, such as Kerr, would 
argue that the concept of consensus (ijmāʿ) “has not been formally expressed and suggests even 
that for lack of such expression it is doubtful to what extent it can be said truly to have existed in 
relation to particular points.”181 Other scholars would contend that Rida did not necessarily 
suspended ijmāʿ to elevate the application of maṣlaḥa. But “Rida’s line of thought against ijmāʿ 
and qiyās is based on his view that there are no clear Qur’ānic or ḥādīth references to the 
commitment to the scholarly consensus or analogy as the only two legal sources after the Qur’ānic 
or ḥādīth.”182. However, we do not find Rida articulating a clear, or a unified, statement about 
ijmāʿ. For instance, in his book titled al-Khilāfa we find Rida includes sound ijmāʿ in his discussion 
about Shura: “I [Rida] say that the Imam [ruler] should seek mushāwara [consultation] in every 
matter where there is no evidence in Qur’an or Hadith, a sound ijmāʿ to rely on, or in case of ijtihād 
based on decisive evidence, particularly in matters related to siyasa and war that are concerned 
with public interest.”183 Later on, Rida  addresses the question of authority and argues that ijmāʿ 
can take two forms: ijmāʿ of the Umma and ijmāʿ of those who loosen and bind (ahl al-ḥall wa-l-
ʿaqd).184 Rida contends that if a referendum can be held to identify the opinion of the Umma on a 
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certain issue, then the public opinion is mandatory and is enforced, and the ruler is not entitled to 
overrule or reverse such opinion.185 Similarly, the agreed-upon opinion of those who loosen and 
bind, as representatives of the public, constitutes an ijmāʿ, acknowledged by jurists, provided that 
those who loosen and bind can conduct ijtihād. If those who loosen and bind disagree among 
themselves, then the opinion that is based on stronger evidence from the Qur’an and Hadith will 
prevail. 
To Rida, caliphate is the source for legislation (or al-Ishtirāʿ) and comprises three main 
pillars: those who loosen and bind (ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd), Shura council and the caliph. These 
entities should exhibit the qualifications of mujtahids for they will be responsible for legislation, 
which is a necessity to human societies. Therefore, creation and change of morality in social and 
legal matters is the role of the caliphate and its affiliated entities. Hourani reflects on Rida’s 
comments regarding the legislative powers of the caliphate by stating: 
The rulers of the community have not only the executive and judicial powers, they can legislate in 
the public interest. Thus there can be a body of 'positive law' (qanun) subordinate to the Shari'a in 
the sense that if there is conflict it is the latter which is valid, but otherwise independent and with 
a binding force which derives ultimately from the general principles of Islam; for it is not only the 
right but the duty of a Muslim nation to give itself 'a system of just laws appropriate to the situation 
in which its past history has placed it.186 
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185 Riḍā, p. 89. 
186 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: 
Cambridge Cambridgeshire, 1983), p. 234. 
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It can be argued that Rida rejected the traditional position on ijtihād, but within certain 
limits and a certain extent.187 For instance, Rida advocated for a return to the Divine Scripture and 
less inclination towards the division of doctrinal schools. Nonetheless, Rida has not suggested the 
“complete abandonment of the four traditional schools, but rather a gradual approximation and 
amalgamation of them. Like 'Abduh he appeals to the principle of piecing together (talfīq), but he 
wants it to be applied more systematically than before.”188 Rida’s position on ijtihād is reflected in 
his legal opinions (fatāwā). For instance, in Islamic law, necessity (ḍarūra), contends Rida, has 
certain rulings related to it notably permitting the prohibited (ḥaram) and eliminating adversity 
and hardship in religion, thus legislation carry a high level of flexibility and responsibility to 
determine the permitted (ḥalal) and prohibited (ḥaram). Rida gives an example for such flexibility 
in the way usury (ribā ) can be permissible if necessity calls for it, and in this situation necessity 
is the advancement of the Muslim community from the shackles of foreign intervention.189 Thus, 
public interest (maṣlaḥa) in this context represents a legal tool in the hands of the caliphate (the 
Islamic state) to enact laws for the public good. However, the extent to which maṣlaḥa should be 
applied is ambivalent. Kerr argues that if maṣlaḥa becomes the dominant legal tool, then analogy 
(qiyās) can be dispensed with, and maṣlaḥa can be “a legal source in its own right.” But Kerr 
continues to argue that this hypothesis is only an implication and has not been forthrightly stated 
by Rida.190 While the statement has not been clearly articulated by Rida, it indicates the ways in 
which Rida attempted to integrate maṣlaḥa and qiyās and formulate a legal structure that is 
imbedded in a form of Islamic government; caliphate, composed of three constituents; ahl al-ḥall 
wa-l-ʿaqd, Shura council and the great Imam. Yet, we cannot identify the power relations between 
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these entities and if positive law could operate as Islamic since the maṣlaḥa (or ḍarūra) deems it. 
Maṣlaḥa in its flexibility as a legal tool and in the hands of an Islamic state, caliphate, can be a 
productive legal tool to traverse the limitations and complexities of other legal tools or finite 
Scripture, and to depart from the division of doctrinal schools and adherence to taqlīd (precedent 
following).  
 The field of Islamic studies is replete with scholars proposing different models for change, 
but few scholars venture to synthesize between modern legal system and Islamic legal tools. 
Another prominent figure who championed the arena is the Sudanese scholar Hassan al-Turabi (b. 
1932 - d. 2016). Turabi ventures to broaden the scope of analogy (qiyās) and consensus (ijmāʿ) 
with the final objective of establishing an Islamic system that is not isolated from society.191 To 
this end, Turabi advocated for going back to “the roots, and create a revolution at the level of 
principles.”192 Turabi contends that it is crucial to depart from the medieval fiqh tradition, which 
was unique to that context and should be understood accordingly, and envisage a “new fiqh that 
will transcend the limitations of the old.”193 Thus, Turabi argues for a “radical expansion” of the 
concept of qiyās to remove the limitations imposed by scholars to narrow the scope of qiyās and 
expand it to be a natural qiyās (qiyās fiṭrī) free from the complicated conditions influenced by 
Greek philosophy. Qiyās, according to Turabi, can be divided into two categories: first, inferring 
certain objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid) through examination of Divine Scripture and then apply the 
maqāṣid to nascent issues; second, analyzing a set of religious ordinances prescribed to a specific 
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context and inferring and prioritizing public interest rules (maṣlaḥa) which can be called qiyās al-
maṣlaḥa (lit. analogy of public interest).194  
 Consensus (ijmāʿ) is also a key concept in Turabi’s model for applying Sharia. Ijmāʿ has 
always been a key element in ijtihād, however, it has also been a controversial topic particularly 
with respect to what constitutes an ijmāʿ and whether it is feasible in contemporary contexts. 
Turabi complicates the concept of ijmāʿ by arguing that it is no longer a practice confined to 
scholars but extends to include Muslims experts from all scientific and social fields.195 Turabi 
recognizes three primary elements to ijmāʿ: an organized group, Shura (consultation) among 
Muslims in public matters and presence of a Sultan. Turabi contends that ijmāʿ takes two forms: 
the first is the public referendum model in which a decision is made based on a poll and in 
accordance with the Shura principle, and the second form is the consensus of those who loosen 
and bind (ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd). In this context, ijmāʿ, according to Turabi, is not final and can be 
overruled by another ijmāʿ. In other words, there is resemblance between ijmāʿ and the public 
referendum of the democratic nation-state.196 While Turabi’s model moved beyond theory to 
become a corner stone in reinstating the Sharia during the government of Numayri,197 it was not 
without limitations. The proposed concept of ijmāʿ, as understood by Turabi, is not rooted in the 
Islamic legal traditions but serves a political agenda.198 Despite these limitations, Turabi’s model 
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for qiyās and ijmāʿ is a step towards reinvigorating legal tools of ijtihād in a way that can be 
applied in the modern legal structure. 
Practice of ijtihād with an emphasis on ijmāʿ can be identified in a number of other models. 
Among scholars who concentrated on ijmāʿ Muhammad Iqbal (b. 1877 - d. 1938) is a prominent 
figure. Iqbal is a proponent of the idea of permanence and change in which he contends that there 
are, in Islam, ordinances that are fixed and others that are subject to change to cope with the 
contemporary lifestyle and to meet with the growing needs of societies. One way to implement 
this balance is through the principle of ijtihād that occupied an entire chapter in Iqbal’s seminal 
book titled The construction of Religious Thought in Islam.199 There are three levels to the practice 
of ijtihād, according to Iqbal: complete authority to legislation, which amounts to the authority of 
school eponyms that is “admitted by the Sunnis, but in practice it has been denied ever since the 
establishment of the schools, in as much as the ideal of complete ijtihād is hedged round by 
conditions which are well-nigh impossible of realization in a single individual. Such an attitude 
seems exceedingly strange in a system of law based mainly on the ground work provided by the 
Quran which embodies an essentially dynamic outlook on life,”200 relative authority, and special 
authority which is concerned with particular cases unadjudicated by the founding fathers of 
doctrinal schools. The significance of this division, as we will observe later in chapter three, lies 
in the fact that it shows resemblance to the division adopted by ʻAṭīya particularly with regard to 
the availability of certain genres of ijtihād. 
                                                           
199 Syed Abdul Rahman, ‘IQBAL’S CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGISLATION IN ISLAM’, Islamic 
Studies, 25.1 (1986), 45–58 (pp. 50–51). 
200 Ziauddin Ahmad, ‘IQBAL’S CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC POLITY’, Pakistan Horizon, 34.2 (1981), 44–58 (p. 
52). 
 76
Iqbal observes that ijtihād, which he understands as the principle of historical movement,201 
is key to introducing any changes to the legal system, the state and the community. Iqbal states 
four sources of ijtihād; Qur’an, Hadith, analogy (qiyās) and consensus (ijmāʿ), but presents his 
most influential ideas within the scope of ijmāʿ. With regard to Qur’an, Iqbal deems the Qur’an to 
be the ultimate guide entailing “lofty moral principles and positive legal rules” to which Muslims 
should abide.202 Iqbal, however, maintains that contemporary generations hold the right to re-
interpret Qur’anic injunctions in accordance with the circumstances of contemporary life. Iqbal 
seems to be less convinced about the legal import of Hadith and relies on the idea that “personal 
authority is quite contrary to the spirit of Islam.”203 With respect to qiyās, Iqbal mentions some of 
the early Muslims scholars but seems to hold Abu Ḥanīfa in high esteem as Iqbal describes Abu 
Ḥanīfa to have “made a great use of analogical reasoning in view of changing socioeconomic 
conditions, which arose by the extension of Muslim states.”204  
Ijmāʿ occupies a vital role in the thought of Iqbal but departs from the traditional conception 
of the principle. Ijmāʿ, in its traditional form, can be identified as “agreement of Muslim mujtahids 
at any era after the time of the Prophet on a legal injunction of a practical matter.”205 Iqbal departs 
from this definition by expanding the framework of participants from scholars to the Muslim 
community as a whole, and its representatives.206 Thus, ijmāʿ should take the form of a legislative 
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assembly, and by arguing so, Iqbal integrates two major concepts in Islam: Ijmāʿ and Shura. Iqbal 
defines the Shura as “the opinion of the whole ummah with regard to affairs of common interest 
which are conducive to the healthy development of the state.”207 Iqbal believes that this method of 
applying Sharia is optimum for two reasons: first, “followers of different schools of fiqh are unable 
to perform ijtihād because they represent different point of views and may interpret Sharia 
according to their own school of fiqh meanwhile Sharia is for the entire Muslim community,” and 
second God has not delegated interpretation of Sharia to a certain group.208 
 Iqbal proceeds to argue that Shura is the only possible way to apply ijmāʿ in the modern world. 
Thus, Iqbal lists a number of prerequisites for members to join the Shura council. The conditions 
comprise: 1. Firm belief in the tenets of Islam; 2. Integrity of character; 3. Understanding of the 
duties and responsibilities; 4. Good intellect and “an impressive physical personality.”209 Other 
conditions are required, some of which are traditional such as knowledge of Qur’an and Hadith, 
while others are general like knowledge of modern sciences, and national and international issues. 
The scope of the Shura council includes amending of existing laws to conform with Islamic 
injunctions, implementing Islamic laws that are not enforced and drafting new laws that are in 
accordance with Islamic injunctions.210 Iqbal’s proposal transforms the practice of ijtihād from its 
individualistic and doctrinal school framework to a much larger framework; Shura council, with 
the participation of the whole Muslim community (Ummah), as the council will legislate the law 
and the nation will take part in deciding its applicability. Despite the striking resemblance to 
Western democracy, Iqbal contends that this mode of governance is not particularly democratic in 
a Western sense as it relies on religious grounds and through religiously accepted channel: ijmāʿ. 
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4. Conclusion  
Summarily put, ijtihād has taken many forms and models with the final objective of integrating 
it in society. But the basic conundrum is how it should be incorporated in the legal structure of the 
modern nation-state. As Sherman Jackson rightly points out that “the bulk of reformist energy goes 
either into rendering Shari‘ah more adaptable to the norms and dictates of the nation-state, along 
with its putatively inextricable trappings (viz., democracy, human rights, monopoly over law) or 
to pointing out its utter incompatibility with the latter.”211 Scholars have to be cognizant of the fact 
that authority lies in the institutional structure of the nation-state and models for renovation should 
take this premise into account. On the other hand, Sharia legislation through the mere codification 
of fiqh will exhibit certain complexities and problems. Therefore, a synthesis between the two 
entities; ijtihād and the legal system of the nation-state is required to produce a viable legal 
structure based on the principles of renovated fiqh and conforms to the regulations of the Sharia 
while preserving the institutional authority of the nation-state. In the models of integration 
discussed earlier we could observe that scholars have attempted different methodologies for 
integrating ijtihād into the legal structure of the modern nation-state through different legal tools: 
maṣlaḥa, qiyās and ijmāʿ. In the following chapter we investigate the ways in which ʻAṭīya 
provides a new model for integrating ijtihād into the legal and political structures of the nation-
state through renewal of the tools of ijtihād and integrating maqāṣid into the process. 
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Chapter III: 
The Ijtihād Institution and Renewal of Maqāṣid  
1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates ʻAṭīya’s project for consolidating ijtihād and consensus (ijmāʿ) into a 
state institution that is responsible for legislation, and renewal of objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid). 
It examines ʻAṭīya’s approach in transforming the five essential elements: “religion (dīn), life 
(nafs), intellect (ʿaql), offspring/lineage (nasl), and property (māl),”212  into four realms: the 
individual, the family, the Umma and humanity. In this chapter we explore ʻAṭīya’s model for 
attempting to incorporate ijtihād and maqāṣid into the structure of the nation-state. I argue that 
ʻAṭīya may not have provided a solution or a method through which we can plausibly argue in 
favor of Sharia application, but he proposes a theoretical approach that is cognizant of the internal 
institutional structure of the nation-state. ʻAṭīya’s approach, whether with regard to ijtihād or 
maqāṣid, keeps in mind the nation-state as a fact that Sharia has to merge with rather than overrule. 
ʻAṭīya offers a possible synthesis between ijtihād and the modern legal structure that takes the 
form of the Ijtihād Institution, then proceeds to highlight the relationship between this Institution 
and judiciary and executive bodies. Furthermore, ʻAṭīya is mindful of the complexity of 
codification; therefore, he suggests a method through which Ijtihād Institution will play a role in 
legislating general guidelines for judiciary to facilitate its adjudication. 
In previous chapters we have examined the different approaches towards Sharia 
implementation in society. In the first chapter, we discussed Sharia application through 
codification which included examining three attempts: the Anglo-Muhammadan Law, the Mecelle 
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and Mashrūʻ Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah (Sharia Codification Project). We denoted the 
inherited limitations towards Sharia codification which can be summarized as structural and 
theoretical limitations that impeded the judiciary from performing their ijtihād. In the second 
chapter, we examined the concept of ijtihād and the different ways in which scholars have 
redefined some legal tools to integrate Sharia into society  through the intellectual projects of 
Rashid Rida, Hasan al-Turabi and Mohamed Iqbal and their use of public interest (maṣlaḥa), 
analogy (qiyās), and consensus (ijmāʿ), respectively. I begin the current chapter by introducing a 
background of ʻAṭīya’s life and works. The first section aims to give the reader an overview of 
ʻAṭīya’s intellectual journey and scholarly contributions. It highlights his affiliation with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and reasons for fleeing Egypt. The second section investigates the main 
works that have examined ʻAṭīya’s work and identifies the gap in research. The third section 
examines ʻAṭīya’s ijtihād and attempts to answer questions such as: How does he define ijtihād 
and in what way is his conception of ijtihād different from or similar to earlier scholars? The 
significance of this section lies in discussing the concept of “Ijtihād Institution” as it constitutes 
one of the main principles in ʻAṭīya’s model. The fourth section investigates renewal of maqāṣid 
and the ways in which ʻAṭīya expands on the five essential maqāṣid to become 24 maqaṣid. 
2. Biographical and Intellectual Background  
Born in 1928, ʻAṭīya spent the early years of his life in the Delta area in a small village under the 
name of Koum al-Nour in al-Daqahlīyah governorate. In 1948, ʻAṭīya graduated from Fuad I 
University (Cairo University) with a degree in law, then received another diploma in Sharia from 
the faculty of law in 1950. In 1945 ʻAṭīya joined the Muslim Brotherhood as he was attracted to 
the intellectual and social project of al-Banna. ʻAṭīya reflects on his affiliation to the Muslim 
Brotherhood by stating, “the closest Muslim Brotherhood gathering was in al-Zāher [a 
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neighborhood in Old Cairo], where I used to attend the Friday congregation and lessons by Sheikh 
Gabr al-Tamimi.”213 Due to his affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, ʻAṭīya was detained for 
two and a half years (1949-1952) as part for a mass detention wave. ʻAṭīya was deeply affected by 
al-Banna and other intellectuals in the Muslim Brotherhood which is evident from ʻAṭīya’s 
statement: “I was profoundly influenced by al-Banna who enjoyed a certain personal and spiritual 
impact on people. I consistently attended al-Banna’s Tuesday class. Moreover, I was influenced 
by Muhammad Farīd Abdel Khaliq as we attended his Thursday class and also by Abdelaziz 
Kamel.”214 
In 1960, ʻAṭīya received his PhD in law from Université de Genève, then traveled to 
Kuwait to practice law. ʻ Aṭīya occupied a number of scholarly and professional posts. For instance, 
ʻAṭīya was a Sharia and a legal consultant for financial transactions and banking, a consultant to 
the International Institute of Islamic Thought and the chief executive officer of the Islamic Bank 
at Luxemburg. ʻAṭīya occupied academic positions such as head of the Department of Law in the 
School of Sharia at Qatar University and Editor-in Chief of The Modern Muslim Journal (Majallat 
al-Muslim al-Muʿāṣir), which we will refer to hereinafter as “the Journal”.215 ʻAṭīya’s academic 
background in law and Sharia as well as his exposure to modern systems of governance have aided 
him in producing remarkable publications. ʻAṭīya is a prolific writer with publications in many 
fields, e.g. fiqh, finance and objectives of the Sharia (maqaṣid). We focus on ʻAṭīya’s main 
publications that are significant to his renewal model which includes his book titled al-Naẓariyah 
al-ʿAmmah lil-Shariʿah al-Islamiyah (General Theory of Sharia) that he authored in the year 1988 
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and in which he discusses the main characteristics of Sharia, legal maxims, application of Sharia 
ordinances and the details about the Ijtihād Institution. Another key publication is titled Tajdīd al-
Fiqh al-Islāmī (Renewal of Fiqh), which was published in the year 2000, where ʻAṭīya engages in 
a debate on the basic principles and approaches of renewal with another great scholar, Wahbah Al-
Zuhayli (d. 2015). A principal publication by ʻAṭīya is al-Tanẓīr al-Fiqhī (Theorization of Fiqh) 
that he authored in the year 1987 and the book is a collection of seminars that he delivered during 
his stay in Qatar and in his capacity as Head of the Department of Law at Sharia School in Qatar 
in the year 2000. In Theorization of Fiqh, we find ʻAṭīya formulating a classification of legal 
maxims and arguing that such classification could be the basis of a new theory of fiqh, as well as, 
highlighting the major works on legal maxims and how to employ them.  
Another significant publication is Naḥwa Tafʿīl Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa (Towards Realization of 
the Higher Objectives of Sharia: A Functional Approach) whicht was published in the year 2000 
where ʻAṭīya proposes a new division of Sharia ultimate objectives (maqāṣid). In addition to a 
number of journal articles in Majallat al-Muslim al-Muʻāsir, particularly Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Ijtihādi 
(Renewal of the Process of Ijtihād) that he published in 2000 that discusses the concept of renewal 
in relations to ijtihād. The stated publications play significant and complementary roles in the 
renewal model. For instance, we find ʻAṭīya suggesting a methodology for the theorization of fiqh 
in two of his publications: Tajdīd al-Fiqh al-Islāmī and al-Tanẓīr al-Fiqhī, while advocating for a 
new form of ijtihād that takes a legislative structure in al-Naẓariyah al-ʿAmmah lil-Shariʿah al-
Islamiyah and Tajdīd al-Fikr al-Ijtihādi. 
ʻAṭīya is credited for his pioneering role in publicly arguing in favor of renewal of fiqh (tajdīd 
al-fiqh) through the Journal that he established in January 1974 and headed, till his death in 2017. 
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In the inaugural issue of the Journal, ʻAṭīya stressed on the need for renewal (tajdīd) in fiqh and 
uṣūl as he stated: 
The Journal is concerned with presenting the fiqh heritage in a new form and compare its concepts and 
principles with modern legal and intellectual principles. It is also focused on establishing the foundation 
and theorization of Islamic legal principles. Moreover, the Journal will not be limited to these goals as 
it will encompass the concept of ijtihād as defined in uṣūl al-fiqh.216 
To elaborate on ʻAṭīya’s approach, one could visit the website of the Journal that highlights the 
vision and objectives of its editor-in-chief: “The Journal is concerned with tackling Sharia-related 
issues in modern life. The primary focus is ‘modernity’ in relation to three components: ijtihād, 
theorization (al-Tanẓīr) and Islamization of Knowledge.”217 To this end, the Journal is focused on 
two fields: Islamic movements and civic research.218 The Journal is peer reviewed by prominent 
scholars, e.g. Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali, Manal Yahya and Zaghlol al-Naggar. It is 
noteworthy that the Journal is authorized and situated in Beirut after ʻAṭīya fled Egypt in 1954 due 
to Nasser’s oppressive measures against Islamist groups. 
2.1. Literature Review 
Despite the significance of ʻAṭīya’s renewal model, one can find limited literature 
discussing his project. In search for works that analyzed and appraised ʻAṭīya’s proposal, I came 
across few academic works that analyze ʻAṭīya’s project. In her dissertation entitled al-Tajdīd fī 
uṣūl al-fiqh (Renewal in uṣūl al-fiqh), Jamilah Bu Khatim, under the supervision of Ali Gomaa, 
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an Egyptian ex-mufti and a prominent scholar, Bu Khatim surveyed a number of scholars who 
tackled the concept of tajdīd in uṣūl in an attempt to navigate the wide spectrum of renewal in uṣūl 
in the modern period and the ways in which such proposals provide new insights towards the 
application of Sharia. Bu Khatim managed to cover a wide range of scholars from progressive 
thinkers, e.g. ʻAṭīya, to more traditional and conservative trends in fiqh traditions. In the 
introduction to her dissertation, Bu Khatim notes that her interest in the topic of renewal of fiqh 
was inspired after reading about the debate on renewal in the Journal. This marks the extent of 
influence introduced by ʻAṭīya nearly two decades after establishing the Journal.219  
In discussing ʻAṭīya’s project Bu Khatim selects two books and a number of journal 
publications, notably: Naḥwa Tafʿīl Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa’ and al-Naẓariyah al-ʿAmmah lil-
Shariʿah al-Islamiyah. Bu Khatim summarized the key concepts in the selected publications, 
particularly the new model for maqāṣid and the thematic restructuring of uṣūl. However, Bu 
Khatim overlooks key points in ʻAṭīya’s model. For instance, ʻAṭīya’s concept of theorization that 
he discusses in his book titled al-Tanẓīr al-Fiqhī and some of the main features of renewal of fiqh 
in his book titled Tajdīd al-Fiqh al-Islāmī. An additional principal concepts in ʻAṭīya’s model is 
concerned with collective ijtihād and its institutionalized form to which the author briefly discusses 
but does not cover in much detail. It should be noted that it was a difficult process to obtain ʻ Aṭīya’s 
publications as he is not publicly recognized like other figures of the Muslims Brotherhood, e.g. 
Qaradawi, or Islamic intellectual, e.g. Abu Zahra. Therefore, Bu Khatim may have encountered 
such difficulties in procuring the resources for her research. 
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Ibrahim al-Ansari discusses ʻAṭīya’s model for renewal (tajdīd) in his dissertation entitled 
The Renewal of Islamic Legal Theory: Models of contemporary Ijtihād. Al-Ansari attempts to 
examine the extent to which renewal in uṣūl has been proposed and explores its viability to solve 
problems in contemporary Muslim societies. Al-Ansari analyzes how close, or far, these calls for 
tajdīd can be similar to, or different from, the original form of uṣūl. To this end al-Ansari 
investigates the various attempts for renewal during the 20th and 21st century. In chapter four, al-
Ansari tackles the trends of renewal in uṣūl through examination of two trends: objectives of sharia 
and general theory. Al-Ansari discusses ʻAṭīya in the section on “general theory trend” and 
investigates some concepts in ʻAṭīya’s model such as “new classification” of sources and uṣūl, the 
synthesis between Sharia sciences, e.g. uṣūl, and modern sciences and scope and framework Sharia 
application. However, the author relies mainly on ʻAṭīya’s Al-naẓariyah al-ʿAmmah lil-Shariʿah 
al-Islāmīyyah and overlooks significant concepts in ʻAṭīya’s model for renewal such as the Ijtihād 
Institution, how ʻAṭīya uses analogy (qiyās), and his model for objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid). 
Another important mention of ʻAṭīya can be found in Mohammad Hashim Kamali’s 
seminal work titled Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. Kamali discusses ʻAṭīya’s model for 
renewing uṣūl al-Fiqh as part of his discussion of reinvigorating ijtihād in modern society. Kamali 
focuses on a certain aspect of ʻAṭīya’s book Al-naẓariyah al-ʿAmmah lil-Shariʿah al-Islāmīyyah 
that is concerned with division of the main sources of Sharia. ʻAṭīya classifies the sources into five 
main components: 1. Transmitted proofs; 2. Ordinances of rulers; 3. Existing conditions; 4. 
Rationality; and 5. Original absence of liability. Kamali contends that the last two are 
“superfluous” and are unnecessary to the division for a few reasons.220 Kamali argues that 
rationality (ʿaql) can fall under ijtihād, in general, analogy (qiyās) or public interest (maṣlaḥa). 
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Moreover, “original absence of liability…is subsumed in conventional uṣūl al-fiqh, under the 
presumption of continuity, or istiṣḥāb.”221 Interestingly, Kamali discusses the idea of integrating 
ijtihād, Shūrā (consultation) and consensus (ijma’) at an earlier stage of his book in an approach 
analogous to ʻAṭīya’s model, which will be referred to later on.  
It is noticed that the aforementioned innovative approaches to studying ʻAṭīya’s model 
have not fully covered his model for integrating ijtihād and the legal system in the nation-state. 
Therefore, this chapter will attempt fill in this gap by examining ʻAṭīya’s model for restructuring 
ijtihād and its relationship with his new classification of objectives (maqāṣid). 
3. Ijtihād according to ʻAṭīya 
In this section we examine ʻ Aṭīya’s model for ijtihād and the ways in which he attempts to integrate 
ijtihād and consensus (ijmāʿ) to formulate an institution that is based on religious legitimacy and 
fits into the legal structure of the nation-state.  
We have defined ijtihād, in chapter 2 and elsewhere, but to recapitulate, it is “a process of 
legal reasoning and hermeneutics through which the jurist-mujtahid derives or rationalizes law on 
the basis of the Quran and the Sunna; during the early period, the exercise of one’s discretionary 
opinion (raʾy) on the basis of ʿilm (q.v.).”222 Another important definition is introduced by Abu 
Zahra in his book titled uṣūl al-fiqh: “exerting the utmost effort to infer, and/or apply, al-aḥkām 
Sharʿiyya [Sharia Ordinances].”223 Ijtihād can be practiced by mujtahids who fulfill a number of 
prerequisites that include knowledge of Qur’an and Hadith, as the main sources for legislation. 
The scope of the term ‘knowledge’ differs from one scholar to another as we have mentioned 
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earlier, in chapter 2 section 1. For instance, some scholars, such as al-Ghazālī, do not require the 
complete memorization of Qur’an but legal verses or at least know where they are located in the 
Qur’an. 224 Prerequisites also include knowledge of cases of consensus ijmāʿ, capacity to perform 
analogy (qiyās), knowledge of Arabic and knowledge about theory of abrogation.225 
ʻAṭīya is a proponent of renewal (tajdīd), which he divides into two categories: emerging 
from within the Islamic tradition or imported from the outside. ʻAṭīya states Western theories, e.g. 
structuralism and deconstruction, are not a good fit to interpret or examine Islamic studies due to 
the fact that such theories will decontextualize Islamic concepts.226 Thus, renewal, to ʻAṭīya, has 
three main elements: 1. content-based renewal; 2. renewal is required to stem from within an 
Islamic-based tradition and should be focused on the development of fiqh and uṣūl; and 3. renewal 
should have a clear methodology.227 By ‘an Islamic-based tradition’ I presume ʻAṭīya means 
Muslim scholars who have knowledge and experience in Islamic jurisprudence, but he does not 
explicitly state it. Therefore, we find ʻAṭīya advocating for a renewal in some aspects of ijtihād, 
notably analogy (qiyās), consensus (ijmāʿ), and objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid).   
With respect to analogy (qiyās), ʻAṭīya proposes to apply it in a manner that prioritizes 
public interest (maṣlaḥa). To understand ʻAṭīya’s concept of analogy we need to provide an 
overview of the concept, as we suggested in the second chapter. Hallaq defines analogy (qiyās) as 
a “collective name for a variety of legal arguments including, inter alia, analogy, argumentum a 
fortiori, reductio ad absurdum, or deductive arguments.”228 The significance of analogy is 
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attributed to connecting legal opinions of mujtahids to Scripture.229 Analogy has four major 
components: al-‘Aṣl (lit. “the origin” and indicates the case which has a direct inference from 
Scripture or Scripture itself), al-Farʿ (the case which does not have a direct inference), al-Ḥukm 
(the legal opinion which qiyās is extending from one case to another), and al-ʿilla (ratio legis).230 
In this section we will focus on al-ʿilla and what are the ways in which it has been interpreted and 
how does al-ʿilla differ from what ʻAṭīya is proposing?  
The basis of qiyās is ratiocination of Scripture and there are two main approaches 
regulating this practice. The first approach is adopted by the majority of uṣūli scholars which states 
that ratiocination of Scripture should be regulated by al-waṣf al-ẓāhir al-munḍabiṭ al-munāsib 
(appropriate, apparent and constant quality) and could take the form of ratio legis (al-ʿilla). The 
proponent of the second trend were scholars from the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools, notably Ibn 
Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn Qayyim (d. 1350), and the ratiocination is regulated by al-waṣf al-
munāsib (appropriate quality) but without regulations and developed into al-ḥikmah (rationale). 
The key difference is that al-ḥikmah achieves maṣlaḥa in accordance with objectives of Sharia 
from a broad perspective.231  
In other words, the rationale (al-ḥikmah) is more flexible in achieving public interest 
(maṣlaḥa) in accordance with Scripture. ʻAṭīya advocates for reliance on the rationale (al-ḥikmah) 
when conducting analogy as ratio legis (al-ʿilla) restricts achieving the benefit in a modern 
context.232 ʻAṭīya suggests this application for two reasons: achieving the objectives of Sharia 
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(maqāṣid) and adapting to the needs of modern society. ʻAṭīya justifies this conclusion by arguing 
that the use of ratio legis (al-ʿilla) was possible at the time of the early generations as life was far 
less complex and al-ʿilla can be established, while in modern society the situation has changed 
greatly and the connection between Sharia ordinances (aḥkām) has become difficult to establish.233 
To continue the discussion on the prerequisites to practice ijtihād, ʻAṭīya states that a 
mujtahid is required to be knowledgeable about the status quo (maʿrifat al-wāqiʿ). This 
prerequisite, claims ʻAṭīya, is a fundamental condition for a sound ijtihād. ʻAṭīya considers ijtihād 
a continuous process of scholarly discussion and that juristic opinions are not fixed. For instance, 
legal opinions of school founders like Imam Shāfiʿī do not have the attribute of permanence such 
as Qur’an and Hadith; therefore, juristic opinions should exhibit compatibility with the era and 
time to achieve objectives of Sharia. 234 In this regard, ʻAṭīya proposes that ijtihād should be 
enforced on new, as well as old legal cases. ʻAṭīya bolsters his position on reviewing previous 
legal opinions by stating: 
It is established that a change in time, place and individuals will have an impact on ijtihād and 
fatwā [non-binding legal opinion] and we do not agree on limiting the role of the mujtahid to 
selecting from old opinions…the modern mujtahid should be entitled to reach an opinion that has 
not been stated by earlier generations, given the mujtahid can provide a Sharʿi reference [juristic 
basis or reference to Divine Scripture].235 
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Moreover, ʻAṭīya proceeds, restricting the ijtihād process to preferment between juristic opinions 
(tarjīḥ) has no grounds in Sharia. Between ʻAṭīya’s statement on the continuity of ijtihād and his 
claim that ijtihād is a communal obligation (farḍ kifāya),236 one can safely presume ʻAṭīya to be a 
proponent of the notion that the gates of ijtihād were never closed. But ʻAṭīya does not concede 
that ijtihād is available in all its ranks.237  
  ʻAṭīya identifies knowledgeable about the status quo (maʿrifat al-wāqiʿ) as a condition for 
a sound ijtihād as a mujtahid should be an expert in both Islamic jurisprudence and technical 
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kifayah is a legal obligation that must be discharged by the Muslim community as a whole, such as military 
struggle: if enough members in the Muslim community discharge the obligation, the remaining Muslims 
are freed from the responsibility before God. However, if a communal obligation is not sufficiently 
discharged, then every individual Muslim must act to address the deficiency. In recent Islamic literature, 
this terminology is used to discuss social responsibility, such as feeding the hungry, commanding good, 
and forbidding evil. See: Esposito, 'Fard Al-Kifayah.’  
237 Scholars assigned ranks for mujtahids based on their level of efficacy. The ranking is divided into six 
categories; four are considered mujtahids while the other two are deemed muqallid (a jurist or layman 
who follows a mujtahid. See: Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, p. 209. The first rank of 
mujtahids is called mujtahid mustaqil who fulfill all the conditions for ijtihād and efficiently employs the 
legal reasoning tools. They formulate their own legal methods. This ranking includes the companion-
scholars and the tabʿīn (the second generation e.g. Sa'id Ibn Al-Musayyib (d. 715)) and founders of 
doctrinal schools that survived (e.g. Malik and Shāfiʿī) or that did not survive (e.g. Sufyan al-Thawri (716–
778)). See: Abū Zahra, p. 389. The second ranking is called mujtahid muntasib (affiliated mujtahid) and 
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prominent figures) in terms of legal reasoning and construct their ijtihād in furuʿ (branches). See: Abū 
Zahra, pp. 393–95. The third ranking is called mujtahid fil al-madhhab (mujtahid in the school) 
characterized by their compliance with the process of legal reasoning established by the higher-ranking 
mujtahids in in matter of furuʿ and uṣūl. See: Abū Zahra, p. 396. If there is an opinion from a well-accredited 
higher-ranking mujtahid, they will certainly adhere to such  an opinion. The fourth category is named 
mujtahid murrajiḥ (preponderant mujtahid) and is closely related to the third as they build on and 
continue to apply the process of tarjīḥ. However, the fourth ranking does not infer the jurisprudential 
rulings of furuʿ nor give their own opinion on cases. Therefore, they were given the title of murrajiḥ (a title 
given to scholars who examine the various reports and rulings to indicate which is stronger or closer to 
Sunnah or qiyās). The rankings that followed the tradition of taqlid are muḥāfiẓīn and muqallidīn who did 
not perform any form of ijtihād. The ranking of muḥāfiẓīn was concerned with differentiating between the 
tarjīḥ of the aforementioned rankings. They were characterized by their encyclopedic knowledge of 
previous works; however, they did not perform tarjīḥ. In other words, this category of scholars focused 
more on building on the previous categories and establishing close familiarity with their work. The 
muqallidīn established familiarity and understanding of fiqh books but without any scholarly production. 
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knowledge of modern sciences.238 For instance, in order for a mujtahid, ʻAṭīya contends, to give 
their legal opinion on a medical case such as gender selection or abortion, a mujtahid is required 
to have a minimum of medical knowledge and familiarity with social norms to provide a sound 
ijtihād.239 But to what extent does the notion of knowledge of the status quo (maʿrifat al-wāqiʿ) 
limit or allow the existence of all ranks of ijtihād? According to ʻAṭīya, certain ranks of ijtihād are 
not feasible. He argues that absolute mujtahid [mujtahid muṭlaq] is not an achievable rank and is 
unexpected to re-emerge. This is due to the proliferation of technical knowledge in modern 
societies which makes it close to impossible for mujtahids to be cognizant of many venues of social 
and scientific fields.240 Then the question arises of what are the ways in which mujtahids will 
participate in modern life? ʻAṭīya responds to this question by proposing two forms of ijtihād: 
specialized or partial ijtihād (al-ijtihād al-khaṣ aw al-juz’ī) and collective ijtihād (al-ijtihād al-
jamā’ī).241 In other words, ʻAṭīya argues that since the absolute ijtihād, where mujtahids 
“presumed to be all-encompassing and thus wholly creative,”242 is no longer available, ijtihād has 
to be performed in specific fields where mujtahids gain the sufficient knowledge and become 
experts in both jurisprudence and modern technical sciences. The other proposal is to revert to the 
early period where ijtihād was practiced collectively by the Saḥaba (early generation of Muslims), 
hence, it acquired the nature of both Shura and consensus (ijma’). 
Firstly, specialized ijtihād (al-ijtihād al-khaṣ) is a form of ijtihād where the mujtahid 
specializes in giving fatwā in certain fields. ʻAṭīya is referring to the process of iftāʾ (providing a 
non-binding legal opinion), but the mujtahid will be limited to a specific field, e.g. economics or 
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medical. While al-Azhar attempted to introduce modern sciences to school and university curricula 
due to their significant role in understand the relationship between life and religion, ʻAṭīya 
contends that including few books is not sufficient. Therefore, a university major with established 
credit hours should be the main objective, followed by a graduate degree in the same field.243 
ʻAṭīya is proposing that students major in one modern science, e.g. economics, while studying fiqh 
books pertinent to their field of study and by doing that the gap between modern sciences and fiqh 
tradition should be bridged. This form of ijtihād will be significant on the individual level. ʻAṭīya 
seems to be more lenient, or rather less concerned, as he argues that the individual can perform 
their own ijtihād in relation ritual actions (ʿibadāt), if they can perform ijtihād, or follow the ijtihād 
of a certain scholar (taqlīd), whom the individual believes to be the most knowledgeable and this 
marks the jurisdiction for specialized ijtihād. ʻAṭīya states that it is not possible to enforce a legal 
opinion in the private sphere, hence, specialized mujtahids will provide the jurisprudential but 
legally non-binding opinion on the individual level.   
Secondly, collective ijtihād (al-ijtihād al-jamā’ī) takes a legislative and an institutional form. 
ʻAṭīya divides the concept of al-ijtihād al-jamā’ī into two categories: ijtihād and consensus 
(ijmāʿ), then proceeds to describe how this concept will fit into the legal structure of the modern 
nation-state. ʻAṭīya contends that ijmāʿ is a contentious term since it requires the agreement of all 
mujtahids of a certain era over an issue. Then ʻAṭīya states that scholars have debated about 
opposing opinions and whether such opposition overrules the consensus or the extent to which it 
should have an impact. Even consensus of the Saḥaba can be debated whether it complies with the 
conditions of consensus established by the scholars, which require agreement of all mujtahids at 
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the time. Hence, ʻAṭīya agrees with Abdulwahab Khalaf’s (b. 1888- d. 1956) argument244 that the 
ijmāʿ of Saḥaba is a form of Shūra. ʻAṭīya contends that the collective opinion, at the time of 
Saḥaba, is achieved through individual reasoning (ijtihād) in a collective manner and in 
compliance with the Divine Scripture.245 By individual reasoning, I presume, that each of the 
Saḥaba contributes their opinion based on their ijtihād that relies on Divine Scripture, then debate 
about the most convincing evidence.  Then ʻAṭīya proposes to implement this form of collective 
ijtihād in the modern nation-state through an institution which he calls ‘the Ijtihād Institution.’ 
ʻAṭīya states that if this form of collective ijtihād becomes regulated by the ruler, then it establishes 
a legitimacy of the opinion to acquire the rank of ‘wājib’ (obligatory) and supersedes all other 
ijtihād.246 
3.1. The Ijtihād Institution  
Ijtihād Institution, ʻAṭīya suggests, will provide a solution to the codification conundrum. He 
contends that codification is a widely contested subject in the fiqh tradition mainly due to 
constraining the ijtihād process and confining the multiplicity of opinions. ʻAṭīya identifies two 
main trends in the modern period with regard to codification. The first position is advocated by 
Tariq al-Bishri (b. 1933) who argues for a reverse codification; scholars will have to examine 
positive laws, then find a juristic opinion in fiqh books as a basis for the opinions in positive law. 
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through iftāʾ, qaḍāʾ or in a congregation; and 4. ijmāʿ has to be a complete consensus without any opposing 
votes. Khalaf comments that enforceability of such ijmāʿ is not feasible, even at the time of companions. 
Khalaf contends that what took place is the agreement of present members (companion-scholars) of the 
community on a certain issue; hence, it is a form Shūra. See: Abdulwahab Khalaf, ʿilm Uṣūl Al-Fiqh Wa 
Khulaṣat Al-Tashrīʿ Al-Islāmī., 7th edn (Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi), pp. 45–49. 
245 Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah, Al-Naẓariyah Al-ʿammah Lil-Shariʿah Al-Islamiyah, pp. 194–95. 
246 Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah, Al-Naẓariyah Al-ʿammah Lil-Shariʿah Al-Islamiyah, pp. 194–95. 
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In other words, al-Bishri attempts to justify the legitimacy of positive laws through the fiqh 
traditions and argues that within the vastness of fiqh tradition, one can definitely find a juristic 
opinion complying with modern laws. If there are no opinions, then the law must be amended to 
conform with Sharia. The second position is espoused by al-Sanhuri who contends that positive 
laws do not conform with Sharia and codification should be based on Sharʿī sources. While the 
two positions are seemingly opposed, ʻAṭīya considers them complimentary. ʻAṭīya states that al-
Sanhuri is addressing Sharia scholars and urging them to draft fiqh in accordance with the modern 
principles of law, whereas al-Bishri is taking a practical position while encountering the possible 
social issues that might arise, therefore limiting any amendments to what directly violates the 
ordinances of Sharia.247  
Moreover, ʻAṭīya states that the ruler is entitled to adopt a legal opinion which will be 
enforced, as long as it does not contradict with the ordinances of the Divine Scripture. However, 
disagreement between scholars arise on the extent to which the ruler is entitled to practice this 
right. On the one hand, a number of scholars guarantee the right to the judge to practice ijtihād 
based on a number of hypotheses: 1. Codification will always be incomplete and restrict the judge’s 
flexibility; 2. Amending codes is a lengthy and an arduous process; 3. Codification formulates 
legal maxims in response to specific cases which might hinder other cases that do not conform to 
the role; 4. Social affairs develop at a faster pace and the judge’s decision is limited with the code; 
5. Codification has become a tool at the hands of rulers to achieve their political goals and establish 
totalitarian regimes.248  
                                                           
247 ʻAṭīyah and Al-Zuhayli, pp. 41–42. 
248 Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah, Al-Naẓariyah Al-ʿammah Lil-Shariʿah Al-Islamiyah, pp. 204–5. 
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On the other hand, a number of scholars argue in favor of the codification project for a 
number of reasons: 1. Sharia codification enables the laymen to identify its rules and regulations 
which takes place through publishing new laws in news outlets; 2. Multiplicity of legal opinions 
renders them unenforceable, but codifying one legal opinion settles the case; 3. Codification of 
Sharia ordinances facilitates the adjudication process for the judge and litigants; 4. Codification 
eliminates possible inefficient or questionable judges; 5. Adjudication is a right guaranteed to ruler 
and the judge is his representative, hence, the ruler is entitled to decide; 6. Allowing freedom of 
ijtihād requires the judges to be able to practice ijtihād and meet the prerequisite conditions.249 In 
other words, judiciary will follow the general guidelines stipulated by the Ijtihād Institution while 
maintaining the right to practice ijtihād for each case. This, according to ʻAṭīya, provides a 
framework for legal centrality and ijtihād. 
The Ijtihād Institution, argues ʻAṭīya, will take a middle path in this convoluted issue. The 
Ijtihād Institution will draft an Islamic code that is applicable on broad legal principles (kulliyyāt) 
without reference to particular legal maxims (juz’iyāt) which will allow the judiciary some 
flexibility to perform ijtihād and meet the needs of the society. ʻAṭīya proceeds with a number of 
basic principles that will shed more light on the workings of the Ijtihād Institution. The Institution 
will determine the scope of codification, which will include social aspects, e.g. family and personal 
status and financial transactions, and will not include liturgical actions (ʿibadāt) and morality. 
While the institution will not regulate morality, it will lay the foundations of moral issues that are 
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directly related to social affairs such as organizing zakāh (alms-giving) collection and 
discretionary punishment (taʿzīr)250 on moral violations.251  
The controversial aspect in this statement is the employment of taʿzīr to administer morality. 
Hence, ʻAṭīya draws a distinction between public morals in positive law and in Sharia. There are 
a number of demarcations between what constitutes morality in positive law and in Sharia. ʻAṭīya 
contends that the idea of public morals is connected with the public and private and the objective 
of achieving public interest. For instance, in public law all agreements that contradict public 
interest are null and void such as violation of personal liberty and freedom of speech which 
constitutes public discipline.252 The concept of public discipline is a flexible and a changing notion 
that copes with every era and time to suit the needs of society. For instance, slavery was accepted 
as part of the social order and public discipline but in a modern context it is a violation. Thus, 
public discipline is based upon prevalent social ideologies that are reflected in the legal system. In 
Sharia the public morality is determined by the limits of Sharia itself not according to public 
desires. In essence, public morality in Sharia is regulated by the ordinances of what is permissible 
and what is prohibited, and public interest is a priority, whereas in positive law morality is 
regulated by what is socially acceptable, which, according to ʻAṭīya, might not comply with 
Sharia’s ordinances.253 
While in theory the concept seems virtuous and is supposed to improve moral code of the 
community, it is difficult to determine which moral code the government will be administering. 
                                                           
250 Punishment for crime not measuring up to the strict requirements of ḥadd punishments, although they 
are of the same nature, or those for which specific punishments have not been fixed by the Quran. See: 
Esposito, 'Tazir.’  
251 Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah, Al-Naẓariyah Al-ʿammah Lil-Shariʿah Al-Islamiyah, p. 207. 
252 Ibid. 161–62. 
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For instance, the Islamic Republic of Iran has created revolutionary courts in June 1979 and their 
jurisdiction included unlawful detention and other political matters. Competence of revolutionary 
courts expanded and in 1981 the courts started trying sexual offences and prescribed punishment 
(Ḥadd) 254 crimes. Two issues of concern can be raised in dealing with the concepts of Ḥadd and 
taʿzīr (discretionary punishment). First, the sentences can be based on general verses from the 
Qur’an and Hadith which can be abused during application. For instance, “[v]ery often the charge 
on which convictions were based was taken from Koran 5:33, viz. "fighting God and His 
Messenger (muḥārabat Allāh wa-rasūlihi)" and "spreading corruption on earth (al-saʿy fī l-arḍ 
fasādan), for which the courts could impose punishments like alternate amputation, and the death 
penalty.”255 The second, which is more essential, is the fact that administering criminal law in 
Islam, whether Ḥadd or taʿzīr, is surrounded by many restraints which renders the application of 
law to be a difficult process. Peters comments on the application of Islamic criminal law in Iran 
by suggesting that: 
“the testimonies of eyewitnesses are generally difficult to find; it is evident that most sentences were 
pronounced on the strength of admissions and that one may have justified doubts as to whether 
these were obtained without undue pressure. For heavy reliance on confession as a means of 
proving crime can be an incentive for the police to apply torture on the suspect during the 
preliminary investigation.”256  
                                                           
254 A punishment fixed in the Quran and hadith for crimes considered to be against the rights of God. The 
six crimes for which punishments are fixed are theft (amputation of the hand), illicit sexual relations 
(death by stoning or one hundred lashes), making unproven accusations of illicit sex (eighty lashes), 
drinking intoxicants (eighty lashes), apostasy (death or banishment), and highway robbery (death). See: 
Esposito,' Hadd.'  
255 Rudolph Peters, ‘The Islamization of Criminal Law: A Comparative Analysis’, Die Welt Des Islams, 34.2 
(1994), 246–74 (p. 260) <https://doi.org/10.2307/1570932>. 
256 Peters, ‘The Islamization of Criminal Law: A Comparative Analysis’, p. 262. 
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In other words, application of prescribed punishment (Ḥadd) can be a difficult task and 
discretionary punishment (taʿzīr) could serve as a tool in the hands of the ruler. 
In addition to determining the scope of codification, ʻAṭīya refers a number of significant 
principles to elaborate on the modes of operation of the Ijtihād Institution. First, the Institution 
will be responsible for dividing codified ordinances into two categories: a commanding statement 
which is obligatory; and a commentary and complementary report, which contracting parties refer 
to, but preserve contracting parties the right to choose another legal opinion as long as it has Sharʿī 
basis. Second, the institution will legislate the general principles and avoid minute details to allow 
judiciary flexibility to tailor the legal opinion and without limiting the law. Third, the institution 
will not be confined to one doctrinal school but will select any legal opinion that achieves the 
public interest (maṣlaḥa) provided that the opinion is in compliance with the Sharʿī approach of 
inference and is based on evidence from Divine Scripture. The inference methodology and 
evidence for each opinion will be stated in an explanatory report to facilitate the task for judges.257 
It is noteworthy that ʻAṭīya suggests a comparative approach towards fiqh studies that includes 
non-Sunni sects such as Ja'fari, Zaydi and Ibāḍi and include their opinions in the codified law. This 
inclusive approach, argues ʻAṭīya, is aimed to eliminate intolerance and educate the public that the 
disagreement among scholars is based on different inferences or exegesis of a religious text.258 
Moreover, ʻAṭīya contends that the ruler is entitled to transform the moral code into an enforceable 
doctrine in a manner that achieves public interest.259  
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3.2. Ijtihād Institution, Judiciary and Executive Bodies  
Scholars of Islamic law have proposed different models to integrate Sharia into modern society. 
Such models have been prescribed, identified and explained, but many scholars overlook the 
significance of highlighting the power dynamics within the structure of the nation-state. In his 
endeavor to overcome this challenge, ʻAṭīya ventures to identify the roles of judiciary and 
executive bodies.  
Judiciary and executive bodies are not tasked with legislation, argues ʻAṭīya, however, 
such bodies are entitled to legislate in specific situations. ʻAṭīya defines judiciary as the body that 
hears and adjudicates lawsuits; therefore, they are not required to legislate. Nonetheless, judiciary 
have the authority to legislate in two cases: legislative vacuum and precedents. With regard to 
legislative vacuum, ʻ Aṭīya argues that a judge is required to provide their legal opinion in a lawsuit. 
Therefore, in case of lack of direct ordinance in the Divine Scripture, the judge will perform ijtihād 
through drafting a legal maxim for the particular case that does not follow any legal maxim and 
employ the new particular (furuʿ) to adjudicate the case. With respect to precedents, ʻAṭīya 
identifies the precedent in this context as a source for regulations as in the “English system.” 
However, the precedent does not constitute a source for ordinances (aḥkām) in Sharia for other 
judges, or even the same judge but their main role is to provide guidance.260  
 The executive bodies are entitled to legislate under specific conditions. By executive bodies 
ʻAṭīya means caliphs, rulers and ministers who derive their authority from God’s sovereignty in 
accordance with the verse: “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and 
those in authority among you” (4:59). Obedience, according to ʻAṭīya, includes three categories of 
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decisions issued by executive bodies: 1. Edicts in the framework of Sharia-based policy (al-siyāsa 
al-Sharʿiyya)261 that take the form of public laws that may not necessarily require ijtihād but 
require technical and administrative expertise such as traffic law, commercial register and public 
notary. The Ijtihād Institution, however, will review such laws in order to ensure their 
compatibility with Sharia and the overall body of legislation. 2. Bylaws and regulations that 
organize internal operations within the administrative body of the state or elaborate the details of 
public laws. 3. Administrative decisions within state bodies and ministries.262  
 In sum, we notice that ʻ Aṭīya attempts to balance between the legal centrality of the nation-
state and plurality of ijtihād. ʻAṭīya’s proposal attempts to integrate the civil law, statutory law, 
with the common law, that is regulated based on the concept of precedent. But the precedent 
operates differently in the way it does not constitute a binding rule but a guiding principle. The 
model of ʻAṭīya’s precedent resembles the concept of analogy (qiyās) in the way it establishes a 
legal precedent but not obligatory and its main function is to elaborate the legal reasoning of the 
adjudication. ʻAṭīya states that a supreme court will supervise the Ijtihād Institution and court 
verdicts to ensure the sovereignty of the Sharia.263 Moreover, those who loosen and bind (ahl al-
ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd) will supervise the decision of the ruler/caliph to ensure compatibility and 
conformity with Sharia. Hence, both the ruler and those who loosen and bind should be able to 
perform ijtihād to ensure familiarity with the ordinances of Sharia. ʻAṭīya does not provide new 
prerequisites for the ruler or for those who loosen and bind and suffices by referring to the 
                                                           
261 A broad doctrine of Islamic law that authorizes the caliph/ruler to determine the ways in which the 
Sharia should be administered through discretionary measures, rules and policies. One principle 
condition in that any regulation should not violate Sharia. See: Kamali, Siyasa Shar’īyya or the Policies of 
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262 Jamāl al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah, Al-Naẓariyah Al-ʿammah Lil-Shariʿah Al-Islamiyah, pp. 213–14. 
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conditions established by earlier scholars in fiqh books.264 This legislative model, however, does 
not indicate how the members of the Ijtihād Institution will be selected, either as members of the 
parliament through public selection, by appointment by the ruler, or selection by the scholars 
amongst themselves. 
4. Objectives of Sharia (Maqāṣid al-Sharī’ā) 
In this section we examine the role of objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid al-Sharī’ā) in ʻAṭīya’s model. 
An overview of the different models for maqāṣid should precede our discussion of ʻAṭīya’s 
proposal to explore the possible changes. Then we will proceed to examine the related aspects of 
the maqāṣid.  
The concept of maqāṣid was “in inchoate and abstract form” during the first four centuries 
of Islam and only after that it developed through a discussion on God’s objective of the law, mainly 
in theological debates.265 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) was the first jurisprudent to discuss the 
maqāṣid in an elaborate manner and states that “God’s purpose in revealing his law to humankind 
is man’s maṣlaḥa, which consists of preserving five vital goods, called the five necessities (al-
ḍarūrāt al-khamsah): religion (dīn), life (nafs), intellect (ʿaql), offspring/lineage (nasl), and 
property (māl).”266 A number of scholars have contributed to the discussion on maqāṣid. For 
instance, al-Qarāfī added a sixth element, to the five prescribed by al-Ghazālī, which is protection 
of honor “al-ʿirḍ.” Another prominent scholar in the study of maqāṣid is Ibn Taymiyya who 
departed from the notion of confining maqāṣid to a certain number and argued that “the Sharīʿah 
promoted such other values as fulfilment of contracts, preservation of the ties of kinship, good 
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relations with one’s neighbours, moral purity, trustworthiness and the love of God on which the 
Qur’an and Sunnah were equally explicit. These he maintained should be added to the list of the 
maqāṣid.”267  
Maqāṣid is meant to achieve the balance between the spiritual and the material, and 
between the interests of the individual and the society. ʻAṭīya considers rules of maqāṣid to be part 
of the legal methodology of uṣūl al-fiqh; since maqāṣid aids the scholars in interpreting the 
Scripture to reach the public interest.268 The question, then, arises, what are the ways in which 
ʻAṭīya suggests to employ the concept of maqāṣid in inferring the legal ruling? ʻAṭīya contends 
that public interest can be achieved through inference from maqāṣid without employing 
complicated legal tools such as qiyās. For instance, drinking wine is prohibited to achieve the 
principle of ‘preserving the mind.’ This ruling can be conveyed through regular analogy (qiyās) to 
include other forms of alcohol beverages. The ratio legis (al-ʿilla) in this context is ‘preventing 
absence of mind’ can be expanded through al-qiyās al-wāsiʿ (lit. wide-range analogy)269 to include 
everything that could lead to the absence of mind, e.g. narcotics. In the regular and expanded form 
of analogy, a ratio legis has to be the basis of the ruling. However, by applying maqāṣid, ʻAṭīya 
suggests, we can further expand on the concept of ‘preserving the mind’ to include prohibition on 
issues such as superstitions and sorcery. This is possible without reference to the ratio legis but 
through inference from general Scripture ordinances that call for ‘enjoining good and forbidding 
wrong.’270 In this sense, ʻAṭīya suggests that scholars will be able to rely on general concepts of 
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maqāṣid, such as ‘preserving the mind,’ to adjudicate legal cases without having to undergo the 
intricate process of relying on ratio legis. Therefore, ʻAṭīya proposes a new classification to 
expand on the scope and application of maqāṣid in a modern context.271 
ʻAṭīya argues that the study of maqāṣid has suffered a stagnation since the time of al-
Shāṭibī (b. 1320 - d. 1388) as the efforts of following scholars were limited to either summarizing 
or rearranging what al-Shāṭibī established. ʻAṭīya contends that al-Shāṭibī followed certain 
methods and means to ascertain the maqāṣid which, according to ʻAṭīya can be summarized as: 
- Explicit texts from Divine Scripture (Qur’an and Hadith) which constitute the basis for 
ratiocination and ratio legis (al-ʿilla) in legal rulings  
- “Inductive analysis of the actions of the Lawgiver, which may be divided into two types. 
The first type is an inductive reading of the legal rulings whose bases (ʿilla) have been 
determined by means of recognized approaches (māsalik al-ʿilla), yet without an explicit 
text from the Qur’an or the Sunnah. The second is an inductive reading of the various 
pieces of textual evidence in support of legal rulings which have a common objective 
(ghāyah) and basis (bāʿith).  
- The Companions’ understanding of the rulings found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah.”272 
ʻAṭīya contends that it is significant to take into account the role of reason and innate understanding 
(al-fiṭrah) advocated by other scholars.273 For instance, ʻ Aṭīya gives an example of al-Juwaynī, the 
Imam of the Two Sacred Shrines, who devotes a chapter in his book titled al-Burhān to a 
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discussion of inductive reasoning (istidlāl) in which he advocates for its use in the absence of 
Divine Scripture.274 By calling our attention to the role of reason and the different suggestions of 
earlier scholars, ʻAṭīya contends that maqāṣid should not be limited to Divine Scripture but the 
concept should be expanded to include any source or method that achieves public interest. 
 ʻAṭīya makes a few references before formulating the new classification. First, he argues 
that it is necessary to exclude some of the concepts and ideas that are related to maqāṣid but tend 
to be confused with them, including such concepts as “innate human disposition or understanding 
(al-fiṭrah) and beneficence (al-samāḥah), distinguishing features [of the Law] such as alleviation 
and the elimination of hardship, means and mechanisms such as the prohibition against legal 
subterfuges, closing and/or opening the door to legal artifices (Sadd al-dharāʾiʿ) and respect for 
Islamic legislation, as well as major values of relevance, the sum total of which goes to make up 
‘the philosophy of legislation.”275 Second, he contends that maqāṣid as objectives of Sharia will 
be the main focus; therefore, “it is necessary to adhere to the criterion laid down by al-Ghazali, 
namely, the search for human interests recognized by the Law, and not human interests in their 
non-restricted sense as understood by human beings without reference to the Law.” 276 But it should 
also be noted that: 
“[o]f the human interests recognized by the Law, some are religious/spiritual in nature, while others are 
earthly/material in nature. Hence, adherence to the Law does not require that we restrict ourselves solely 
to so-called religious interests, since Islam does not recognize this type of distinction between the sacred 
and the worldly. Rather, maqāṣid relating to pure worship and devotion, maqāṣid relating to pure 
human interest, and those which are common to both, are all included within maqāṣid al-sharʿ, that is, 
                                                           
274 Ibid. p. 2. 
275 Ibid. p. 104. 
276  Ibid. p. 104. 
 105
the objectives of the Law, in a single, integrated system which encompasses the realm of what has come 
to be termed human rights.”277  
 The higher maqāṣid, according to ʻAṭīya, are “embodied in the worship of God, acting as 
His vicegerents on earth, and populating and developing the earth through faith and its 
requirements. Such requirements of faith include righteous action which achieves happiness both 
in this life and the next, which encompasses both the material and spiritual aspects of existence, 
and which strikes a balance between the interests of the individual and those of society, between 
particular national interests and the interests of humanity at large, and between the interests of the 
current generations and those of generations to come. All such intents, moreover, “find their 
expression on the respective levels of the individual, the family, the Ummah and all of 
humanity.”278 ʻAṭīya states that he has divided the discussion on each maqṣid into three sections. 
In the first section, he highlights the concept of the maqṣid under discussion. In the second section, 
he provides “evidence in its support in the form of texts from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and in 
the form of an inductive reading of subsidiary legal rulings which have been issued toward the 
achievement of said intent, or maqṣid.”279 In the third section, he presents “an exposition of the 
ranks of essentials, exigencies and enhancements as they pertain to the means by which the maqṣid 
of relevance may be achieved.” 280 
4.1. The Maqāṣid as They Pertain to the Individual  
Under this category we find ʻ Aṭīya have enumerated the five objectives that the traditional scholars 
have formulated, with some differences. The five objectives include preserving religion (dīn), life 
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(nafs), intellect (ʿaql), offspring/lineage (nasl), and property (māl). ʻAṭīya emphasizes three 
differences from the traditional view on the five principles: “(1) the definition of the content of 
‘religion’, with consequent differences among scholars with respect to where they rank religion in 
relation to the other universals, (2) the choice of the word ‘honor’ (ʿirḍ) for the fourth universal 
[rather than either ‘progeny’ (nasl) or ‘family lineage’ (nasab)], and (3) revisions relating to the 
secondary maqāṣid for each of the five universals.281 
 First, preservation of life (nafs) includes protection from death, damage or harm to the 
body, which is equivalent to ‘the right to life’ in the positive law. This can be achieved through 
“provision of security in order to prevent attacks on people’s lives, prohibitions against murder, 
assault, and suicide, enforcement of the law of retribution against those who commit deliberate 
aggression against others,” and meeting the requirements of livelihood including food, drink, 
clothes and shelter. To fulfill this maqṣid, ʻAṭīya contends, there is a need for personal freedom 
and dignity. ʻAṭīya argues that “both animals and humans need food and drink in order to survive, 
however humans also have psychological and spiritual needs. Hence, the preservation of human 
life is not possible apart from the preservation of all these aspects together, which thereby take on 
the status of essentials.”282  
 Second, preservation of the intellect (ʿaql) “is composed of three main elements, namely: 
(1) the development of the mind, (2) the preservation of the mind, and (3) the utilization of the 
mind. Hence, although scholars have traditionally referred to this objective as the preservation of 
the mind, or human reason, we prefer to call it consideration for the mind in order to ensure that it 
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encompasses all of these elements at once.”283 These three elements include a variety of sub-
categories that range from scientific thought and nourishing the mind with knowledge to avoiding 
anything that would damage the brain or cause mental breakdown. ʻAṭīya expands on this 
subcategory to include blind imitation, groundless speculation and superstitions, to the extent that 
he suggests avoiding media outlets that promote brainwashing or misleading information.284  
 Third, preservation of personal piety (tadayyun). ʻAṭīya argues that “it is necessary first to 
preserve human life, which is the basis for all human action, then the mind, which is the basis for 
our being held accountable before God’s law, and only then personal piety [which is only possible 
given the soundness of the first two].”285 Preservation of personal piety can be attained through 
“establishing and strengthening a sound doctrine” through contemplation and comprehension of 
Qur’an and Hadith, and “shunning of the major sins relating to doctrine, such as shirk, or 
association of partners with God, hypocrisy, showing off, unfounded religious innovations, etc.”286 
It can also be achieved through performance of obligatory liturgical actions and abiding by the 
codes of integrity, truthfulness and sincerity in Islam. 
Fourth, preservation of honor (ʿirḍ) has a broad scope. ʻAṭīya defines “ʿirḍ” as :the “aspect 
of a person [on the basis of] which he seeks to protect his life and [to prevent his] noble descent 
or reputation from being disparaged or defamed.”287 ʿIrḍ is not restricted to the sexual aspect of 
one’s being but extends to include human dignity, sanctity and private life. Therefore, this 
subcategory aims to “prevent people from causing someone harm by the easiest of means, that is, 
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through words. There are explicit texts [in the Qur’an and the Sunnah] prohibiting attacks on 
others’ honor by means of false accusations, slander, etc.”288 
Fifth, preservation of material wealth which is close to the concept of property (māl) in the 
traditional division. ʻAṭīya contends that ‘material wealth’ refers to “the wealth of the individual; 
as for that of the family and the Ummah,” and that wealth, from an Islamic perspective, belongs 
to God and humans are his deputies on earth and are responsible before Him for “how they put 
wealth to use.”289 Therefore, argues ʻAṭīya, “what follows from the first premise [i.e., that all 
wealth belongs to God] is that ownership, rather than being an absolute right, has a social function, 
while the second premise [i.e., concerning humans’ role as God’s deputies on earth] leads to the 
conclusion that work is a duty not only in order to earn one’s living but, in addition, in order to 
populate and develop the earth.”290 To this end, Islam has established legal rulings to regulate 
obtaining and preserving material wealth. Such rulings include contracts, inheritance, moderation 
in expenditure and punishment for theft and other crimes. 
4.2. The Maqāṣid as They Pertain to the Family  
ʻAṭīya states that ‘family’ is the nucleus of society and constitutes the most significant form of 
connection and organization throughout history. Therefore, Islam has attempted to provide 
numerous regulating rules to manage family affairs. ʻAṭīya identifies that earlier scholars have 
attempted to examine this aspect of maqāṣid but with some limitations. For instance, al-Ghazali 
explores the maqāṣid of marriage, yet very broadly. Other scholars, such as Ibn ʿĀshūr (b. 1879 - 
d. 1973), was concerned with the objectives of Sharia in all of its divisions and distinguished 
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between the rulings of marriage in Islam and in pre-Islamic times, such as family lineage, 
declaration of bond, temporality and blood relations. However, ʻAṭīya contends, the points raised 
by Ibn ʿĀshūr were maqāṣid of subsidiary, particular rulings within the framework of family 
relations, not the general maqāṣid of Sharia. ʻAṭīya states that his approach is different as it 
explores “family-related rulings in the context of viewing the family as one of the spheres for 
which we are searching for general maqāṣid al-Sharī’a.”291 Thus, ʻAṭīya provides seven maqāṣid 
within the framework of family. 
 The first objective is ‘regulating the relationship between the sexes.’ Sharia aims to 
organize the relationship between the sexes rather than leaving it to natural impulses by prescribing 
a permissible framework with rights and responsibilities: marriage. Therefore, a number of legal 
rulings have been established including “those which encourage marriage, sanction polygamy and 
divorce (with their associated conditions), enjoin the avoidance of relations outside marriage, 
whether in the form of adultery or sexual perversion, close off the paths to temptation by means 
of chastity and the wearing of hījab to prohibit a man and a woman from being alone together.”292 
The second objective is preservation of offspring. Sharia affirms the objective that heterosexual 
relationships, within the legitimate framework, aim to preserve offspring conforming with God’s 
way. To achieve this intent, marriage and procreation are encouraged, while other actions such as 
burying females and abortion are prohibited. Hence, procreation is considered among the essential 
maqāṣid and is regulated by multiple rulings within the context of marriage, divorce and 
polygamy.293  
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The third objective is achieving harmony, affection and compassion. ʻAṭīya states that the 
marriage relationship between the two sexes should not be confined to a mere physical interaction 
but partners should find compassion and repose in each other. Therefore, “Sharia has issued rulings 
concerning living together as a couple in kindness and harmony, rules of etiquette governing sexual 
intercourse, as well as other rulings which provide the possibility of a family atmosphere filled 
with warmth, tenderness and refined human sentiment.”294 The fourth objective is preservation of 
family lineage (nasab). It is an essential maqṣid, argues ʻAṭīya, to preserve the nasab, therefore, 
Sharia has prescribed a number of ordinances which include prohibition of adultery and 
prescribing waiting periods for divorced women or widows.295 The fifth objective is preservation 
of personal piety within the family. ʻAṭīya attempts to highlight the significance of personal piety 
in the framework of family by drawing examples from successful and unsuccessful experiences of 
Prophets such as Abraham, Jacob and Noah. ʻAṭīya notes that it is the responsibility of the head of 
the household to ensure religious piety starting with a religious partner, educating the offspring 
about their religion and morality as prescribed in the Qur’an: ““And bid thy people [family] to 
pray, and persevere therein” (20:132).”296  
The sixth objective is organizing the institutional aspect of the family and by that ʻAṭīya 
means that he views the family as an integrated permanent structure where members have right 
and obligation to fulfill. ʻAṭīya elaborates on the internal dynamics by stating that 
 “[t]he family is led by its head, who is assigned guardianship (qiwāmah) and who consults with 
his wife concerning the family’s affairs. In this context, the spouses follow an approach laid out by Sharia 
for arbitration in the event of a dispute between them and for severing the marital bond if the dispute 
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becomes insoluble. This organization is not restricted to the nuclear family, consisting only of the parents 
and their children, but applies equally to what has come to be termed the extended family which includes 
relatives and in-laws. Hence, Sharia has established arrangements for relations among all these various 
parties.”297 
Therefore, Sharia contains detailed rulings on regulating the relationship between husband, wife 
and children highlighting rights and duties of each member towards the other and the family, 
altogether. Such rulings include waiting period, living allowance and divorce. The seventh 
objective is organizing the financial affairs of the family. ʻAṭīya states that Sharia has prescribed 
details accounts and ordinances for organizing social, emotional and financial affairs of the 
household. This includes dowry, wife allowance, wet nurses and many other types. This aspect 
moves beyond the nuclear family to include wills made out on behalf of next-of-kin, endowments 
and paying blood money on behalf of relatives. 
4.3. The Maqāṣid as they Pertain to the Umma 
ʻAṭīya divides maqāṣid of Sharia with respect to the Umma into seven subsections with the 
objective of isolating the exact maqāṣid that promote the status of Umma, at the same time ʻAṭīya 
admits that there is correlation between all the maqāṣid on the individual and collective levels. The 
first objective is concerned with institutional organization of the Umma. ʻAṭīya agrees with 
Qaradawi in viewing the Umma as “a distinctive entity with its own particular characteristics, 
components and organizations.”298 ʻAṭīya contends that Sharia does not have strict procedures that 
would confine application in any era and gives the example of legal personality. Sharia 
acknowledges the concept of legal personality in certain occasions, such as waqf, but not in an 
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absolute sense. Sharia, however, focused on unifying the Umma under one doctrine (ʿaqīda) and 
allowed pluralism of doctrinal schools and does not contradict multi-party system in the general 
Islamic framework. ʻAṭīya argues that the core principle should be sovereignty of Sharia over any 
modern or pre-modern ideologies. After acknowledging this premise, one can derive the 
institutional basis such as collective organization based on the report from the Prophet that says: 
“If there are three of you, appoint one of the three of you to be your leader,” and the recognition 
of Shura based on the Qur’an: “whose rule [in all matters of common concern] is consultation 
among themselves” (42:38).299 
The second objective is preserving security which takes two forms: internal and external. 
By internal security, ʻAṭīya refers to legislation of laws and regulations to preserve life, honor and 
property and prescribing sanctions and punishments if violated. By external security, ʻ Aṭīya means 
ensuring the ability and forces to deter others from committing acts of aggression against the 
Umma. The third objective is concerned with establishing justice which, according to ʻAṭīya, can 
take multiple forms: being justice with God, with one’s self and with one’s family, and with others. 
In the context of Umma, justice here entails justice in adjudication (qaḍāʾ) and ruling (ḥukm). 
Justice, states ʻAṭīya, is a key maqṣid of Sharia promoted by the Qur’an in multiple occasions: 
“Indeed, [even aforetime] did We send forth Our apostles with all evidence of [this] truth; and 
through them We bestowed revelation from on high, and [thus gave you] a balance [wherewith to 
weigh right and wrong], so that men might behave with equity” (57:25).300 The fourth objective is 
focused on preservation of religion and morals. ʻAṭīya states that Sharia does not acknowledge the 
separation of ethics and morals from religion, as the case in secular systems which “have a limited 
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conception of general morality based on commonly agreed upon ethical standards which are not 
to be violated.”301 Preservation of religion, in the context of Umma, can be achieved through 
prevention of any action that might undermine the principles of religion and through adherence to 
religious teachings. To preserve religion on the collective level, Sharia has required communal 
prayer, Friday congregation and pilgrimage in order for the Muslim community to sense the 
doctrinal bond that unites them. Morals have a great importance in Islam, on the individual and 
collective levels, and have been promoted by the Prophet in multiple reports, such as: “I have been 
sent to perfect noble traits of character.”302  
The fifth objective is cooperation, solidarity and shared responsibility. ʻAṭīya argues that 
these terms are connected and encompass areas culture, society and economy, however, they 
cannot be imposed by force but can be derived from Scripture on unity and brotherhood, such as: 
(“All of you are descended from Adam…”) and the brotherhood born of faith (“All believers are 
but brethren” [49:10]). Furthermore, Scripture has enumerated different ways cooperation and 
solidarity can take place. For instance, Scripture urges Muslims “to confirm and fulfill this intent: 
from the inclusive command to cooperate in furthering virtue and God consciousness rather than 
evil and enmity, to its practical manifestations such as the requirement to pay zakāh and spend of 
one’s substance in charitable ways in general, and the possibility of levying a tax on the wealthy 
whose proceeds go to help the poor; add to this various other expressions of charity and 
benevolence.”303 The sixth objective is the dissemination of knowledge and preservation of reason 
in the Umma. ʻAṭīya states that this maqṣid can take two forms: prohibition of damage and 
nurturing the mind. Prohibition of damage can be through preventing the spread of drunkenness 
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and intoxication among members of society or misleading news outlets that brainwash the 
community and spread mindless bigotry. Nurturing the mind can take place through contemplating 
and scientific thinking. To ascertain this maqṣid, Sharia has prescribed a number of ordinances 
directly such as prohibition of consumption of intoxicants or indirectly regarding avoiding damage, 
mental or physical.304 The seventh objective is populating and developing the earth and preserving 
the Umma’s wealth. This maqṣid is concerned with civic engagement through collective 
participation and financial support. ʻAṭīya contends that material wealth belongs to God and 
humans are his deputies; hence, “ownership has a public function and is not an unqualified right” 
which means that funds may be in possession of certain individuals, but they also belong to the 
Umma.305 To achieve this intent, a number of ordinances can be found in Sharia on Zakāh, 
charitable contributions and dedicating one-third of one’s will to charitable uses. Moreover, 
society is encouraged to participate in economic activities such as enhancing public facilities, 
establishing an endowment system, facilities for the homeless.306  
4.4. The Maqāṣid as they Pertain to Humanity 
In this maqṣid we find ʻAṭīya examining the international relations and to what extent an Islamic 
state should export its Islamic identity. First, ʻAṭīya notes that some scholars use the term ‘the 
nation to be called’ (Ummat al-daʿwa) instead of ‘the abode of unbelief’ (dār al-kufr) and then he 
proceeds to state that scholars have disputed “whether non-Muslims are addressed by the 
subsidiary rulings of Islamic law or whether they are simply being called to faith in God.”307 ʻ Aṭīya 
states his position as follows: 
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“Universal legal rulings – as opposed to Islamic law’s subsidiary rulings – are not limited to calling 
non-Muslims to faith in God. When the Qur’anic discourse employs the address, “O mankind!” (2:21 
and elsewhere) or, “O man!” (82:6 and elsewhere), this is not limited to the call to faith, although this 
is its primary focus. Rather, such discourse is advocating universal principles, one’s response to 
which does not depend on prior faith but, rather, on reason and logic.”308 
ʻAṭīya proceeds to state that implementation of Sharia principles and maqāṣid constitute the 
objective of Muslim government’s foreign policy in dealing with other nations. Therefore, 
maqāṣid on the realm of humanity take different forms. 
 The first objective of Sharia is mutual understanding and cooperation. ʻAṭīya begins this 
section by relying on a verse from the Qur’an about complete equality between all races: “O men! 
Behold, We have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and 
tribes, so that you might come to know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God 
is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-Knowing, all-Aware” (49:13). 
ʻAṭīya states that there is not any form of tribal or ethnic superiority, but the distinction is based 
on spiritual purity. Moreover, cooperation among the different races and ethnicities is based on the 
maqṣid of mutual understanding, which arises from interaction. The second objective is realizing 
human viceregency on earth. ʻAṭīya states that humans are deputies of God on earth, therefore, 
they have the freedom of choice and also burdened with the consequences of their choices. There 
are two types of succession: one humanity at large and the other to the Islamic Umma, which was 
discussed on the section on maqāṣid pertaining to Umma. Succession to humanity covers a variety 
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of subjects such as protecting the environment, fighting crime and development of agricultural 
lands.309  
The third objective is achieving world peace based on justice. This objective is focused on 
war and peace and the ambivalence surrounding them. ʻ Aṭīya criticizes the claim that Islamic states 
are war-inclined by arguing that that the justification for war is defense against an invasion and 
quotes a number of verses from the Qur’an: “And [thus it is:] had thy Sustainer so willed, all those 
who live on earth would surely have attained to faith, all of them: dost thou, then, think that thou 
couldst compel people to believe?” (10:99), and “There shall be no coercion in matters of faith” 
(2:256).”310 The original relation between Muslims and non-Muslims is based on peace, from an 
Islamic perspective, in accordance with various Hadiths and verses from the Qur’an: “But if they 
incline to peace, incline thou to it as well…” (8:61). Therefore, in order to fulfill this maqṣid, 
ʻAṭīya suggests “the creation of an international organization which would ensure collective 
security, organizing cooperation in a variety of areas arranging treaties among states and 
overseeing their implementation.”311 The fourth objective is international protection of human 
rights. This objective ensures “extending assistance to the oppressed everywhere and protection of 
freedoms and rights, particularly the freedom of thought and religious belief, have been among 
Islam’s major concerns, lest tyrannical regimes prevent the Islamic message from reaching all 
people.”312 The fifth objective is  dissemination of the Islamic message which is shouldered by all 
Muslims. The core message of Islam, which should be disseminated, revolves around existence 
and oneness of God and abiding by His rules and staying away from His prohibitions. ʻ Aṭīya states 
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that the message of Islam should be communicated through “wisdom, gentle exhortation, and 
reasoned dialogue, but not through coercion of others to embrace Islamic doctrine.”313 
4.5. Realization of Maqāṣid  
In this section we discuss what ʻAṭīya aims to achieve from his new classification and the way in 
which it complements his proposal for a new legislature. ʻAṭīya argues that “legal studies dealing 
with positive law lack discussions of maqaṣid, and that Islamic legal studies lack discussions of 
the function of positive law in the organization of society and the extent to which the state should 
intervene in individual freedoms.”314 Therefore, he formulates this new categorization of maqāṣid 
in hope to develop their implementation particularly in relation to “the subdivisions of Islamic law 
and to the modern sciences.”315  
ʻAṭīya criticizes some of the ways in which earlier scholars have investigated maqāṣid. For 
instance, ʻAṭīya begins by asking the question: “What, then, is meant by the term maqāṣid-based 
ijtihād? Is there some new concept which requires a designation, or are we dealing with the use of 
a new term to refer to an old entity, mechanism or type of evidence?”316 ʻAṭīya refers to two 
prominent scholars who have examined maqāṣid-based ijtihād: al-Raysuni (b. 1953 - ) Nour al-
Din al-Khadimi (b. 1963 - ). In his book titled Maqāṣid-Based Ijtihād al-Khadimi discusses 
maqāṣid and the ways in which it can be employed to infer new rulings. However, ʻAṭīya believes 
that “al-Khadimi’s book makes no reference to any sort of new mechanism, [and that] maqāṣid are 
not independent from other types of evidence derived from Islamic law. Hence, he [al-Khadimi] 
offers no justification for applying this new designation and fails to make clear what it adds to 
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already recognized Islamic legal evidence.”317 On the other hand, ʻAṭīya states that al-Raysuni 
provides a much more elaborate discussion on maqāṣid-based ijtihād in his book titled Imam al-
Shāṭibī’s Theory of the Higher Objectives & Objectives of Sharia. Al-Raysuni outlines four 
principles of maqāṣid-based ijtihād: “1. The inseparability of texts and rulings from their intents, 
2. Combining universal principles with evidence applicable to particular cases, 3. Achieving 
benefit and preventing harm, and 4. Consideration of outcomes.”318 However, ʻAṭīya states that 
maqāṣid-based ijtihād, as articulated by al-Raysuni, falls under the category of unrestricted interest 
(istiṣlāḥ) and “it would seem most fitting – given that our theme is that of ‘interests’ – not to allow 
maqāṣid to be treated or viewed separately from uṣūl al-fiqh but, rather, to preserve them as an 
advanced branch of Islamic jurisprudence which serves to support and assist it in developing its 
remaining branches.”319 
ʻAṭīya suggests developing the maqāṣid in order to formulate a complete juristic system 
which includes all branches, present and future, without waiting for the emergence of a particular 
case in order to issue a legal ruling appropriate thereto, which is regulated as follows:  
“1. Ascertaining the maqāṣid which belong to the two categories identified by al-Ghazali, namely: 
(a) those which are ascertained based on numerous pieces of textual evidence and which are 
definitive in nature, and (b) those which are in keeping with some fundamental principle which, 
though it is not specified in the Law, does not conflict with, and is not overridden by a definitive 
principle derived from the Qur’an, the Sunnah or the consensus of the Muslim community. 2. 
Classifying these maqāṣid and building them into an intellectual edifice in which similarities and 
parallels are brought together and divided into groups according to their subject matter, thereby 
                                                           
317  Ibid. p. 161. 
318 Ibid. p.162  
319  Ibid. p. 168. 
 119
revealing the features of the Islamic legal conceptualization in relation to each subject according to 
the divisions of contemporary juristic writings. 3. Adding to each of the maqāṣid the means which 
serve to lead to its realization, drawing upon whatever modern tools and approaches do not conflict 
with Islamic legal principles. 4. Adding to the maqāṣid and wasā’il belonging to each group those 
Islamic legal rules which apply specifically thereto, as well as general Islamic legal rules of 
relevance. Such rules of both types may be viewed as a basic part of each group’s structure, since 
they represent Islamic legal rulings derived from other evidence found in Islamic law. 5. 
Constructing an integrated theory for each group from which branches may be derived, which may 
be drawn upon in a way which serves to achieve the maqāṣid, and which harmonizes with Islamic 
legal principles. 6. Adding to (4) and (5) above whatever maqāṣid are relevant to each of the human, 
social and natural sciences, including: (a) divine laws of creation (al-sunan al-ilāhiyyah) relating 
to the topic of the science concerned, and (b) definitive facts which have been identified by science, 
to ensure that the theory applicable to each science is inclusive of all normative and objective 
elements relating thereto. As for the normative elements being referred to here, they include: a) the 
Islamic conceptualization of God, the universe, human beings and life, b) general moral values and 
those specifically applicable to science, c) maqāṣid al-Sharī’a specific to science, and d) Islamic 
legal principles which pertain to [human] action.”320 
ʻAṭīya proposes to employ the new classification and methodology highlighted in a number 
of ways, notably codification. Codification, argues ʻAṭīya, can conducted in three phases. The first 
phase is the study of Muslims’ life circumstances to identify their needs, customs and the problems 
they encounter. This will differ from one country to another, therefore, legislators are encountered 
with two choices: “first alternative consists in working to pass standardized legislation which 
applies to all Islamic countries, while the second is simply to establish broad guidelines in 
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conformity with which laws may differ from one country to another. Arab states have tried the 
first alternative – that of standardized legislation – in the area of personal status laws, as well as in 
civil, commercial and penal laws; however, they have yet to achieve the actual standardization of 
any of these laws. As for the other alternative, it has been adopted by the European Union, which 
has succeeded in bridging the gaps among its various laws within the parameters set by broad 
guidelines (known as ‘directives’) issued by the organization’s joint bodies. This process has led 
to the emergence of what is termed European Law, which is not, in reality, a standardized law but, 
rather, a set of criteria and directives for each branch such that each European state commits itself 
to amending its laws in conformity with these criteria.”321 The second phase includes choosing one 
of the two alternatives. The third phase involves drafting the rulings chosen in the form of laws in 
order to be applied within the system prevalent in each country.322 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined two main aspects in ʻAṭīya’s project: ijtihād and maqāṣid. We 
have observed that ʻAṭīya provides an in-depth analysis of the structure and content of modern 
legal structure given his scholarly knowledge in both modern law and Islamic law. We have 
noticed that ʻAṭīya makes certain claims comparable to what scholars of the modern period have 
argued for, including the assumption that gates of ijtihād never closed but differently contends that 
absolute mujtahid (mujtahid muṭlaq) is not an achievable rank and unexpected to re-emerge due 
to the proliferation of technical knowledge in modern society. Hence, this requires a renewal of 
ijtihād in a manner that combines two of the most authoritative sources after Scripture, in Sunni 
tradition: ijtihād and consensus (ijma’). ʻAṭīya contends to integrate collective ijtihād (al-ijtihād 
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al-jamā’ī) into a state institution which will be called “the Ijtihād Institution.” The Ijtihād 
Institution will be responsible for legislation and codification, and we have highlighted the process, 
scope and approach for the Institution. The Institution will operate in accordance with the new 
classification for maqāṣid.  Maqāṣid will function as the public policies required for a complete 
juristic system that legislate based on Sharia and prioritizes the public interest. 
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Conclusions 
In his book, The impossible state: Islam, politics, and modernity's moral predicament, as well as 
in other publications, Hallaq presents the argument of how Sharia is not a legal tradition that is 
assimilable to the modern nation-state, as he argues. “The Islamic state, judged by any standard 
definition of what the modern state represents, is both an impossibility and a contradiction in 
terms.”323 In a different place, we find that Hallaq sets forth the required criteria that any attempt 
to implement Sharia should consider: “[i]ntegral to any conception of Sharī’a is a theoretical, 
methodological and, perhaps, hermeneutical system that is expected by modern Muslim 
intellectuals to underlie the means by which legal and norms and rules are to be derived.”324 I 
concur that there is a need to provide a fresh and a comprehensive model that combines theoretical, 
methodological and hermeneutical elements to synthesize Sharia into the institutional fabric of the 
modern nation-state without compromising the nature of Sharia or being in conflict with the 
modern structure. As Jackson puts it, “the basic structure of the nation-state has emerged as a 
veritable grundnorm of modern Muslim politics” and it has become an integral part of reality, thus 
Muslims scholars and intellectuals have become invested in “rendering Shari‘ah more adaptable 
to the norms and dictates of the nation-state, along with its putatively inextricable trappings (viz., 
democracy, human rights, monopoly over law) or to pointing out its utter incompatibility with the 
latter.”325 Jackson proceeds to argue that attention should be directed towards the basic structure 
of the nation-state and “the extent to which it might promote its own set of problems for an Islamic 
politics, independent of and perhaps only compounded by any commitment to Shari‘ah per se.”326 
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Jackson’s statement about being cognizant of the constituent elements of the modern nation-state 
is a significant point for this thesis in evaluating Sharia codification and restructuring, as far as the 
legislative and codification processes are concerned. 
 In this thesis we have examined the different approaches or applications of Sharia, which 
included three main attempts: relying on codification, expanding on traditional heritage and 
integrating the modern and the traditional in the works of ʻAṭīya. We argued that each of these 
attempts provide a unique perspective into Sharia application, but, as Jackson and Hallaq implied, 
a viable proposal should exhibit an understanding of the specificities of the legal structure of the 
nation-state, on the one hand, and remodel the traditional sciences in a way that preserves the 
essence of Sharia. Hence, in the first chapter, we have explored the challenges and limitations 
inherent in Sharia codification projects. I argued that each of the codification projects evaluated 
fell short in various aspects such as using fiqh jargon, lack of a facilitating section (general 
principles) that aids the judiciary in performing their duties. These are quintessential features to 
the success of modern laws. In other words, these limitations are concerned with content and 
structure which render the codified Sharia a poor imitation of either the common law or civil law. 
 In the second chapter, I reviewed the concept of ijtihād and highlighted its role and function 
in early and modern periods. I examined the main prerequisites for conducting ijtihād and the main 
trends of practicing ijtihād to situate ʻAṭīya and his renewal model on the spectrum of tajdīd. Then 
the chapter proceeds to investigate a number of scholars who attempt different methodologies for 
integrating ijtihād into the legal structure of the modern nation-state through different legal tools: 
maṣlaḥa, qiyās and ijmāʿ. We notice that ʻAṭīya draws on some of their works. For instance, he 
emphasizes the concept of ijmāʿ in a manner that exhibits resemblance to Iqbal’s integration of 
ijmāʿ and Shura, but ʻAṭīya’s concept is more nuanced. Iqbal’s Shura that is based on ijmāʿ and 
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takes the form of a parliament whose members are selected by the Umma. Such council will draft 
the laws based on Sharia but the whole Umma will take part in deciding their enforcement. While 
ʻAṭīya’s concept is a legislating council that will be responsible for drafting Islamic-based laws 
and supervises the legislature of any bylaws or regulations to ensure their compatibility with 
Sharia. While ʻAṭīya concentrates on the general function and role of the Ijtihād Institution and its 
relationship with judiciary and executive bodies, we find Iqbal focuses on the selection of the 
members of the Shura council and prerequisites that they should exhibit.  
 In the third chapter, we examine ʻAṭīya’s project for ijtihād and maqāṣid. I discussed the 
ways in which ʻAṭīya’s model aspires to establish a balance between codification as a requirement 
for legal centrality of the nation-state and flexibility of ijtihād through the Ijtihād Institution. The 
significance of ʻAṭīya model lies in that it does not threaten the authority of the state nor does it 
compromise the essence of Sharia. I argued that ʻAṭīya’s contributions may not have provided a 
solution to the seeminly antithetical entities: Sharia and nation-state, but he called our attention to 
key points that may lead the discussion on future projects. ʻ Aṭīya proposed a state institution based 
on the concept of ijtihād and highlighted its connection to judiciary and executive bodies. 
Furthermore, ʻAṭīya suggested a new classification of maqāṣid in hope to develop a complete 
juristic system. These proposals attempt to respond to the legal aspect of the nation-state and the 
basis for legislature and morality.  
  
 125
Bibliography 
Abdul Rahim, Adibah, and Anita Abdul Rahim, A Study on Muhammad Iqbal’s Framework of Ijtihad, 2014, XXXVI 
<https://doi.org/10.17576/islamiyyat-2014-3602-01> 
Abou El Fadl, Khaled, Reasoning with God : Reclaiming Shari’ah in the Modern Age (Lanham, Maryland : 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2014) 
Abū Zahra, Muhammad, Uṣūl Al-Fiqh (dar el-fikr el-arabi, 1958) 
Abu Zaid, Wasfy ʻAshour, ‘Jamāl Al-Dīn ʻAṭīyah - A Journey of Contributions and Renewal’, Islam Online 
<https://archive.islamonline.net/?p=374> 
Ahmad, Ziauddin, ‘IQBAL’S CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC POLITY’, Pakistan Horizon, 34.2 (1981), 44–58 
Akgunduz, Ahmed, Introduction to Islamic Law (Istanbul: IUR Press, 2010) 
Al-Maḥmaṣānī, Ṣubḥī Rajab, Falsafat Al-Tashrī [Sic] Fi Al-Islām: The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam 
(Leiden: Brill, 1961) 
Anderson, M.R., Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India, WLUML Occasional Paper (Women 
Living Under Muslim Laws, 1996) <https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=2e-5GwAACAAJ> 
———, Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India, WLUML Occasional Paper (Women Living 
Under Muslim Laws, 1996) <https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=2e-5GwAACAAJ> 
Anghel, Elena, ‘GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW’, Lex et Scientia, xxiii.2 (2016), 120–30 
Ayoub, ‘The Mecelle, Sharia, and the Ottoman State: Fashioning and Refashioning of Islamic Law in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association, 2.1 
(2015), 121 <https://doi.org/10.2979/jottturstuass.2.1.121> 
Ayoub, Samy, ‘We’re Not in Kufa Anymore: The Construction of Late Hanafism in the Early Modern Ottoman 
Empire, 16th - 19th Centuries CE’ (Dissertation (Ph.D.)--University of Arizona, 2014., 2014) 
Bū Khātim, Jamīlah, Al-Tajdīd Fī Uṣūl Al-Fiqh, al-Ṭabʻah al-ʻArabīyah 1. (al-Duqqī, al-Jīzah: al-Duqqī, al-Jīzah : 
Dār al-Fārūq lil-Istithmārāt al-Thaqāfīyah, 2010) 
Christie S. Warren, ‘Istiṣlāḥ’, 2009 <https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780195305135.013.1050> 
Codd, Rachel Anne, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Role of Ijtihad in Legal Reforms in the Muslim World’, Arab Law 
Quarterly, 14.2 (1999), 112–31 <https://doi.org/10.1163/026805599125826354> 
Dainow, Joseph, ‘The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison’, The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 15.3 (1966), 419 <https://doi.org/10.2307/838275> 
Emon, Anver M., Rumee Ahmed, and Syed Adnan Hussain, Anglo-Muhammadan Law (Oxford University Press, 
2017) 
<http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199679010.001.0001/oxfordhb
-9780199679010-e-67> 
Esposito, John L., ‘Fard Al-Kifayah’, 2004 
 126
———, ‘Hadd’, 2004 
———, ‘Islamic Law’, 2004 
———, ‘Qiyas’, 2004 
———, ‘Shawkani, Muhammad Al-’, 2004 
———, ‘Tazir’, 2004 
Esposito, John L., and Emad Eldin Shahin, The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics (New York, NY : Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 
Esposito, John, and John Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
Fareed, Muneer Goolam, Legal Reform in the Muslim World : The Anatomy of a Scholarly Dispute in the 19th 
and the Early 20th Centuries on the Usage of Ijtihād as a Legal Tool (San Francisco: San Francisco : 
Austin & Winfield, 1996) 
Fyzee, Asaf A. A, ‘Muhammadan Law in India’, Comp Stud Soc Hist, 5.4 (1963), 401–15 
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500001821> 
Fyzee, Asaf Ali Asghar, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, 3d ed. (London]: London : Oxford University Press, 
1964) 
al-Ghazzālī, Abū Ḥāmid, Al-Mustaṣfá min ʻilm al-uṣūl, ed. by Aḥmad Zaki Ḥammad (Riyad: Dar Al-Maiman), I 
Giunchi, Elisa, ‘The Reinvention of “Sharīʿa” under the British Raj: In Search of Authenticity and Certainty’, The 
Journal of Asian Studies, 69.4 (2010), 1119–42 
Hallaq, Wael B., An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Cambridge 
Core <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511801044> 
———, Sharīʻa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, UK, 2009) 
———, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012), nlebk 
<http://ezproxy.library.arizona.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=nlebk&AN=619713&site=ehost-live> 
———, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament, Paperback edition (New York, 
NY: Columbia University Press, 2014) 
———, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 2005 
———, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, UK, 2005) 
———, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16.1 (1984), 3–41 
Hill, Enid, ‘Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of ’Abd 
Al-Razzaq Ahmad Al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971’, Arab Law Quarterly, 3.1 
(1988), 33–64 <https://doi.org/10.2307/3381741> 
 127
———, ‘Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of ’Abd 
Al-Razzaq Ahmad Al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971 [Part II]’, Arab Law Quarterly, 
3.2 (1988), 182 <https://doi.org/10.2307/3381872> 
Hourani, Albert, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge 
Cambridgeshire, 1983) 
ʻAṭīyah, Jamāl al-Dīn, Al-Naẓariyah Al-ʿammah Lil-Shariʿah Al-Islamiyah, 1st edn (Matbaʿet Al-Madina Al-
Munawarah, 1988) 
———, Al-Wāqiʻ Wa-Al-Mithāl Fī Al-Fikr Al-Islāmī Al-Muʻāṣir, 1st edn (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2001) 
———, Naḥwa Tafʿīl Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿa (Damascus - Syria: Dar al-Fikr, 2001) 
———, Towards Realization of the Higher Objectives of Islamic Law. Maqāṣid AlSharīʿa: A Functional 
Approach., trans. by Nancy Roberts, 2nd edn (London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 
2007) 
ʻAṭīyah, Jamāl al-Dīn, and Wahbah Al-Zuhayli, Tajdīd Al-Fiqh Al-Islami, 1st edn (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Muasir, 
2000) 
ʻAṭīyah, Jamal Eldin, ‘Tajdīd Al-Fikr Al-Ijtihādi’, Majallat Al-Muslim Al-Muʻāsir, 96, 2000, 31–50 
Ibrahim, Yasir S., ‘Rashīd Riḍā and Maqāṣid Al-Sharī’a’, Studia Islamica, 102/103, 2006, 157–98 
Jackson, Sherman A., Islamic Reform between Islamic Law and the Nation-State (Oxford University Press, 
2013) <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195395891.013.004> 
John L. Esposito, Emad El-Din Shahin, and Peter Woodward, ‘Hasan Al-Turabi’, 2013 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195395891.013.0029> 
Kamali, Mohamad Hashim, ‘Siyasa Shar’īyya or the Policies of Islamic Government’, American Journal of 
Islamic Social Sciences, 6.1 (1989), 59–80 
Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, ‘Issues in the Legal Theory of Uṣūl and Prospects for Reform’, Islamic Studies, 
40.1 (2001), 5–23 
———, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2011, /z-wcorg/ 
KARČIĆ, FIKRET, ‘Applying the Sharī’ah in Modern Societies: Main Developments and Issues’, Islamic Studies, 
40.2 (2001), 207–26 
Kazemi-Moussavi, Ahmad, ‘Modern Intellectual Approaches to Islamic Law’, Islam and Civilisational Renewal, 
1.3 (2010), 474 
Kerr, Malcolm H, Islamic Reform (Berkeley: Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966) 
Khadduri, Majid, ‘THE “MASLAHA” (PUBLIC INTEREST) AND“ 'ILLA” (CAUSE) IN ISLAMIC LAW’, New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, 12.2 (1979), 213 
Khadduri, Majid, and Herbert J. Liebesny, ‘The Majalla’, Law in the Middle East, 1955, 292–308 
Khalaf, Abdulwahab, ʿilm Uṣūl Al-Fiqh Wa Khulaṣat Al-Tashrīʿ Al-Islāmī., 7th edn (Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi) 
 128
Lauzière, Henri, and Henri Lauzière, The Making of Salafism : Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century (New 
York : Columbia University Press, 2016) 
Layish, Aharon, ‘The Transformation of the Sharīʿa from Jurists’ Law to Statutory Law in the Contemporary 
Muslim World’, Die Welt Des Islams, 44.1 (2004), 85–113 
<https://doi.org/10.1163/157006004773712587> 
Majmaʻ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmīyah. Lajnah al-Taḥḍīrīyah li-Taqnīn al-Sharīʻah al-Islāmīyah, Mashrūʻ Taqnīn Al-
Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá Madhhab Al-Imām Abu Ḥanīfa., Taqnīn Al-Sharīʻah Al-Islāmīyah ʻalá 
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